Within the current Cold War between China and the United States, the former shows focus while the latter dispersion. This translates into a substantial advantage to Beijing.
Focused China
Beijing, indeed, has a clear national project and a well-rounded foreign policy aimed at supporting the materialization of such a project. On top, its geopolitical aspirations are much more interconnected and, in most instances, closer to home.
Its actions respond to converging strategies. Such strategies go from attaining China’s “Great Unification” with Taiwan, to controlling the South China Sea through its Nine Dash Line and its area-denial/anti-access positioning; from establishing an Air-Defense Identification Zone over most of the East China Sea to its pushing pressure upon America’s naval presence in the Eastern Pacific; from undermining America’s alliances with other Asian countries to fostering a strategic partnership with Russia; from consolidating a two-ocean blue water navy able to protect its trade sea-lanes in the Pacific and Indian oceans, to acquiring port facilities in the latter.
These strategies aim at a dual but intertwined plan: Strengthening China and overcoming its external vulnerabilities. This is complemented by a group of economic objectives, which includes making China the epicenter of an Asian-led global economic order. Its Belt and Road Initiative falls under this purpose.
According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, China marches towards its perception of its global destiny, following a clear strategy. Such destiny is the resurrection of its historical glory. (Rudd, 2017).
To add firmness to China’s strategy, Xi Jinping took the rudder of the State in his hands and got rid of the country’s collective leadership. The latter not only implied an institutionalized system of ruling and succession but was instrumental in guaranteeing the presence of checks and balances. However, it also represented weak leadership and strong factions. It resulted, as well, in an increasingly independent People’s Liberation Army, walled off from civilian control. Through its anti-corruption campaign, Xi was able to assume a thorough control over the party while bending the military establishment to his will. Today a single view, that of Xi, prevails. A focused China is thus guided by a firm leadership. (Dyer, 2014, pp. 36, 37; Holtz, 2018).
Dispersed America
Contrariwise, the U.S. presents itself as a dispersed juggernaut. This derives from three basic considerations. First, a huge horizontal fracture within its political system and society translates into Republicans and Democrats inhabiting completely different planets. As a result, the country’s foreign policy is also fractured into irreconcilable visions, gravely hampering consistency and continuity. A sort of Sisyphus kind of syndrome prevails within America’s foreign policy: A heavy rock is carried to the top of the mountain by each Administration, only to see it rolled down with the arrival to power of a contending one.
Second, the only foreign policy topic in which both American planets coincide is China. However, more than promoting a structured strategy this simply translates into the joint bashing of that country. According to Kishore Mahbubani, America’s approach to China is guided by subconscious emotions, while former Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson categorizes such approach as attitude not policy. Hence, subconscious emotional attitudes are at the forefront of the U.S.’ outlook on China. What is clearly lacking is a master plan. Not surprisingly, the Sisyphus syndrome is also acute within America’s relationship with China. (Mahbubani, 2020, pp. 7, 253; Sanders, 2021).
Third, the United States continues to act as the global player par excellence. This, notwithstanding its limitations. As a result, it involves itself with multiple geopolitical scenarios at the same time, including six regional military commands distributed around the world. This increases the risks of dispersion and the confusion of priorities.
Iran at the forefront, China in the backburner
Of the three above considerations, the third seems to be the most consequential in what refers to China. During the first Trump Administration, the country went off on a tangent and almost unleashed a totally unnecessary war with Iran. One, that would have put China on the backburner. This time around it seems to be on the verge of bombarding Iran’s nuclear installations. According to Thomas Friedman, though: “Well, carrying out regime change through an air war is very difficult. And even stripping Iran of all its nuclear capacity will be difficult just with aerial bombing”. If such is the case, this could translate into boots on the ground. (Wakin, 2025).
As The Economist puts it: “Yet for Mr. Trump to enter the fray would be a huge gamble (…) Even if he intends to hit nuclear targets and nothing else, America could be sucked in (…) Where does that leave America? Fordow is important, but even if it is destroyed Mr. Trump cannot be sure of eradicating Iran’s programme once and for all. Secret facilities and stocks of uranium might survive; know-how definitely would. If Iran is not to go nuclear, America might therefore have to go to war in the Middle East repeatedly – forcing them to choose between non-proliferation and giving full attention to its rivalry with China”. (The Economist, 2025).
According to China’s self-conceptualized “strategic opportunity”, the first two decades of the new millennium were supposed to represent a relatively benign period. One, in which the country could increase its power without fearing a serious American challenge. Although that period of strategic opportunity ended much earlier than expected by Beijing, a war between the U.S. and Iran would renew and expand it beyond China’s wildest dreams. Xi Jinping’s belief that “time and momentum are on our side” would certainly materialize.
China’s focus and the U.S. dispersion clearly plays in Beijing’s favour. A war between America and Iran would definitively confirm this, giving China the best of gifts.
References:
Dyer, Geoff (2014). The Contest of the Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Holtz, Michael (2018). “Xi for life? China turns its back on collective leadership”, Christian Science Monitor, February 28.
Mahbubani, Kishore (2020). Has China Won? New York: Public Affairs.
Rudd, Kevin (2017). “Xi Jinping offers a long-term view of China’s ambitions”, Financial Times, 23 October.
Sanders, Bernie (2021). “Washington Dangerous New Consensus on China”, Foreign Affairs, June 17.
The Economist (2025). “Where will the Iran-Israel war end?”, June 19.
Wakin, Dan (2025). “Tom Friedman on Israel, Iran and the War That Could Change Everything”, The New York Times, June 20.
Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD – Retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).