By Samra Hamid
Outer space has long been considered a free zone, unclaimed, ungoverned, and unmapped. By definition, it is a vast, continuous expanse that is open and seemingly unoccupied. Yet today, it is anything but free. What was once viewed as a shared frontier for humanity has now become the next theatre of strategic competition.
Major powers such as the United States, Russia, China, and, more recently, India are steadily transforming space into a domain of military adventurism. The cost of this transition is being disproportionately borne by developing states, whose security calculations are being reshaped without their consent or participation.
Besides Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and High Earth Orbit (HEO), there are other orbits of strategic value, including the geosynchronous orbit (GSO). GSO, also referred to as geo-stationary orbit (GEO), is a communication satellite’s orbit, which enables surveillance coverage making it high in demand. For this purpose, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regulates the allotment of GEO “slots”. The GEO orbit is very valuable, as evidenced by the fact that eight equatorial countries claimed sovereignty over the GEO slots in the Bogota Declaration.
Among the treaties, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is a foundational treaty that shapes the current legal and international perspectives of space activities. This treaty serves as the legal foundation which has given birth to many other treaties, such as the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”. The Outer Space Treaty is supported by several key legal agreements, including the Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968, the Liability Convention of 1972, and the Registration Convention of 1975. Additional treaties, such as the 1972 ABM Treaty, the 1973 International Telecommunications Convention, and the 1980 ENMOD Convention, further define acceptable military and peaceful space activities.
While several states maintain that “peaceful purposes” exclude military activities, the US policy has consistently interpreted “peaceful purposes” as “non-aggressive purposes”. The US has a strategic advantage in space-based weapons, while China and Russia depend on direct-ascent ASAT systems. Although they have proposed a PPWT treaty aiming to confine the US capabilities, they have in particular excluded Earth-to-space weapons like China’s 2007 ASAT test. Most of the critics claim that the PPWT is an unprovable and diplomatically hypocritical model of the international system. As an example, in February 2024, Russia was alleged to have developed a nuclear ASAT weapon. This raised serious concerns for the US officials who alleged it, as a contravention of the Outer Space Treaty. The White House acknowledged the effort of developing Russia’s Nuclear ASAT, but it did not agree to its successful implementation. Creating room for itself to set such weapons, subsequently labeling it as a preventive program for its national security. One can see that the individuals spearheading the international treaties to prevent it are also involved in such acts. This loop in the law has consequently led to a situation whereby strategic restraint is discretionary, and technological rivalry is unavoidable.
However, it can be argued that large-scale combat may not be fought in space, but the weapons from space will unquestionably affect Earth. There are almost 13,000 to 14,000 active satellites in space in different orbits. As modern militaries depend on satellites for intelligence, navigation, communication, and early-warning systems, a greater presence in space means more accurate information. Therefore, states attempting to destroy these assets would, in effect, blind and incapacitate the opponent without firing a single shot on the ground. It is this logic that has drawn powerful states towards offensive space capabilities, not for prestige alone, but for the immense military advantage they offer.
In addition to the existing threats, AI and cyber technologies are making their way into emerging technologies and space warfare. These technologies accelerate space weaponization by increasing speed, precision, and unpredictability of conflict, reducing the response time, making the domain far more unstable than before. The US Department of Defense acknowledged in 2023 that AI will be used for “autonomous space domain awareness and rapid threat response”. Cyber threats make this volatility even worse, as seen in Russia’s 2022 cyberattack on Viasat that disabled Ukrainian communications, illustrating how satellites can be crippled without firing a shot.
Meanwhile, US officials increasingly view China and Russia’s development of tools to “hack, jam, or spoof” as a threat to American satellites. Resultantly, prompting the UK Space Command to caution that such attacks may “constitute an act of war,” and NATO has declared that major cyberattacks on space assets could trigger Article 5. All the presupposed conclusions combined can result in an unexpected war, later realizing that it was all an error by the AI. In a different vein, Dual-use artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities also add to the game, as the USX-37B spaceplane and the Shijian satellites of China led to each accusing the other of covert military operations, eroding trust, and creating uncertainty in both places.
This competition is not confined solely to the international level but also to the non-state players that acquire power in such ways. For instance, groups such as Anonymous Sudan and other terrorist organizations in the world have access to communication satellites like STARLINK and SATCOM. As a result, it erodes the internal security of the states. In the case of developing nations such as Pakistan, there is too much at stake. They have neither the financial capabilities nor the technological capabilities to militarize space. Furthermore, those states that are economically capable are rigorously proceeding towards achieving such capabilities and leaving those that are incapable in a security dilemma. For example, the ASAT test conducted by India in 2019 posed substantial questions to the deterrence posture of Pakistan. However, Pakistan cannot and does not want to indulge itself in an arms race in space as it is economically and politically weak. Thus, turning such aspirations into an unachievable dream, but still, its diplomatic policy of dwelling against arms in outer space, speaks of the urge to maintain a state of affairs in the region. If space becomes a battlefield, developing nations will be at a disadvantage. Even enhancing conventional arsenals or pursuing incremental technological upgrades will not shield them from vulnerabilities created by space-based weapons. The strategic imbalance will widen, and dependency on spacefaring powers will deepen.
In conclusion, major powers themselves openly acknowledge the escalating threat as US Space Command warns on the China, fielding counter-space weapons stating, “at a pace we have never seen before,” the Pentagon calls cyber and AI threats to satellites the “most immediate challenge,” China’s white papers accuse the US of accelerating space militarization, Russia argues that US missile defense satellites pose “direct threats”. India’s leadership insists that while it does not seek war in space, it “must be prepared for new threats.” The world is rapidly drifting towards a future in which conflict may begin with the push of a button thousands of miles above Earth. It is not just that states are developing space weapons, but that they are doing so without a clear end-state or crisis management system, working step-by-step towards a conflict, that nobody professes to desire.
Author: Samra Hamid – Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network, Quetta, Pakistan.
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).