May 1, 2026, date of the UAE’s effective exit from OPEC, may ultimately be remembered as the moment the “brotherly” facade of the Arabian Peninsula entered a phase of structural fracture.
What was once considered the most stable axis of power in the Middle East—the alliance between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—is increasingly evolving into a strategic rivalry with regional and global implications. This “Gulf Divorce” is not merely a diplomatic disagreement; it represents a profound restructuring of power that extends from the energy markets of OPEC to the battlefields of Sudan. To understand this schism, one must look beyond the official rhetoric of bilateral cooperation and examine the growing competition for influence in a rapidly changing post-oil world.
The Energy Schism: A War of Volumes vs. Prices
The primary driver of this divergence lies in the two countries’ competing visions for the future of energy. For decades, the UAE operated as a reliable partner within the Saudi-led OPEC framework. However, under the leadership of President Mohamed bin Zayed (MbZ), Abu Dhabi has accelerated a strategy centered on maximizing oil monetization before the global energy transition significantly reduces long-term hydrocarbon demand.
The UAE has invested heavily in expanding production capacity, aiming to reach approximately 5 million barrels per day within the coming years. According to multiple energy market assessments, Abu Dhabi increasingly favors market share expansion over coordinated supply discipline. The logic behind this strategy is straightforward: monetize reserves while demand remains structurally strong.
Saudi Arabia, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), operates under different economic imperatives. Riyadh’s ambitious Vision 2030 program—including mega-projects such as NEOM—requires sustained oil revenues and relatively elevated prices to maintain fiscal stability. Several energy analysts estimate that Saudi fiscal breakeven levels remain substantially higher than those of the UAE. For Riyadh, maintaining a price corridor closer to $80 per barrel is therefore not only desirable, but strategically necessary.
The growing friction inside OPEC reflects these diverging priorities. Whether or not the UAE formally abandons future quota mechanisms, Abu Dhabi has already signaled increasing unwillingness to subordinate its long-term economic strategy to Saudi production discipline. The result is a more competitive Gulf energy landscape and a gradual erosion of Saudi predominance within the oil market architecture.
The Sudan Proxy War: A Battle for the Red Sea
While the energy dispute dominates financial headlines, the most visible geopolitical manifestation of this rivalry has emerged in Sudan. The conflict increasingly resembles a proxy confrontation between Gulf powers competing for influence across the Red Sea corridor.
The UAE has widely been associated with political and logistical support networks connected to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti. Abu Dhabi’s interests in Sudan are both economic and strategic. Sudan’s agricultural potential is viewed as an important long-term component of Gulf food security strategies. More critically, the country occupies a central position along the Red Sea trade system.
Through state-linked logistics actors such as DP World, the UAE has pursued a long-term strategy aimed at consolidating influence over ports and maritime infrastructure stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Red Sea basin. A favorable political configuration in Sudan would significantly reinforce Abu Dhabi’s regional logistical network.
Saudi Arabia views this expansion with growing caution. For Riyadh, the Red Sea constitutes a critical security perimeter directly linked to both trade routes and national security. Saudi policymakers fear that excessive Emirati influence in Sudan could reduce Riyadh’s leverage over one of the world’s most strategically sensitive maritime corridors. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has supported diplomatic initiatives such as the Jeddah Talks while maintaining closer ties with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
The tragedy of Sudan is that its internal fragmentation has been intensified by external competition. The financial and military backing provided by regional actors has transformed a domestic conflict into a broader geopolitical contest.
Hemedti: The Functionary of Chaos
To understand the strategic calculations behind the UAE’s Sudan policy, one must examine the role of Hemedti himself. Unlike a traditional state leader, Hemedti operates as a hybrid actor positioned between militia commander, business entrepreneur, and geopolitical broker.
Originally emerging from the Janjaweed networks in Darfur, Hemedti consolidated influence through control over gold mining operations and paramilitary structures. Multiple regional reports have highlighted the importance of gold exports and informal financial networks linking Sudanese resources to Gulf markets, particularly Dubai.
This independent financial base enabled Hemedti to bypass many traditional state institutions and develop autonomous regional relationships. During the Yemen conflict, RSF forces reportedly operated alongside Gulf coalition forces, strengthening ties between Sudanese paramilitary networks and Gulf security structures.
For the UAE, Hemedti represents a flexible and highly transactional partner capable of securing strategic interests without the institutional constraints associated with traditional state actors. For Saudi Arabia, however, his growing autonomy represents a destabilizing factor that risks undermining regional balance and long-term security predictability.
The Red Sea Bottleneck and the Iranian Shadow
The rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is further shaped by the deteriorating security environment in the Red Sea and the Gulf. Houthi attacks against maritime traffic and the persistent risk of escalation involving Iran have forced both states to reassess their regional security models.
Saudi Arabia has increasingly pursued a strategy of controlled de-escalation with Tehran, particularly following Chinese-mediated diplomatic normalization efforts. Riyadh’s objective is clear: create a sufficiently stable regional environment to protect large-scale economic diversification projects and foreign investment flows.
The UAE, while maintaining pragmatic economic ties with Iran, has simultaneously deepened military and technological cooperation with both the United States and Israel following the Abraham Accords. Abu Dhabi appears to favor a more proactive maritime security posture centered on strategic port access, naval logistics, and diversified security partnerships.
The consequence is a fragmented Gulf security architecture in which Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly promote different models of regional order and crisis management.
The Global Implications of the Divorce
The implications of this Gulf rivalry extend far beyond the Middle East. For years, Western policymakers tended to approach the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a relatively coherent Saudi-led bloc. That assumption is becoming increasingly outdated.
Economically, greater Emirati production flexibility could contribute to downward pressure on oil prices over the medium term, particularly if competition inside OPEC intensifies. While lower prices may temporarily benefit inflation-strained Western economies, prolonged market fragmentation could also increase volatility across global energy markets.
Politically, the Sudan conflict continues to generate severe humanitarian consequences and contributes to migratory pressures affecting both North Africa and Europe. The instability of the Red Sea corridor also threatens one of the world’s most important maritime trade arteries, through which a substantial percentage of global commerce transits annually.
Conclusion
The gradual dissolution of the Saudi-UAE strategic axis signals the emergence of a more competitive and transactional Middle East. The traditional rhetoric of Gulf unity is increasingly being replaced by a realist struggle for influence, market access, maritime control, and strategic autonomy.
At its core, the rivalry reflects two competing visions for navigating the transition toward a post-oil world. Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve regional centrality through controlled markets, economic transformation, and political stabilization. The UAE, by contrast, appears more willing to embrace strategic flexibility, commercial expansion, and diversified geopolitical partnerships.
As long as global markets remain dependent on Gulf energy exports and Red Sea shipping routes, the evolving relationship between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will remain one of the defining dynamics of international politics. Sudan, tragically, illustrates the broader consequences of this competition: when regional powers pursue strategic advantage simultaneously, fragile states often become the primary battlegrounds.
The sands of the Middle East are shifting once again—not through ideology, but through competition for power, logistics, capital, and strategic survival.
Author: Alberto Cossu – International Management Consultant, collaborating with research institutes and government agencies on strategic and geopolitical analysis. He is a Geopolitical Analyst at Vision & Global Trends and a regular contributor to the journal Geopolitica. His work is also published in prominent Italian policy and defense outlets, including Airpress – Formiche, Analisi Difesa, and Digit-export, the online magazine of the Union of Chambers of Commerce of Lombardy. His research focuses on global geopolitical dynamics, with particular emphasis on the United States, India, Russia, China, and the Middle East, as well as on the strategic implications of innovation and emerging technologies in the evolving international order. He holds a degree in Political Science and a Master’s in Business Management.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).