World Geostrategic Insights interview with Volodymyr Dubovyk on the prospects for peace talks between Russia and Ukraine; what concessions Kiev could reasonably make in the context of real negotiations with Moscow; why President Zelensky signed a decree to withdraw Ukraine from the international convention banning anti-personnel mines: the setbacks at the NATO summit in The Hague; and the likely impact of the US Department of Defense’s decision to suspend shipments of certain defense missiles to Ukraine.
Volodymyr Dubovyk is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for International Studies at Odessa National Mechnikov University.
Q1 – Amid intensified drone and missile attacks on Ukraine, President Putin said, during a press conference, on June 27, in Minsk, that the heads of the Russian and Ukrainian delegations in the two rounds of talks held in Istanbul “continue to maintain direct contact by telephone” with each other, and are currently “discussing when the next round will be held,” adding that the third meeting will have to discuss the memoranda presented by each side for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, he admitted that these documents are “at opposite ends of the spectrum.” In fact, both sides have established mutually exclusive red lines that seem to preclude a diplomatic agreement. In your opinion, how much importance can still be attached to these so-called peace talks between Russia and Ukraine?
A1 – I am not aware as to whether the contacts between the heads of Ukrainian and Russian delegation from the last two rounds of meetings in Istanbul are indeed maintained. From what we see, there is no negotiation process as such; the only thing that is working is the exchange of the prisoners and of the bodies of the fallen soldiers.
Even the basic truce or ceasefire is not being discussed, since Russia declines to do that. Comparing “memoranda” of two sides is, indeed, pretty useless at this point. Russia has not made any corrections to its maximalist list of demands, which basically amounts to Ukraine’s surrender. Naturally, Ukraine can not agree to these demands.
The direct “peace talks” would hardly lead to actual progress, movement towards peace. The necessary condition for this to change is for Ukraine to receive a substantial amount of support from its partners, and for the sanctions against Russia decisively strengthened. Moscow can only alter its position if faced with a robust approach and sanctions.
Q2 – The head of German diplomacy, Johann Wadephul, on June 23 said that Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to impose the “capitulation” of Ukraine without any real willingness to negotiate, and therefore to give in on any of his maximalist demands, while, on the contrary, Kiev is ready for “real negotiations” with Moscow. Indeed, a diplomatic agreement is usually reached when the parties make mutual concessions. Ukraine is demanding the complete withdrawal of Russian forces and the restoration of its borders to the 2014 situation, including Crimea. In your opinion, what concessions could Kiev reasonably make in the context of “real negotiations” with Moscow? Which demands might it give in to?
A2 – Ukraine tacitly is ok with the temporary occupation of Ukraine’s land by Russia (those which Russia currently occupies). There is an understanding that Ukraine may indeed not be able to liberate them any time soon. This does not mean that Kyiv is ready for the formal recognition of these lands as a part of Russia, which seems to be one of Russia’s key demands.
Also, Ukraine realizes that its path towards NATO membership is nearly impossible in the near future. But, again, there is no appetite in Kyiv in codifying this in any sort of the agreement on permanent neutrality or non-alignment.
Q3 – With the conquest on June 27 of the small village of Shevchenko, in the Donetsk region, the Russian army has taken control of a lithium deposit considered one of the most important in Eastern Europe. According to some analysts, Moscow’s advance in the region jeopardizes Ukraine’s economic strategy, which is currently seeking to exploit its minerals and rare earths to finance reconstruction and attract Western investment, particularly from the US. What is your opinion?
A3 – I think that this is hardly a core part of Ukraine’s reconstruction strategy. Much more than that will be needed. It remains to be seen how the renovation fund with the U.S. will be working. Also, at this point the focus for Ukrainians is on the ongoing war more, than on the reconstruction and recovery after the war.
So, the utmost priority is to obtain more defensive arms. That being said, of course, the natural resources of Ukraine do play and will play a significant role. A lot of them and also Ukraine’s main industrial base is in the currently occupied territories, and also in those where the hostilities are taking place now. A certain amount of repositioning of the industry and exploration of the new resources will be needed.
Q4 – On June 29, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree to withdraw Ukraine from the international convention banning anti-personnel mines. Why? What is the significance of such a decision?
A4 – Well, this is an unpopular but necessary step. The mine fields are an effective defensive tool, even in contemporary warfare, as it turns out. Russian defensive mine lines in the South and East of Ukraine, for example, have turned out to be a crucial factor in preventing successful Ukrainian operations there. This is especially useful when you have long borders with a permanently hostile neighboring power. Little wonder that countries like Finland and Poland have now also resorted to the same decision.
Q5 – The recent NATO summit in The Hague decided to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, as requested by the U.S. President Donald Trump, but the war in Ukraine was not the focus of the meeting. The final statement from the summit does not condemn Russia’s attack on Ukraine, but only describes Moscow as a “long-term threat.” Nor does it include even a vague promise to integrate Ukraine into NATO one day. In essence, it seems to be a significant step backward from previous summits with regard to support for Kiev. What is your opinion? Can Ukraine still count on unconditional support from the United States and European countries?
A5 – Yes, indeed, the NATO Hague summit has not been a decisive step with regard to the support of Ukraine. We in Ukraine saw this and did not expect any major achievements or breakthroughs there. But the very fact that the summit took place, and there was no major scandal, quarrel or rupture there, considering the very specific position of the current U.S. administration was, perhaps, a moderate success. The 5% benchmark is significant. Now it remains to be seen if the member states will live up to it, and how effectively they will use the funds. Indirectly this is a good thing for Ukraine, as it increases the ability of the arms production and military procurement, and, therefore, hopefully, will impact aid to Ukraine.
Q6 – From early July, Russia has been bombarding Kyiv with the largest air strike since the start of the war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the US Department of Defense announced the suspension of shipments of certain air defense missiles to Ukraine due to concerns about US stockpile levels. What impact could this decision have on Ukraine’s defensive capabilities?
A6 – There is a hope that this decision by the Pentagon will be reversed. But the problem is there, anyway – these are the remnants of the U.S. weapons for Ukraine. They will run out soon. The future of military aid from the U.S. is murky. There is no talk of the new aid package. It seems that Ukraine, and its supporters, will try to purchase American arms for Ukraine, if Trump is going to be ok with it.
Volodymyr Dubovyk – Director of the Center for International Studies at Odessa National Mechnikov University, Ukraine.
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