1 – Bypassing the Gold Standard: Strategic Logic Behind the U.S.-Saudi 123 Agreement
On July 22, the Donald Trump administration concluded a pivotal bilateral civil nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Strikingly, this agreement was reached without requiring Riyadh to adopt what non-proliferation scholars have long regarded as the “gold standard”: an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) granting full-spectrum verification and safeguards.
Western mainstream media immediately decried the deal as a grave failure, warning that omitting these guardrails creates a perilous loophole for indigenous Saudi nuclear weaponization and risks triggering a regional nuclear domino effect.
This anxiety is amplified by a prevailing perception that Washington’s broader Middle East strategy is fundamentally destabilizing. Critics argue that by treating Iran’s persistent nuclear ambitions as an immediate trigger, Washington launched a prolonged “war of choice” rather than a “war of necessity.” In this view, the current 123 Agreement represents an unprecedented strategic blunder—granting Riyadh latent enrichment capabilities that conventional American diplomacy would have vigorously blocked. Yet, a closer examination reveals that evaluating this agreement purely through the traditional framework of multilateral non-proliferation misinterprets its strategic imperative.
The 30-year civil nuclear framework enables American firms—led by Westinghouse—to construct civilian reactors and conduct feasibility studies for U.S.-built, “black-box” uranium enrichment technology in the Kingdom. However, unlike standard international nuclear transfers, the deal relies on U.S. national safeguards rather than the full inspection regime of the IAEA Additional Protocol.
2 – Shift to Dynamic Risk Management: Countering Eurasian Realignment
The structural divergence of this strategy becomes remarkably clear when contrasted with the landmark 2009 U.S.–UAE 123 Agreement. The 2009 pact with Abu Dhabi was engineered for total risk elimination. Under that framework, the UAE legally foreswore domestic uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing, pledging to maintain this prohibition into the indefinite future. Furthermore, it accepted strict IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards alongside the Additional Protocol, complete with automatic enforcement mechanisms that mandate the immediate suspension of nuclear assistance and the return of supplied materials in the event of non-compliance.
In contrast, the new agreement with Saudi Arabia shifts from absolute risk elimination to dynamic risk management. Rather than imposing a permanent ban, the U.S.-Saudi framework permits U.S.-controlled “black-box” technology and feasibility studies under bilateral American oversight rather than multilateral IAEA inspection regimes. Enforcement measures are no longer automatic legal triggers, but are instead transactional—tied to Riyadh’s ongoing security alignment, intelligence coordination, and geopolitical compliance. While non-proliferation traditionalists view this structural pivot as a policy regression and a compromise of non-proliferation norms, demanding rigid adherence to the gold standard was no longer politically or geopolitically viable for Washington, though the deal remains subject to Congressional approval.
Speaking on the sidelines of the ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio explicitly defended the agreement’s timing and rationale, asserting that it directly advances vital U.S. national security interests. Washington was forced to respond to Riyadh’s rapid geopolitical diversification across Eurasia. In December 2022, Saudi Arabia established a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China, cementing deep political, technological, and economic ties with Beijing. This was followed in September 2025 by a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan, which pledged enhanced military cooperation and legally stipulated that an armed attack on one nation would be treated as an attack on the other.
With major powers competing for influence in the Gulf, Washington recognized that demanding strict non-proliferation commitments would simply push Saudi Arabia into commercial and nuclear partnerships with Beijing or Islamabad. Had the U.S. refused to sign a 123 Agreement, Riyadh would have acquired foreign reactors anyway. Consequently, the United States would have surrendered commercial revenues, lost technical oversight over Saudi Arabia’s nuclear research and development, and forfeited crucial diplomatic and military leverage in the region.
3 – Institutional Distrust and Trilateral Deterrence: The Israel-U.S. Security Architecture
Bypassing the IAEA reflects the administration’s broader skepticism toward multilateral institutions and the United Nations system. Washington has adopted a radical policy of strategic disengagement, withholding mandatory financial assessments and withdrawing from key treaties. This posture has destabilized the structural foundations of several international bodies, forcing structural downsizing.
Although Washington has not withdrawn from the IAEA outright, it harbors deep skepticism toward the agency’s capacity to detect or deter covert proliferation. Instead, Washington prioritizes direct national intelligence monitoring, bilateral enforcement, and unilateral military action. This doctrine has been demonstrated in Iran: following Tehran’s refusal to abandon its nuclear program, the U.S. executed intensive 12-day military strikes in June 2025 and launched sustained kinetic operations starting in June 2026.
A primary structural barrier preventing Saudi Arabia from converting civil technology into nuclear weaponry is Israel’s absolute strategic posture. Tel Aviv views the emergence of any new nuclear-armed state in the Middle East as an existential threat that will not be tolerated under any circumstances. In this context, Section 622 of the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2027 (S.4615) institutionalizes and expands permanent intelligence sharing between the United States and Israel. Under this legal mechanism, Israeli military intelligence would receive equal, direct access to operational data regarding Saudi Arabia’s nuclear facilities.
This bilateral intelligence integration completely bypasses the delays inherent in UN Security Council debates or IAEA reporting schedules. If Riyadh attempts to divert technology toward weaponization, Israeli intelligence will identify the shift immediately—enabling rapid military intervention either independently or alongside American forces.
4 – The Abraham Accords Imperative: Structural Hegemony in the Post-Liberal Order
Finally, the implementation of the 123 Agreement is explicitly contingent upon Saudi Arabia accepting the Abraham Accords framework. Originally normalizing relations between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, the Accords dismantled the traditional Arab consensus that made a Palestinian state a mandatory prerequisite for diplomatic recognition.
While Riyadh maintains rhetoric critical of Israeli actions for domestic and regional audience management, it refrains from operational countermoves, quietly building tacit, tactical alignment with Tel Aviv. Formally entering the Abraham Accords forces Saudi Arabia to implicitly accept American and Israeli strategic military dominance in the region. In exchange for civil nuclear technology, security guarantees, and economic integration, Riyadh commits itself to a regional architecture led by Washington and Tel Aviv.
Critiquing the U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear deal based on traditional non-proliferation benchmarks misconstrues contemporary Middle Eastern geopolitics. The liberal international order and the NPT-IAEA regime are fast becoming remnants of an ancien régime.
Under the emerging regional architecture, the deal represents a realistic compromise: Saudi Arabia acquires civil energy and security guarantees; Washington blocks Chinese influence while retaining technical leverage; and Israel maintains qualitative military superiority backed by ready intelligence monitoring. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to develop nuclear weapons not because international law prohibits it, but because the strategic architecture makes weaponization both unnecessary and structurally unviable.
Author: Masahiro Matsumura – Professor of International Politics and National Security at St. Andrew’s University in Osaka (Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku), Japan.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).
Image Source: AFP