By Anton Evstratov

    Iranian-Russian relations in recent months have not only qualitatively improved and deepened against the backdrop of the countries’ cooperation on the Ukrainian issue, but also acquired dimensions previously unexpected. 

    Anton Evstratov
    Anton Evstratov

    Military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran has become the most obvious to the global public and public discourse in general.  Despite the fact that both partners stubbornly deny deliveries of Iranian drones to the Russian Armed Forces, the world media regularly report on both deliveries and operations of Iranian vehicles in Ukraine.  For example, as far back as November 1 CNN talked about the procurement of 1,000 weapons from Iran  to Russia, including more than 450 kamikaze drones.

    Specific models currently operating in Ukraine are also named – the famous Shaheed-136, as well as the Mohajeer and the Arash-1 and Arash-2. It is believed that the latter models, which have increased power and range, have arrived at the front only in recent days. Also called the Shaheed 131 model. Russia’s leading military correspondents are also actively writing about Iranian drones in their telegram channels. It is noteworthy that Moscow, while denying the Iranian origin of the UAVs operating against the AFU, notes that it uses Russian Geran drones and, more recently, Lancet drones for this purpose.  It is believed that they, reminiscent of their Iranian counterparts, carry more explosives and, therefore, are more powerful. At the same time, even this version does not completely exclude the Iranian presence in the creation of these types of weapons – we can talk, for example, about the joint production of modernized samples at Iranian facilities in the IRI or Syria.

    The Western media occasionally publish information about Iranian military instructors allegedly training Russian military personnel to operate the new UAVs, but there has been no confirmation of this information so far. 

    Reports about possible deliveries of ballistic missiles from Iran to Russia are extremely noteworthy. These are the Zulfikar with a range of 700 kilometers and the Fateh-110, which can fly 300 kilometers. In turn, this was reported by The Washington Post.  Moreover, the already mentioned CNN included ballistic missiles in the above thousand units, in addition to drones.  Theoretically, the appearance of such munitions from the Russian side – on the one hand quite cheap, but on the other hand, having characteristics that do not allow the Ukrainian air defense to shoot them down effectively – could seriously affect the situation in the war zone. 

    Iran, in turn, in addition to payment for the equipment supplied, receives other important preferences from the Russian side. For example, during the meeting of the Russian-Iranian intergovernmental commission in Grozny, the creation of a free trade area (FTA) between the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and Iran was discussed, as well as Moscow’s lending for electrification of the Garmsar-Incheburun railroad, among other issues (for example, cooperation in the health sector). Joint financial initiatives between Iran and Russia are extremely important. For example, the countries are working on their own payment system, which may soon become operational. Moreover, against the background of the disconnection of the Russian MIR payment system in a number of EAEU countries, Iran, on the contrary, has made efforts to extend it to its territory. 

    These areas are rightly considered by both countries as an opportunity to mitigate the consequences of Western sanctions imposed on them.

    The purely political aspects of interaction are also important, particularly in the South Caucasus, which is important to both countries. There, their interests collide with those of Turkey and Azerbaijan, and are expressed in a “corridor logic. If Tehran and Moscow are interested in cooperation and integration from the north to the south within the framework of the North-South logistic route, Baku and Ankara make every effort to create the Zangezur corridor via Armenia, ensuring the Turkish military, political and economic expansion from west to east. At the same time, Russia’s military and political capabilities in the South Caucasus, due to its employment in Ukraine, are insufficient. In this regard, it is extremely important for Moscow to ensure the loyalty of Iran and transfer to it some of the functions to counteract the efforts of Turkey and Azerbaijan. At present, judging by the recent actions of the IRI – the statements of its leaders, the opening of the consulate in Japan and the major exercises on the border with Azerbaijan – these functions are performed by the Islamic Republic. In a way, Azerbaijan itself helps this by allowing anti-Iranian statements by its politicians and by openly expressing loyalty to the forces that have recently protested against the Iranian regime.

    Another important point of regional political cooperation between Tehran and Moscow is Tajikistan, which is close to Iran ethnically and to Russia strategically (as the only potentially non-Turkic state in former Soviet Central Asia not subject to Turkish influence).  Both countries are now actively developing military-technical cooperation with Dushanbe (in particular, Iran has opened a factory in the country to produce its drones, while Moscow sells weapons to the region). By tacitly supporting Tajikistan, Moscow and Tehran, on the one hand, prevent the growth of Turkish influence in Kyrgyzstan and other neighboring countries, and on the other hand, can act much more easily in the territory of Afghanistan, home to millions of Tajiks who have lost much of their faith in the United States that left the republic. 

    At the same time Tajikistan earlier through the mouth of the leader Emomali Rakhmon voiced a number of claims to Russia, which was not left without attention of Europe, which immediately rushed to offer Dushanbe support and cooperation. Active joint activities with Tehran in the Tajik direction in a sense solve this problem for Moscow as well. 

    The two countries continue to cooperate in Syria, where they support both the government of Bashar al-Assad and the Shiite communities and militias. This cooperation is particularly important because it is in Syria that Moscow and Tehran have gained unique experience in military, logistical and technical cooperation in war conditions, which is now being used quite successfully in Ukraine. 

    Given all of the above factors, it is easy to understand that Russia has not only deepened its interaction with Iran, but also depends on the Islamic Republic in many ways. The latter, in turn, is trying to use this, among other things, to solve its main problem at the moment – the negotiations on the nuclear dossier. While previously Russia’s position was objective and balanced, not suggesting that it was getting close to the development of Iranian nuclear weapons, the situation may now change. Previously, Russia not only did not link the deterioration of political relations with Western countries to the negotiations on a nuclear agreement with Iran, but even occasionally criticized the latter. In February 2021, when the International Atomic Energy Agency disclosed Iran’s production of uranium metal, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov urged Tehran to “show restraint and a responsible approach. Two months later, when the Iranian leadership announced that it had begun enriching uranium to 60 percent, Russian experts described the decision as “perhaps the most dangerous step” by the IRI in recent times. 

    The special operation in Ukraine changed the situation dramatically.  On the one hand, Iran is quite capable of paying for Russia’s loyalty with its military products. On the other hand, despite the fact that the Russian leadership as a whole now hardly wants Iran to become a new nuclear power, it would be extremely desirable for it to distract Western countries from Ukraine with an Iranian “nuclear bogeyman”.  Even now, Moscow appears to be willing to drag out the talks within the 5+1 group. For example, on August 25, after Iran asked for more time to submit its views on the final text of the final agreement, the Russian representative stated that “we must be patient. And as soon as Iran shared its response, insisting on the previously withdrawn request to stop the IAEA investigation of Iran’s past nuclear activities, Russia’s response was again condescending.  In June 2022, 30 board members of the International Atomic Energy Agency voted in favor of a resolution calling on Iran to fully cooperate with UN inspectors in their investigation of three previously undeclared nuclear facilities. Russia rejected the document.

    Iran, in turn, responded to the changed situation with concrete actions – the construction of a new test reactor began in Esfahan.

    Undoubtedly, all these actions cause discontent in the Western world, which in the long term could be expressed in additional sanctions against each of the partners. Nevertheless, the leaders of Russia and Iran believe that the benefits of victory in Ukraine should recoup any possible economic costs. In addition to the acquisition of new territories, geopolitical position and prestige, they are talking about ever deeper Eurasian integration and the creation of a new pole of power, with Moscow and Tehran as key participants. Iran’s accession to the SCO is vivid proof of these aspirations. In addition to the above-mentioned Tajikistan, the U.S. media recently threw in information about Afghan fighters allegedly recruited by Russia. Moreover, the IRI and Russia are working quite constructively with their adversaries yesterday’s adversaries – for example, they managed to secure Saudi Arabia’s loyal position on oil exports, which allowed them to raise the price of “black gold” and extract high profits from its sale. Not coincidentally, again, the Wall Street Journal the other day ran a blast about an alleged possible Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities. 

    Tehran and Riyadh were prudent not to allow an armed escalation, but the very fact of the throw-in speaks of the danger of Russia and Iran to the West and the existing world order as a whole. It is extremely difficult to predict the outcome of the Eurasian-Western confrontation, but it’s increasingly complex and global nature is obvious. 

    Author: Anton Evstratov (Russian historian, journalist and journalist living in Armenia, lecturer at the Department of General History and Foreign Regional Studies at the Russian-Armenian University in Yerevan).

    (The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)

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