World Geostrategic Insights interview with Daniel Morales Ruvalcaba on the World Power Index (WPI), a multidimensional tool that analyzes national power through material and immaterial capabilities, exploring its applications to AI and geopolitical shifts, as well as the global redistribution of power, and current structural changes within both the Global North and Global South that extend far beyond simple US-China polarization.
Daniel Morales Ruvalcaba is a Mexican scholar of International Relations whose research has contributed to developing new approaches to the study of power and geopolitics. He is an Associate Professor at Sun Yat-sen University (China) and creator of the World Power Index, a multidimensional framework for measuring national power that has given rise to an international research agenda and numerous publications with leading academic publishers and journals, including Springer, Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, Taylor & Francis, and Palgrave Macmillan.
He holds a PhD in Social Sciences from the University of Guadalajara. He previously served as a tenured professor at ITESO and was a member of Mexico’s National System of Researchers. Throughout his academic career, he has conducted research and taught in Mexico, Spain, China, Uruguay, France, and Poland. He is also the co-editor of two Springer books on national power and global power shifts.
Q1 – Dr. Morales Ruvalcaba, you are the creator of the World Power Index (WPI), a multidimensional statistical indicator that quantitatively measures the national power of states by integrating material, semi-material, and immaterial capabilities. Based on the latest WPI data, how is the growing polarization between the United States and China reshaping the upper echelons of the international power geostructure?
A1 – I wouldn’t describe the central transformation simply as a growing polarization between the United States and China. From the perspective of the WPI, the most significant process is the simultaneous realignment of power within the so-called Global North and Global South. China’s rise is undoubtedly the most important, but it is part of a broader and highly unequal redistribution of national power.
The Global North continues to maintain global preeminence, but its leading countries show stagnation or relative decline. The United States remains the world’s leading power, but its room for maneuver has been reduced. Japan presents the clearest trajectory of relative decline, while several Western European powers have also lost some of their former advantage.
At the same time, there is an increase in power among countries of the Global South, although the WPI clarifies that this rise is not uniform. Power is increasingly concentrated around the so-called BRICS and a smaller group of regional powers, but many states in Africa, Central America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific have also experienced stagnation or decline.
The result, therefore, is more complex than a simple polarization between the United States and China. We observe increased competition at the top, but also internal differentiation in both the North and the South. The emerging configuration combines elements of bipolar competition, multipolar expansion, and persistent global inequality.
Q2 – Given the rapid evolution of modern conflicts, how does the WPI quantify and translate intangible yet decisive factors—such as technological sovereignty, the development of artificial intelligence, and supply chain security—into stable mathematical variables?
A1 – The WPI is particularly well-suited for studying these transformations because, over a decade ago, it was conceived as a multidimensional instrument for analyzing national power. Its purpose was never to capture fleeting events, but rather to measure the relatively stable capabilities that enable states to adapt to a constantly changing international environment. This is precisely why the index remains useful in the face of such recent phenomena as artificial intelligence, technological sovereignty, and supply chain security.
The key lies in avoiding the inclusion of every new international phenomenon as an independent variable simply because it has gained relevance. Instead, it is necessary to first translate such phenomena into stable, comparable national capabilities that hold theoretical significance. The chapter New Perspectives on National-International Power: A Theoretical, Methodological, and Technical Review proposes a framework for identifying, operationalizing, and integrating new dimensions of national power without compromising the WPI’s theoretical and methodological coherence. Artificial intelligence serves as a prime example of this process: rather than an isolated variable, it represents an ecosystem underpinned by previously accumulated capabilities—such as research and development, scientific output, education, communications infrastructure, and productive capacity.
This is precisely the evolution reflected in our new book, Quantitative Approaches to Global Power. For over a decade, the WPI has been tested not only through comparisons between states and regions but also in fields such as health, ecology, global public goods, and sports. In this new volume, Germán Patiño Orozco develops a specific application of that framework to the study of artificial intelligence, showing how technological leadership can be analyzed based on the accumulation of national capabilities—an aspect that the WPI allows to be studied systematically.
Q3 – Your academic work reveals a clear analytical distinction between a country’s national power (as measured by the WPI) and its position within the global geostructure. Based on your data, which countries today show the greatest gap between their theoretical potential for overall national power and their actual position or influence within the world geostructure?
A3 – In our theoretical approach, national-international power and geostructural position are analytically distinct, but not disconnected. National-international power constitutes the basis of a state’s position within the international geostructure. The WPI allows us to identify the configuration and evolution of each country’s capabilities and, by comparing them with other states, to situate it within the geostructure.
For this reason, categories such as world powers, middle powers, regional powers, or subregional powers are not interchangeable. Each corresponds to a specific theoretical and methodological position. Therefore, it is advisable to be cautious when speaking of a gap between a country’s “theoretical power” and its “actual position”, since in our research agenda, the position itself is derived from the relational measurement of power.
A more useful distinction is that between geostructural position and effective influence. Position conditions what a state can do, but it does not automatically determine diplomatic outcomes. Public policies, institutional quality, strategic ability, and diplomacy can either broaden or limit the international projection of available capabilities. Countries like India, Brazil, or Mexico may possess significant national power, but their influence varies enormously depending on the region, international organizations, and their diplomacy. In short, the international geostructure conditions, but does not determine, the international behavior of states. Agency remains fundamental, which is why public policies and foreign policy occupy a central place in our trans-structural approach.
Q4 – We are witnessing a significant fragmentation of traditional multilateral institutions. Do you believe we are moving toward a fully regionalized and fragmented global order or toward a new, well-defined form of bipolar global architecture?
A4 – From my perspective, the concept that best describes the current situation is that of a hegemonic interregnum. An interregnum arises when the existing order progressively loses its capacity to coordinate the international system, while a new hegemony capable of stably articulating the distribution of power, political leadership, and international consensus has not yet emerged. This is a stage characterized by high uncertainty, more intense competition among the main actors, and the coexistence of multiple initiatives to influence the evolution of the system, none of which manages to become the new organizing principle of the international order.
From this perspective, the fragmentation of multilateralism does not constitute a new international order, but rather one of the main manifestations of the interregnum itself. As the coordinating capacity of the institutions inherited from the period of US dominance weakens, flexible coalitions, alternative cooperation mechanisms, and initiatives driven by various actors proliferate. However, this proliferation of proposals does not produce a new synthesis, but rather a more fragmented international governance, where various states attempt to expand their room for maneuver without any hegemonic articulation capable of integrating these initiatives into a common project.
The same is true of regionalism. During an interregnum, regional mechanisms become more relevant because they can partially compensate for the coordination difficulties of the international system. However, their effectiveness does not depend solely on political will or the strength of their institutions. My research shows that it also depends on the configuration of power within each region: how national capacities are distributed, the degree of stability of their hierarchies, and the capacity of states to transform that power into collective articulation and resilience. In other words, regionalism does not replace the international order; it constitutes a partial response to the interregnum whose effectiveness is conditioned by the power dynamics that sustain each region.
Q5 – The expansion of the BRICS bloc has redefined the political weight of the Global South. Is this expansion translating into an effective alternative institutional power capable of challenging the West, or does it risk diluting the group’s internal cohesion and strategic alignment?
A5 – I believe that the BRICS function, above all, as a catalyst for the Global South. Their importance does not necessarily lie in immediately becoming a homogeneous organization or an alliance comparable to Western institutions. Their main function has been to accelerate coordination among emerging powers, expand South-South cooperation, and challenge the historical concentration of decision-making in the G7 and in institutions dominated by the Global North.
Now, the expansion of the BRICS forum has certainly increased its economic and geopolitical weight, but it has also This has added greater complexity to harmonizing their interests, trajectories, and priorities. This can hinder strategic coordination, although it does not necessarily weaken the group, since the BRICS have never depended on ideological or civilizational alignment: their cohesion stems from more concrete shared objectives such as reforming global governance, expanding autonomy, and reducing dependencies.
Therefore, I do not see them as a bloc destined to replace the West, but as a platform that accelerates the institutional redistribution of power and expands the scope of action of the Global South.
Q6 – From your privileged research position at Sun Yat-sen University in China, how do you assess the current strategic stance of Latin American countries in the face of geopolitical pressure to choose between Beijing’s economic influence and Washington’s historical influence?
A6 – It is true. As a Mexican—from a country located in North America yet inseparable from Latin America from historical, cultural, and political perspectives—I feel very fortunate to pursue my academic work in Zhuhai, the only city in mainland China with land connections to both Hong Kong and Macau. This privileged location—in the heart of the Greater Bay Area, one of the world’s most dynamic economic regions, and one with a long tradition of ties to Latin America—has allowed me to observe the evolution of Chinese foreign policy up close and constantly compare it with my research on Latin America.
In this sense, I do not consider that Latin America is forced to choose between China and the United States. This formulation assumes that both powers relate to the region under the same logic, when in reality their strategies are different.
My research with the WPI shows that Chinese policy toward Latin America is primarily driven by pragmatic criteria: Beijing tends to prioritize countries with greater national power and better geostructural positioning, because these offer the greatest capacity for economic and political integration. This dynamic can be observed in Latin America in general, as well as in relations between China and CARICOM.
The United States, especially during the Trump administration, has incorporated a much more visible ideological component into its hemispheric policy, prioritizing cooperation mechanisms with politically aligned governments and increasing the cost of non-alignment.
This difference is important because it shows that the two powers’ approaches to Latin America do not follow the same rules. As a result, Latin American countries’ strategies of international engagement do not follow a single pattern, but are shaped by the interaction between their own national capabilities and the logic according to which each of these powers operates.
Q7 – Your research focuses heavily on South-South cooperation. Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America creating a genuine strategic partnership of equals, or is it reproducing the old patterns of asymmetric dependence that the region has historically experienced with the West?
A7 – Currently, I observe competition among three major global initiatives: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), initially promoted by the G7, and the European Union’s Global Gateway. Their trajectories, however, have diverged. So far, the BRI has maintained the broadest international reach and generated the most visible impact across the Global South, both in terms of investment volumes and the breadth of its presence in regions such as Latin America. While the Global Gateway has preserved greater institutional continuity under the European Union, the PGII has lost much of its political momentum since 2025. Together, they remain relevant alternatives, but neither has yet achieved a level of international consolidation comparable to that of the BRI.
From the perspective of the hegemonic interregnum, these initiatives are not simply international cooperation programs. They represent different projects to expand the political, economic, and regulatory influence of their promoters during a period in which no actor possesses the capacity to articulate the international system. Rather than a confrontation between ideological models, we observe a competition among global initiatives that offer different forms of financing, infrastructure, connectivity, development, and governance to attract partners and strengthen positions within the international geostructure.
In this context, the relationship between Latin American and competing global initiatives is better understood as a process of strategic interaction under conditions of asymmetry. During the current hegemonic interregnum, the proliferation of global initiatives has expanded the range of external options available to the Global South countries. Consequently, their patterns of international engagement no longer follow a single logic of external alignment. Instead, they reflect the interaction between each country’s national capabilities, the opportunities offered by competing initiatives, and the strategic priorities pursued by national governments.
Q8 – As a specialist in Mexican foreign policy, how do you assess the country’s strategic position in the current context of nearshoring and trade tensions between the United States and China? Does Mexico risk being squeezed between the two giants, or can it act as a strategic bridge?
A8 – Mexico possesses exceptional advantages due to its proximity to the US, its manufacturing base, and its extensive network of trade agreements. However, nearshoring does not automatically transform the country into a strategic player. The deeper problem is that Mexico is a stagnant regional power. WPI data show that, after an upward trajectory, its national power lost momentum during the 21st century and became part of the new Latin American cycle of stagnation and setbacks.
In addition, during Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s presidency, Mexico’s international profile became noticeably less active. Throughout his six-year term, he did not make a single official visit to China, the first Mexican president not to do so since diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China were established in 1972. He made no official visits to any European country, did not personally attend any G20 Summit, any Summit of the Americas, any Pacific Alliance Summit (despite Mexico being a founding member), or any Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government.
Therefore, the main risk for Mexico is not being caught between Washington and Beijing, but rather lacking a strategic vision to capitalize on that competition. Mexico needs to regain diplomatic initiative, diversify its partners, and leverage its geographic position as a bi-oceanic and bi-regional country. Only then can it act as a facilitator; otherwise, it will remain a production platform subordinate to external decisions.
Q9 – Looking ahead to the end of this decade, do you believe that geopolitical competition will be fought primarily through economic and technological wars (such as control over semiconductors and rare earth elements), or will traditional military force once again become the main arbiter of the global power structure?
A9 – As I mentioned, we are going through a hegemonic interregnum: a period in which the former hegemonic power has lost the capacity to order the system, but a new hegemony capable of assuming that role has not yet emerged. Historically, interregnums have been characterized by maximum uncertainty, intense competition, redefinition of alliances, confrontation between development models, and geocultural rivalry.
Previous interregnums lasted approximately four decades. If the current one began around 2008, by 2026 we would barely be halfway through. However, this historical comparison has its limitations, especially regarding its eventual resolution.
Following Immanuel Wallerstein, we must consider the possibility that the current hegemonic interregnum unfolds within a terminal crisis of the capitalist world-system. Furthermore, as Norberto Bobbio warned, nuclear proliferation makes a classic world war as a mechanism for resolving the struggle for dominance hardly conceivable.
Therefore, the outcome remains open. The central question is no longer which state will replace another at the apex of the international system, but whether humanity is heading toward a more pluralistic configuration of power or even a deeper transformation of the international system itself. Precisely because of this uncertainty, I believe that the notion of hegemonic transition is insufficient for understanding the current moment, since it presupposes that the process will culminate in the replacement of one power by another. In contrast, the concept of hegemonic interregnum offers a broader analytical framework because it allows us to study this historical phase without anticipating its outcome.
Rather than trying to predict the order that will emerge in the coming decades, I consider it essential to understand the dynamics of this historical period and the conditions that will make possible—or prevent—the emergence of a new international order.
Q10 – Today, large technology corporations, satellite infrastructure providers, and artificial intelligence giants wield economic power and influence greater than that of many states. How can international relations theory incorporate these non-state actors into its assessment of the geostructure of power?
A10 – Large technology companies, digital platforms, and satellite infrastructure providers have acquired unprecedented influence. However, this does not mean they have replaced states as the primary unit of analysis in international relations. Rather, it compels us to understand how national power and the power of non-state actors reinforce each other.
With the help of the WPI, several authors have managed to analyze new manifestations of power without abandoning the State as an analytical reference point: Germán Patiño Orozco demonstrates that leadership in artificial intelligence is closely linked to national ecosystems of innovation and the accumulation of national capabilities; Daniel Tomić examines how contemporary economic power transcends traditional indicators while remaining conditioned by national power; while Carlos Pulleiro Méndez and Nadim Nassif demonstrate that the global success of elite sport cannot be understood solely through international sports organizations or individual actors, but must also be explained by the national capabilities that enable sustained sporting performance.
This perspective is also supported by recent research such as that of Gregg Murray and colleagues on cyber interference in electoral processes, incorporating WPI as one of the most relevant explanatory variables in the analysis. Their analysis shows that countries with greater national power are precisely those most likely to become strategic targets of cyber operations, confirming that new forms of technological competition do not replace geopolitics, but rather develop within it.
Taken together, these studies show that the challenge is not to replace the state as the unit of analysis, but to understand how it interacts with non-state actors to produce new forms of power. The WPI provides precisely a theoretical and empirical basis for studying these relationships.
Q11 – In your recently published book, “Quantitative Approaches to Global Power” (Springer, 2026), you delve deeper into the study of national power and further develop the World Power Index through a wide range of applications and dimensions. Could you outline the key concepts of the book here?
A11 – Over a decade ago, the WPI was born from a seemingly simple question: how to transform the concept of national power into an object of study that can be rigorously measured, compared, and analyzed across states and over time? Quantitative Approaches to Global Power marks an important point in that evolution. It does not simply represent a new measurement, but shows how quantitative methods can strengthen the dialogue between theory and empirical evidence to broaden our understanding of international relations.
The starting point of this work is found in National Power and International Geostructure (Springer 2024), where we developed the theory of national-international power, the concept of geostructure, and the methodological principles that support the WPI. The new volume of 2026 represents the next stage of that research program: it demonstrates that the WPI not only allows us to measure national power, but also to analyze how it influences very different international phenomena.
To this end, the book proceeds in two complementary directions. On the one hand, it deepens the theoretical, methodological, and technical understanding of national power as a multidimensional, relational, and dynamic phenomenon. On the other hand, it tests this analytical framework by applying it to concrete problems in International Relations, such as global public goods, health, artificial intelligence, ecology and sport, among others.
In this regard, the main contribution of Quantitative Approaches to Global Power is to demonstrate that the WPI has evolved far beyond a measurement tool. Today, it constitutes an analytical framework for the systematic study of national power across a wide range of international phenomena. In other words, it provides a common analytical foundation for engaging with other theories, incorporating new dimensions of analysis, and advancing an open, cumulative, and multidisciplinary international research agenda.
Daniel Morales Ruvalcaba – Mexican scholar of International Relations, Associate Professor at Sun Yat-sen University (China) and creator of the World Power Index.