By Mirza Abdul Aleem Baig
The revolution in satellite internet is changing the meaning of connectivity, sovereignty and national security. For Pakistan, the challenge is no longer simply whether to welcome Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite operators. It is whether the country possesses the regulatory foresight and institutional capacity to ensure that this emerging technology strengthens national development without creating new vulnerabilities for terrorism, organized crime and national security.
On October 29, 2026, the Pakistan Space Activities Regulatory Board (PSARB) officially codified the Geostationary Orbit (GSO) Communication Satellite Registration Regulations, marking a critical step forward for domestic space governance. These regulations establish a formal registration mechanism for operators providing, or intending to provide, satellite communication capacity and services through GSO systems in Pakistan.
The development represents progress in formalizing space-sector governance. However, an important distinction must not be overlooked. Geostationary satellites and Low Earth Orbit satellite constellations operate through different orbital architectures. Traditional GSO systems occupy an orbit that allows them to appear fixed relative to the Earth, whereas LEO systems rely on large, moving constellations of satellites and interconnected ground infrastructure.
PSARB itself has acknowledged that LEO mega-constellations constitute a relatively new regulatory phenomenon and require a distinct framework for Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit (NGSO) systems. Therefore, the publication of GSO regulations is an important foundation, but it should not be mistaken for the completion of the regulatory framework required for LEO operators.
Pakistan’s next regulatory priority must be to translate its work on NGSO systems into a comprehensive, enforceable framework that addresses both commercial requirements and national-security considerations. The security risks inherent to this technology is no longer theoretical; they pose an immediate threat to digital infrastructure. Commercial satellite communications are increasingly being used by non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, to overcome connectivity limitations in geographically isolated environments.
The United Nations Security Council’s Thirty-eighth Monitoring Team Report, published in August 2026, provides particularly significant evidence. It documents the use of dozens of commercial satellite communication terminals by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization operating in the Sahel region of Africa, to coordinate its units.
The significance of this finding becomes clearer when considered alongside JNIM’s recent activities. On 25 April 2026, the organization participated in a coordinated offensive across several regions of Mali, planned and conducted alongside the Tuareg-majority Azawad Liberation Front. The offensive demonstrated the continuing capacity of armed non-state actors to coordinate activities across geographically dispersed areas.
The UN Monitoring Team subsequently documented the use of commercial satellite communication terminals by JNIM. This is an important warning for the international community. Similarly, investigative reporting by the Associated Press and PBS FRONTLINE has documented Starlink connectivity at online scam compounds operated by transnational criminal networks in Myanmar. An analysis of device and satellite data identified Starlink IP addresses at at-least 13 of 25 additional scam compounds that emerged or expanded after a major crackdown in 2025. These operations have been associated with large-scale online fraud, human trafficking and the exploitation of trafficked workers.
Although these criminal organizations should not be equated with terrorist groups, the example exposes a common regulatory challenge – commercial satellite infrastructure can be repurposed by unlawful non-state actors when accountability and enforcement arrangements are inadequate. It also demonstrates that provider cooperation, legal authority and international coordination matter as much as the technology itself.
For Pakistan, these developments deserve particular attention. The country’s security environment remains challenging, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. According to the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies’ live militancy database, 1,422 militant attacks were recorded through early November 2026. Recent incidents have included attacks on police personnel in Mohmand and Bajaur and continuing counterterrorism operations in Balochistan.
These incidents provide evidence of an ongoing domestic security challenge; there is, however, no verified data linking these particular attacks to satellite services. Nonetheless, potential security concerns extend beyond terrorist communications. Satellite broadband forms part of a wider digital ecosystem and therefore raises questions about data protection, cyber vulnerabilities, unauthorized terminals, supply-chain integrity, service continuity and the jurisdiction governing network operations.
Pakistan should therefore move beyond a regulatory approach focused only on company registration and spectrum allocation. A dedicated NGSO/LEO framework should establish clear requirements for satellite-system authorization, gateway earth stations, authorized user terminals, local corporate accountability and service licensing.
Second, the framework should establish legally grounded procedures for cooperation between satellite operators, PSARB, PTA, the Ministry of Interior and other competent authorities. These should cover security incident reporting, lawful requests for relevant information, cybersecurity compliance and action against demonstrable misuse. Any access to user information or restriction of service must remain subject to Pakistani law, due process, proportionality and appropriate oversight.
Third, Pakistan should establish independent security assessments and continuing compliance reviews covering the satellite network, gateway infrastructure, ground equipment and software supply chain. Clear incident-response arrangements and service-continuity requirements would be particularly important for public institutions and critical infrastructure.
Finally, security regulation must not become an instrument of unnecessary exclusion. Schools, hospitals, disaster-response organizations, legitimate businesses and remote communities should retain access to the benefits of satellite connectivity. The objective must be to identify and address unlawful use rather than impose indiscriminate restrictions.
The publication of the GSO Communication Satellite Registration Regulations is a welcome institutional development. But the real test of Pakistan’s regulatory preparedness will be whether it completes a similarly coherent framework for NGSO/LEO constellations before commercial deployment expands. The two regulatory regimes should be complementary, comprehensive and consistent with Pakistan’s national security requirements and international obligations.
Strategically, Pakistan must neither fear satellite technology nor embrace it without safeguards. The country should welcome global connectivity while ensuring that its digital infrastructure remains accountable to national law and strategic interests. The satellites may operate beyond our territorial boundaries, but the services they provide within Pakistan must remain subject to Pakistani law.
To get down to brass tacks, the objective should be connectivity without vulnerability, innovation without dependency, and technological progress without compromising national security. Pakistan must regulate the future of satellite internet before that future begins to regulate the country. Ultimately, proactive governance today is the only way to secure the digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy of tomorrow.
Author: Mirza Abdul Aleem Baig – President of Strategic Science Advisory Council (SSAC) – Pakistan. He is an independent observer of global dynamics, with a deep interest in the intricate working of techno-geopolitics, exploring how science & technology, international relations, foreign policy and strategic alliances shape the emerging world order.
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).