The notion of hegemony is directly linked to the acceptance by a substantial part of the international community of a position of undisputed leadership. According to the classical definition of Antonio Gramsci the essence of hegemony entails the capacity to define the terms of a shared agenda. This, by its own nature, implies the recognition by others to a position of leadership. (Fogacs, 2001).
America’s Hegemonic Power
America’s hegemonic power rested, precisely, in the recognition by a substantial part of the international community of a position of leadership. That is, of the capacity for defining the terms of a shared agenda. Under Trump, and as result of his tariffs, bullying, threats, insults, incoherence, contradictions, and transactional approach to foreign policy, recognition in the U.S.’ entitlement to leadership is fading away rapidly.
According to a June 2026 Pew Research published survey, only 35% of respondents across 36 countries, essentially those where the U.S. had been a reliable partner, still view it as such. Meanwhile, only 23% expressed confidence in Trump. (Pew Research Center, 2026). With numbers like these, it is simply impossible to sustain a hegemonic standing.
What is significant, however, is that with the valiant exception of Carney’s Canada, American allies are not directly confronting Trump, but quietly taking the carpet under his feet. That is, creating alternative mechanisms where the U.S.’ leadership becomes less and less necessary. Or put it in another way, learning to live without such leadership. This entails alliances within alliances, strategic partnerships, regional defense networks, and economic diversification.
Little by little, the U.S. is ceasing to be an indispensable partner. This, needless to say, is a road that leads the United States into becoming just one more country. Powerful no doubt about it, but by no means essential. Examples in this regard abound.
Europe
Within Europe several of such mechanisms have come to fruition. The European Union Readiness 2030 Initiative aims to mobilize 800 billion euros for European autonomous defense. This includes a 150 billion euros tag for the so-called SAFE instrument, which aims at joint procurement and strengthening of European weapons capability, thus reducing reliance on American weapons systems. (European Union External Action, 2026). However, jointly with this initiative a proliferation of smaller defense groupings is taking shape.
The former includes a Franco-German nuclear steering group under which the French nuclear umbrella is extended upon Germany. A British and French so-called Lancaster House framework, that commits both nuclear powers to a substantially deeper defense cooperation. Bilateral “embedded alliances” between the U.K., France, Germany and Poland. The so-called Nordic-Baltic Eight, a joint security mechanism that includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) that includes the first five of the previously mentioned countries. A Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) that represents a British led coalition which, besides including the members of the Nordic-Baltic Eight, also counts with the Netherlands. And so on. Interestingly, all of this is outside NATO’s direct purview and, by extension, of America’s supervision. (European Commission, 2026; Élisée, 2026; Feng & Zhengyang, 2026; NORDEFCO, 2026; FIIA65, 20026; GOV UK, 2026).
Canada
At the other side of the Atlantic, Canada has been rather busy in trying to circumvent the abrasiveness of its Southern neighbour. This has included actions such as the following.
Firstly, becoming the only non-European country participating in the EU 150 billion euros SAFE defense instrument for joint weapons procurement.
Secondly, a Canada-Japan Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that encompasses defense, intelligence, economic security, supply chains, technology and energy issues.
Thirdly, a strategic partnership between Canada and the United Kingdom is currently being established, covering the sectors of defense, critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, investment, and trade.
Fourthly, a Canada-Australia Strategic Partnership that includes structural military cooperation, a critical minerals production alliance (including the combination of public financial tools to support critical mineral projects), a Clean Energy Partnership and AI combined development. (Government of Canada, 2026; Prime Minister of Canada, 2025; Prime Minister of Canada, February, 2026; Prime Minister of Canada, March 5, 2026; Prime Minister of Canada, March 6, 2026). The fact that the U.K., Japan, Australia and Canada, that is, four of the five more consequential allies of the United States are hedging against it, speak volumes.
The Indo-Pacific
Within the Indo-Pacific, countries such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and India, still maintain their deference towards the United States. However, they are rapidly building bilateral and minilateral agreements independently from Washington and with the clear intention of “derisking” against its increasingly unreliability. A clear example of it is the Australia-Japan agreement that establishes mechanisms for greater military integration and interoperability. This includes intelligence sharing, co-development of weapons systems, missile testing, laser weapons, among others. Meanwhile, Australia has also developed a Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union, which covers areas such as defense industry, cyber, maritime security and so on. (Australian Government, August, 2026; Australian Government, March 2026).
Simultaneously, as previously seen, Japan and Canada signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. On the other hand, overcoming huge historical mistrust, Japan and South Korea have been developing a significant security partnership with emphasis in defense cooperation. India, on its side, on top of diversifying from excessive dependence on the United States through its close relations with Russia and China, signed a formal Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union. The latter covers maritime security, cyber, counterterrorism and broader defense cooperation. (Reuters, 2026; Carnegie, 2026). Again, hedging and “derisking” in relation to Washington seems to be the nature of the game.
The Middle East
The Middle East, as well, is involved in the same game. The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Türkiye Pact, however, goes even further than some of the previously mentioned strategic partnerships and agreements, reproducing its own version of NATO’s Article 5. According to it, an armed attack against any of the three of them is to be regarded as an attack against the three. However, it has been argued that this pact would also create a defense industries’ ecosystem, involving joint investments in weapons production. (Breaking Defense, 2026). The fact that these three countries feel the need to go to such an extent to protect themselves, says much about the untrustworthiness that they assign to their common privileged ally – the United States.
Highway and Secondary Roads
According to neurology, in the aging brain the “highways” connections are replaced by “secondary roads”. Indeed, aging tends to reduce the integrity and efficiency of some long-range connections within it, which the brain can then compensate by recruiting alternative connections. In geopolitical terms this could translate into the following formulation – An international system whose principal highways are being obstructed does not necessarily collapse. It simply becomes more dependent on a dense network of alternative routes.
The obstruction of the American highway is thus being progressively replaced by a functioning network of secondary roads. In the end, the big loser will be the United States, whose hegemonic standing would have been frivolously squandered from within.
Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD – Retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton University. He is currently an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
(The opinions expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).