By Angana Kotokey

    The expansion of digital technologies has fundamentally transformed the nature of political power, communication, and public engagement across the world. 

    Angana Kotokey

    In Pakistan, digitalization has emerged as a space where political legitimacy is contested, narratives are constructed, and power is exercised. Social media, AI, and online networks have altered state-society relations by creating opportunities for political mobilization, dissent, and perception management. Consequently, political power is no longer confined to electoral institutions, parliamentary politics, or conventional media; it increasingly unfolds in the digital sphere.

    This piece argues that digitalization has become a double-edged political instrument in Pakistan. On one hand, it has empowered the PTI and Imran Khan to sustain populist support, challenge state narratives, and maintain political relevance despite repression. 

    Through social media networks, peer-to-peer communication, and AI-driven technologies, PTI has transformed digital platforms into tools of political resistance and virtual activism. On the other hand, the state and military establishment have sought to harness similar technologies to manage perceptions, shape narratives, and consolidate authority. Apparently, digitalization has expanded beyond domestic political competition into Pakistan’s regional and international image-building strategy.

    Digital Populism and Political Resistance: Imran Khan in Pakistan’s Online Sphere

    Pakistan’s digital transformation has been most visible in the rise of PTI and Imran Khan’s populist politics. Digital technologies have enabled political actors to bypass institutions, engage directly with citizens, and sustain popular support under repression—relying significantly on data analytics, social media algorithms, and AI-driven tools. The party remained ahead of its contemporaries in developing peer-to-peer (P2P) communication networks and leveraging virtual media to strengthen PTI’s political brand. Consequently, PTI became widely regarded as a ‘social media party,’ while Imran Khan was initially labelled ‘Facebook Khan’ in the early 2000s.

    Khan’s vision of Tabdeeli [Change] and Naya Pakistan [New Pakistan], focused on breaking the status quo, fighting corruption, establishing an Islamic welfare state, and critiquing the US after 9/11, was popularised through extensive use of Facebook and X (formerly Twitter). PTI’s online outreach garnered support, particularly among youth, while Imranism became associated with his political philosophy. Moreover, technology sustained the very idea of a national ‘crisis’ or ‘existential threat’, framing corruption and cultural globalization as threats requiring immediate change and positioning Imran Khan as the leader capable of addressing them.

    PTI’s bottom-up innovation became significant during the 2024 elections. After the Supreme Court banned its traditional electoral symbol, the cricket bat, PTI and its volunteers used social media to inform voters about PTI-aligned candidates and their symbols. YouTube, TikTok, WhatsApp, and other platforms enabled constituency-level engagement even while the party was virtually blacked out from mainstream media. The party also employed AI during a virtual rally, where jailed Imran Khan addressed supporters through an AI-generated audio clip, followed by a series of AI-created videos that helped maintain his visibility.

    Since his imprisonment, digital platforms and AI have sustained Khan’s populist appeal and transnational presence. His prison number 804 was popularized through TikTok, songs, graffiti, and cricket games. His continued digital visibility has challenged attempts to remove him from political relevance. Therefore, PTI’s technology outreach has been instrumental in preserving populism in the digital age. In response, state attempts to curb his digital footprint, including online monitoring systems such as the Firewall built with Chinese technology, reflect growing efforts to control PTI’s expanding influence.

    The Politics of Digital Terrorism: Dissent, State Authority and Political Control

    The term ‘digital terrorism’ was introduced during the 83rd Formation Commanders Annual Conference at General Headquarters (GHQ) in May 2024. Pakistan Army’s media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), elaborated on the term during the annual conference, stating that “digital terrorism, allegedly perpetrated by those abetted by foreign cohorts, is clearly meant to try to induce despondency in the Pakistani nation, sow discord among national institutions, and the people of Pakistan by peddling blatant lies, fake news, and propaganda.” 

    However, rights activists argue that the term is poorly defined and can apply to criticism of the armed forces online. Meanwhile, scholars have argued that framing opponents or critics as digital terrorists can undermine democracy and weaken counter-terrorism efforts against non-state actors.

    Considering Pakistan’s socio-economic and security-related vulnerabilities, digital terrorism appears to blur the distinction between cybercrime, terrorism, public dissent, criticism, and misinformation. Since Imran Khan’s imprisonment, the growing rift between state and society has been reflected across digital media. PTI has used WhatsApp, YouTube, and TikTok to mobilize public sentiment against new laws and reforms, including Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 

    Both PTI and Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) opposed the operation on grounds of inadequate transparency and fears of displacement. Similarly, the Pakistan Mineral Act generated public debate in Balochistan and KP, where communities viewed the legislation as a threat to provincial autonomy and local rights. Notably, digital platforms amplified these concerns, bringing debates over central control, foreign access, employment opportunities, royalty distribution, and the erosion of provincial autonomy under the 18th Amendment to wider public attention. Consequently, social media has become an important platform for questioning new constitutional reforms and the balance of power between Pakistan’s civilian government and the military. 

    At the same time, disagreements with the federal government over these pressing issues have been increasingly interpreted as anti-army propaganda, allowing political criticism to be treated as a matter of national security. Labelling dissent as digital terrorism therefore seeks to reconfigure political power by eliminating resistance. 

    Meanwhile, with the help of digitalization, the establishment is trying to move away from an inward-looking approach to an outward-oriented one—using online platforms systematically to shift the public focus away from internal problems to external/global issues. However, this trajectory is largely being done through the process of ‘perception management’ in Pakistan.  

    Contesting Digital Narratives: Resistance to Perception Management

    Digital platforms have become vital in creating civic consciousness in questioning government policies. In response to public scrutiny over economic fragility, security challenges, and political disagreements, the civil-military establishment has attempted to create an ‘illusion of success’ around Pakistan’s regional conflicts and its emerging role as a mediator in regional crises.

    • Operation Sindoor: Narrative Warfare and the Politics of Perception

    Digital platforms, including print and virtual media, have been instrumental in redefining the notion of victory, earlier understood primarily through the lens of battlefield defeat of the opposition, and now increasingly constructed around strategic gains, including perception triumph. This was evident after India launched Operation Sindoor in May 2025. 

    The four-day conflict following the Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir saw Pakistan engage in ‘narrative warfare’, shifting attention from battlefield realities towards its nuclear capabilities, missile technology, and air power through perception management. The post-conflict period saw Pakistan rearticulate its nationalist discourse around the ‘defense of national sovereignty in the face of a so-called existential threat’. 

    The conflict also provided an opportunity to divert global attention from domestic challenges, rally public support, and frame New Delhi as the aggressor, while global media coverage emphasized Pakistan’s military resilience. The Pakistani establishment, supported by media and digital platforms, projected an image of military victory through events such as the Day of Gratitude, by paying tribute to the armed forces. Such activities served two objectives—diversion from internal problems and maintaining relevance among international partners. Notably, this glorification sustained an illusion of success, reinforced by reduced media coverage of Imran Khan. 

    • Afghanistan–Pakistan Conflict: Narratives of Fear, Threat and Victimhood

    In an effort to manage perceptions of governance failure, Pakistan’s new psychological warfare is built around the narrative of ‘fear’ and ‘victimhood’. This could be seen in its conflict, especially with Afghanistan, following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021. Scholars have argued that ISPR’s playbook on psychological warfare, aimed at establishing narratives, is played to the goals of the Pakistani government to ensure it is relevant again. 

    This paradigm can be explained through the ‘Open War’ between Afghanistan and Pakistan declared in February 2026. Pakistan’s civil-military leadership has portrayed the country as a victim of external threats, diverting attention from internal problems. Apparently, the leftover U.S. weapons in Afghanistan are now being projected as risks—used by militant groups inside Pakistan against the State. 

    Further, Afghanistan is no longer seen as a country that has been freed (after the US withdrawal, Pakistan initially claimed Kabul had achieved freedom), but as an unstable and poorly governed one now. 

    Additionally, the Afghan Taliban, once viewed as Pakistan’s most trusted ally, are now being portrayed as an unreliable partner for Islamabad, which significantly supports the narrative of fear and victimhood. Mainstream reporting in Pakistan has framed the conflict in ways that shape the national narrative around ideas of security and threat, state sovereignty, victimhood, and humanitarian displacements. Notably, much of this discourse was built through the extensive use of digital platforms. 

    • Pakistan’s Mediation Efforts amid US–Israel–Iran Tensions

    Islamabad’s efforts to position itself at the centre of global crisis management made Pakistan an unlikely protagonist in de-escalation between the US and Iran. Analysts view this mediation as driven less by geopolitical ambition than by Pakistan’s economic and security vulnerabilities and a policy of ‘self-preservation’. 

    After direct US-Iran talks began in Islamabad in April 2026, print and digital media, along with billboards, widely portrayed the Islamabad Talks as a decisive moment in Pakistan’s history. This coverage created an impression that negotiations were closer to completion than they actually were. Although the talks revealed a gap between public expectations and actual outcomes, such perception management has increasingly become part of Pakistan’s diplomatic strategy, shaping public perceptions of its global role and influencing beliefs about what can realistically be achieved.

    Hence, Pakistan’s digital trajectory, from resistance to perception management, has generated political and strategic benefits for Islamabad, particularly for the Sharif-Munir leadership. Beyond receiving periodic recognition from the Trump administration as peacemakers, Asim Munir’s growing international profile has strengthened the military’s influence over domestic affairs and foreign policy. His role as a crisis manager has also enhanced the federal government’s domestic acceptance, despite earlier criticism over electoral legitimacy and the sidelining of Imran Khan and PTI. 

    Meanwhile, digital narratives portraying Munir as a global peace broker may challenge Khan’s street mobilisation, while PTI’s focus on Pakistan’s economic, political, and security crises may consequently lose traction.

    The Path Ahead

    The path ahead suggests that digitalization will remain central to Pakistan’s political discourse, diplomacy, and strategic communication. Its potential benefits include wider public outreach, image-building, soft-power projection, and stronger engagement with domestic, regional, and international stakeholders. Digital diplomacy will increasingly be used to promote Pakistan’s interpretation of political developments, legitimize policy decisions, and shape perceptions of conflicts with India and Afghanistan, including regional security and domestic legitimacy. 

    At the regional level, narrative diplomacy may continue to support foreign investment, international cooperation, and strategic partnerships, while Pakistan’s emerging image as a peace broker could strengthen its diplomatic leverage. At home, however, digitally constructed narratives of victory, fear, victimhood, patriotism, and heroism may temporarily divert attention from persistent challenges such as inflation, unemployment, democratic instability, and insecurity. 

    AI-powered technologies and algorithms will further amplify emotionally engaging political content. Consequently, digitalization will likely remain a contested arena where the federal government, military establishment, and opposition forces compete to maintain relevance, mobilize popular support, shape public perceptions, and legitimize political authority. The challenge ahead will be whether digitalization strengthens democratic accountability or increasingly becomes an instrument of perception management and political control.

    Author: Dr Angana Kotokey – Research Fellow, ARPA Opportunity Foundation, New Delhi, India.

    (The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).

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