World Geostrategic Insights interview with Arun Sahgal on how Iran’s massive and effective use of low-cost weapons (primarily swarms of drones) in the 2026 conflict with the United States and Israel has disrupted conventional military strategies, and prompted reconsideration of defense approaches worldwide, and notably for India.
Brigadier Arun Sahgal, PhD is a retired Indian Army officer and a leading national security strategist. He is the Executive Director of the Forum for Strategic Initiative and a Distinguished Fellow at Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE)’s School of Geopolitics. He served 36 years in the Indian Army, focusing on long-term strategy and military planning. He has been the head of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation at the United Service Institution of India (USI), and a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). He was also a member of the National Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation, of the Indian National Security Council (NSC), and continues to support them through consultancy assignments. He holds a PhD in Strategic Studies and conducts strategic gaming and simulation exercises.
Q1 – Iran deployed swarms of low-cost drones to “wear down” Israel’s expensive interceptors (Iron Dome/Arrow) before launching ballistic missiles. What could be the lesson for India? Should New Delhi accelerate the development of directed-energy (laser) anti-drone systems and low-cost solutions, given that relying exclusively on expensive surface-to-air missiles (such as the S-400) against swarms of drones is economically unsustainable in a protracted conflict?
A1 – Iran has transformed the sanctions-dictated imperative to produce low-cost weapons (primarily drones) into one of the most strategically disruptive military programs of the 21st century. The “Shahed” family of low-cost, mass-produced loitering munitions, capable of operating at ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometers, has challenged the economic foundations of air defense, strengthened Tehran’s network of regional proxies, and even forced the United States to reverse-engineer an Iranian drone for its own arsenal.
Iran’s massive deployment of low-cost drones has led to a decisive shift in warfare. The key trends are: the transition from platform-centric superiority to cost-imposition dominance, from precision warfare to saturation warfare, and, most importantly, the shift from linear kill chains to distributed kill networks.
In this emerging context, the doctrinal challenge for India—which first faced the challenge of drone swarms during Operation Sindoor—is “how to fight and win against the cost of the adversary’s attack, given that the cost of using drone and missile systems is lower than the cost of India’s defense.” Furthermore, there is a decisive shift from attrition warfare to contactless warfare as part of the escalation strategy.
What this change implies:
- Swarms of low-cost drones, as primary attack assets, are both expendable and scalable, unlike prohibitively expensive missiles and fighter jets. Second, they enable prolonged attrition campaigns, as demonstrated by the large-scale disruption of U.S., Israeli, and Gulf State military systems through combined attacks involving drones, missiles, electronic warfare, and cyberattacks. The targeting logic aims to disable systems, not merely destroy assets.
- Second, this has led to the transformation of the battlefield, which is becoming increasingly crowded, contested, and continuous, making the availability and resilience of systems a decisive variable.
- There is also the emergence of what can be defined as “doctrinal discontinuities.” First, the shift from platform-centric warfare to system-dominated warfare in terms of legacy platforms; fighter jets, tanks, and ships are being replaced by networks, sensors, drones, and data fusion, which increasingly determine operational outcomes.
- This can be further interpreted as a shift from high-level warfare characterized by resilient denial systems, replaced by counter-drone capabilities. Ukraine has developed counter-drone systems with an 80–85% shoot-down rate, made feasible by production rates of thousands of units per month.
Drones represent a current and escalating danger to India. In fact, India faces an immediate and growing threat posed by low-cost, mass-produced drones, inspired in particular by Iran’s model of proxy warfare. The June 2021 drone attack on the Jammu airbase marked the first offensive drone attack on Indian soil, carried out using improvised and commercially available drones that managed to evade detection systems. This mirrored Iranian tactics employed by proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, now replicated by Pakistan-based networks smuggling weapons and narcotics via drones across India’s western border.
China’s advanced drone ecosystem, including the transfer of MALE-class drones such as the Wing Loong to Pakistan, further heightens the threat. Thanks to technological and manufacturing advantages, China and its allies pose a drone warfare challenge from a peer state that India must urgently counter.
The key strategic lessons for India are as follows:
- Cost imbalance: Defending against low-cost threats with low-cost defenses: Defense systems that rely on expensive interceptors (such as surface-to-air missiles costing millions of dollars) are unsustainable against drones that cost only a few thousand dollars. India must shift to cost-effective solutions such as cannon-based systems, directed-energy weapons (DEW), and interceptor drones—validated in the Indian Army’s 2026 exercises—as part of a scalable and economically sustainable defense.
- Large-scale production: Volume trumps sophistication: The success of Iranian drones lies in their volume, not in technical superiority. India’s more than 550 drone manufacturers and 5,500 pilots are a positive start, but production capacity falls far short of what a prolonged conflict would require. India must prioritize the domestic mass production of low-cost drones, transitioning from assembly to fully local manufacturing—a national priority comparable in importance to the semiconductor mission.
- Integrated drone doctrine: from leadership to the front lines: Iran pairs drones with a clear operational doctrine—night attacks, saturation tactics, and targeted strikes on critical infrastructure. India has also initiated responses following Operation Sindoor, through AI-assisted targeting and the “Ashni” drone platoon program in 380 infantry battalions. What is urgently needed is the institutionalization of drone warfare doctrine across all three branches of the armed forces.
- Sanctions-proof supply chains: Fully indigenous capabilities: Iran built its Shahed program under sanctions using components sourced globally. India must avoid similar vulnerabilities by indigenizing the entire drone technology stack: flight controllers, AI chips, navigation units, sensors, communication modules, and batteries. Initiatives such as Atamnirbhar India must ensure true technological sovereignty, not merely the final assembly of imported parts.
The strategic imperatives for India:
Create a “drone-versus-drone” defense capability: develop and mass-produce low-cost interceptor drones (drawing inspiration from Ukraine’s planned 100,000-unit program for 2025), supplemented by directed-energy and kinetic systems, under a unified UAS countermeasures command.
Develop an offensive capability using expendable swarms: invest in disposable loitering munitions guided by artificial intelligence (such as Nagastra-1 and Sky Striker) with costs and range similar to those of the Shahed, enabling scalable, high-impact swarm attacks.
Strengthen strategic assets: launch a national program to protect the 20 most critical infrastructure sites (power plants, refineries, ports, air bases) with multi-layered defenses—detection, jamming, interceptors, and kinetic systems—against drone swarms.
Counter the use of drones on behalf of third parties: address the gray-zone threat through a unified framework that integrates border surveillance, intelligence, legal attribution, and infrastructure hardening to combat drone-facilitated terrorism, particularly originating from Pakistan.
Q2 – The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has highlighted India’s energy vulnerability. How can India improve its ability to protect its coasts and offshore facilities in the Arabian Sea and ensure long-range maritime surveillance to prevent the blockade of critical energy chokepoints?
A2 – The Strait of Hormuz is a vital source of energy and resources for India, as approximately 60–65% of its crude oil imports and 50% of its natural gas imports pass through the Arabian Sea and adjacent chokepoints. A blockade of Hormuz would constitute a severe strategic shock for India, with profound repercussions for its security and economy. To reduce the risk of a blockade paralyzing energy transit, New Delhi must combine enhanced coastal and offshore protection, long-range maritime surveillance, and proactive deterrence in the Arabian Sea and the access routes to Hormuz. Essential measures include:
Multi-layered offshore defense
To strengthen its coastal and offshore infrastructure (ports, LNG terminals, oil platforms, and ONGC-type platforms), India must implement the following measures:
- Multi-layered coastal surveillance: expand the Integrated Coastal Surveillance System (ICSS) with additional radar nodes, AIS, and electro-optical sensors, particularly along the western coast—especially Mumbai–Gujarat–Goa–Kerala—to fill gaps in surveillance and detection coverage.
- Offshore platform security: Develop a “security vulnerability assessment” model, integrating physical barriers, remote-controlled weapon systems, and automated intrusion detection radars, combined with thermal imaging cameras and AI-based video analytics.
- Coordination between the Navy, Coast Guard, and ONGC: Establish a seamless maritime security architecture linking the Navy, Coast Guard, and ONGC to standardize patrol schedules, rapid response protocols, and joint SOPs against threats posed by drones, missiles, and fast attack craft.
Forward Naval Posture
India cannot rely on coastal defence only; it must project credible deterrence into the Arabian Sea and near Hormuz to raise the cost of any attempted blockade. Some suggested steps could include:
- Standing readiness task groups: Indian Navy already undertakes forward, mission-based deployment in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden. This ensures presence and response, but not chokepoint control under contested conditions. Towards this India should maintain at least one mixed capability task group (destroyer/frigate, support tanker, P 8I detachment, and RPA) deployed in the Central/North Arabian Sea, ready to rush towards Hormuz when tensions spike.
- Escorts and “Operation type” frameworks: Formalise frameworks such as “Operation Urja Suraksha” to escort India bound tankers beyond Hormuz, including pre planned convoy schedules, routing adjustments, and coordinated refuelling points with regional ports.
- Deterrence by capability: India needs to accelerate induction of longer range anti-ship missiles, ship-launched MALE and attack drone systems, and electronic warfare platforms so that any actor contemplating attacks on Indian flagged or India bound tankers faces a credible risk of swift and disproportionate retaliation.
Strategic depth through diversification and resilience
Even with enhanced surveillance and escort, India will find it difficult to fully “dominate” Hormuz. A complementary strategy needs to be developed that reduces the existing dependence on Gulf energy. Some of the steps that India can take are:
- Expand strategic petroleum and gas reserves: Increase SPR capacity and diversify crude sources (Africa, Americas, Central Asia) and LNG suppliers so that disruption in supplies owing to blockade does not immediately trigger shortages.
- Energy source diversification: Accelerate renewables, domestic gas, and nuclear power so that the share of volatile seaborne oil and LNG in total energy consumption falls over time, compressing the “leverage” of any closure.
Regional and multilateral cooperation
It is not possible for the Navy alone to secure all of the Arabian Sea and Gulf; India must leverage partnerships to spread the burden and constrain the strategic room of any state that threatens chokepoints.
- Joint patrol and information sharing pacts: Deepen naval and coast guard coordination with Oman, UAE, Qatar, and possibly GCC led maritime security groups to share radars, satellite data, and incident response protocols around Hormuz and the North Arabian Sea.
- Multilateral SLOC security coalitions: Engage with existing or nascent “maritime security” groups (e.g. trilateral initiatives) to participate in escorts, surveillance sharing, and rules based norms building around key chokepoints, without joining formal anti Iran blocs.
In essence, India needs a tri layered approach: harden the coast and offshore assets, maintain persistent long range surveillance over the Arabian Sea and approaches to Hormuz, and combine a credible forward naval posture with broader energy resilience and regional cooperation to reduce the strategic impact of any blockade attempt.
Q3 – The rapid depletion of precision munitions stocks by Israel and the United States underscores the importance of domestic production for sustained combat capability. In the event of a two-front war (against China and Pakistan), for how many days would India be able to fight before running out of supplies if global supply chains were disrupted? Is the “Atamnirbhar Bharat” initiative sufficient to ensure India’s self-sufficiency in defence production?
A3 – India’s security environment is characterized by a dual challenge from Pakistan and China, in that order. Current combat capabilities are structured to sustain approximately 10–15 days of intense conventional hostilities against both countries. However, India’s response to a conflict with Pakistan will likely be strong but limited. In the event of a war with China, it will be limited and largely constrained by claims and counterclaims along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Nevertheless, it is a fact that both sides have undertaken massive infrastructure development, including frontline deployments, making the possibility of an unintended or limited conflict a real one.
The calculation of war reserves should take into account the entire available force. Based on past experience, in any conflict scenario—whether involving Pakistan, China, or a two-front war—it is likely that only theater-specific forces will be deployed in the initial stages. This means that intrinsic reserves are available to bolster the capacity to sustain the war effort.
With reference to a context of two wars on two fronts, although there is no doubt that Pakistan and China are acting in concert, in my view it is unlikely that the two countries will launch coalition-style operations similar to those we are seeing in Western Asia against Iran. However, concrete operational support can be expected in terms of equipment, resources, and intelligence, including access to their GPS system (BeiDou) and satellite intelligence, etc. In particular, during the standoff with China that lasted more than four years, from 2020 to 2024, Pakistan took no action to exploit the situation.
However, on the crucial issue of planning for a two-front war, the military assessment is to consider 10–15 days of “intense” warfare as the practical upper limit for planning ammunition and stockpiles/spare parts. A 2017 CAG report noted that, for many types of ammunition, Indian stocks might not last beyond 10 days of high-intensity conflict, creating a situation requiring emergency purchases and stockpile expansion.
In future wars, the element of integrated multi-domain warfare will need to be taken into account. This calls into question the buildup of precision weapons such as missiles, rockets, cruise missiles, hypersonic systems, and drones of all types, including strategic (HALE), operational (MALE), and tactical attack drones. With the growing influence of the enabling domains of space, cyber, and electronics, it will also be necessary to plan for protection and redundancies.
The above issue is directly linked to the effectiveness of India’s “Atamnirbhar Bharat” initiatives. The short answer is that the “Made in India in Defence” push has raised the share of domestic production to about 65% of the total value of defense equipment, down from the previous 65–70% reliance on imports. The government has imposed an embargo on imports of a range of military items, accelerated indigenous programs (tanks, missiles, aircraft, ships), and expanded defense exports, which have seen a sharp increase in recent years, signaling an improvement in industrial capacity.
It is equally true, however, that despite these advances, India still relies on foreign suppliers for critical subsystems: engines, certain sensors, advanced electronics, and some long-range precision munitions, which are difficult to ramp up quickly in wartime. Western and Israeli shortages in the current wars in the Middle East demonstrate how even robust industrial bases can be severely strained by a sudden surge in the use of precision munitions; a prolonged subcontinental war would strain India’s industrial base in a similar manner, especially if supply chains for raw materials and components linked to China were disrupted.
The reality is that the progress made under the “Atamnirbhar Bharat” initiative has significantly improved India’s self-reliance and resilience, but it does not yet guarantee full self-sufficiency in a protracted, high-intensity conflict involving both China and Pakistan. The current goal is to reduce dependence on imports and extend the duration of stockpiles for the “combat period” beyond 10–15 days. The exact duration, however, will depend on how quickly the industry can ramp up production under wartime conditions and on the percentage of operational load managed by imported systems versus domestically produced ones.
Q4 – Does the fact that Iran was attacked despite its missile capabilities suggest that conventional deterrence is failing? Could this prompt India to review its “No First Use” (NFU) nuclear doctrine?
A4 – I do not believe that the failure of conventional deterrence is a valid conclusion to draw from the current conflict between the United States/Israel and Iran. There is no doubt that the conflict is extremely lopsided, as the world’s greatest military and economic power, along with technologically advanced nations, is waging a war of attrition against a medium-sized power subject to sanctions. It is equally true that Iran has succeeded to a reasonable extent in waging an asymmetric war with limited resources, yet inflicting significant damage on coalition forces. The regional escalation against Arab states hosting coalition assets and the closure of key economic chokepoints have forced coalition forces to reassess their options, making the labor-intensive and attritional ground offensive extremely costly.
As analyzed in a previous question, there is no doubt that India faces a two-front threat; however, in our view, we do not foresee a protracted situation similar to that with Iran, characterized by a limited but intense conflict. During Operation Sindoor, we established a new normal in terms of creating adequate space for conventional operations, below the nuclear threshold, despite Pakistan’s stance, as a strategy of deterrence through punishment. In the case of China, we do not foresee a large-scale conflict for two reasons: first, as previously noted, the dispute centers on borders; second, the balance of deployable forces along the LAC in both Ladakh and the eastern sector is nearly comparable, even if the Chinese hold an advantage. Operations will be characterized by interdiction and attrition. The role of drones, missiles, electronic warfare, and cyber warfare will ensure that these remain limited. Finally, and most importantly, the fact that all three are nuclear-armed states will serve as a moderating factor.
Q5 – The conflict in Iran demonstrated that without satellite coverage,modern weapons systems become useless. Does India have the capability to defend its space assets from anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, such as those possessed by China, which potentially could render the Indian military blind within a matter of hours?
A5 – India is fully aware of China’s space capabilities and the advantage China holds in integrating space into the combat doctrine of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Recognizing that space dominance is playing an increasingly central role in multi-domain warfare, India has also begun to develop both the architecture and the tools necessary to defend its own space assets.
Having started somewhat late, our capabilities are still evolving and are not yet comparable to China’s comprehensive anti-space capabilities. In other words, India has the potential to deter and respond to certain forms of attack, but remains vulnerable to Chinese non-kinetic anti-space weapons capable of blinding or disabling satellites.
India’s Approach
In terms of ASAT capabilities, in 2019 India successfully tested a ground-launched kinetic ASAT missile against one of its own satellites in low Earth orbit, demonstrating the ability to destroy or disable adversary satellites. This was a clear signal that China cannot assume it has free rein over India’s space assets. Although India has refrained from further tests, the capability itself deters Beijing from using “smash-and-burn” kinetic ASATs against India, for fear of retaliation. Some of the other measures taken to develop space capabilities are discussed below.
India’s military satellite program: As part of the SBS-3 program, India is accelerating the deployment of approximately 52 defense-dedicated satellites (radar, SIGINT, EO, etc.) by 2029, providing enhanced levels of ISR, navigation, and communication that will be difficult to “blind” with a single attack.
Space Situational Awareness and Early Warning: ISRO’s NETRA project provides indigenous space situational awareness (SSA), enabling the tracking of objects, collision risks, and potential hostile maneuvers around Indian satellites. Linked to the Defence Space Agency (DSA) and the DefSpace mission, this infrastructure aims to improve early warning and attribution of proximity or jamming threats.
The Chinese Challenge
Given that China’s anti-space capabilities are significantly larger and more mature than India’s current posture, it may still pose a space challenge. Some elements of this challenge are:
- Non-kinetic “clean” weapons: China is deploying directed-energy weapons (lasers), high-power microwave (HPM) systems, and satellite jammers capable of temporarily blinding or permanently damaging satellite sensors, navigation signals, and power systems without creating debris. These are particularly dangerous for India’s modest fleet of military navigation (IRNSS/NavIC) and ISR satellites.
- Co-orbital and cyber threats: China is developing co-orbital systems with robotic arms (“space stalkers”) and advanced offensive cyber capabilities capable of inspecting, tampering with, or disabling satellites without a kinetic impact. India currently lacks an equivalent suite of co-orbital or space-based “guardian” assets (although some startups and DRDO-led initiatives under the DefSpace Mission are exploring such concepts).
How India Is Seeking to Bridge the Gap
– Diversified “escort” and dispersion strategies: India is pursuing the use of co-orbital “escort” satellites—small escort platforms equipped with robotic arms and formation-flying capabilities—to monitor and protect key military satellites. More broadly, India is moving toward dispersed and redundant constellations and hardened electronics to reduce single-point vulnerabilities.
– Civil-private integration and doctrine: the Indian Space Policy 2023 and the DefSpace Mission are designed to tap into private-sector innovation in sensors, microsatellites, and electronic warfare payloads, accelerating the development of anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technologies. Over time, this could provide India with a more resilient, multi-layered space architecture capable of withstanding a certain level of Chinese pressure from ASATs or jamming without collapsing.
Brigadier Arun Sahgal, PhD – Director at The Forum for Strategic Initiative, Distinguished Fellow at Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE)’s School of Geopolitics.
Image Source: westerncomd_ia (Exercise Gagan Vijay- Validation of in-house fabricated armed drones).