World Geostrategic Insights interview with Dr. Paradorn Rangsimaporn on the key dynamics and shared geopolitical interests currently driving relations between the Central and Southeast Asian countries; how ASEAN can be a model of integration for Central Asia; how Iran’s connectivity initiatives in Central Asia might affect Southeast Asia and if Southeast Asian countries will be able to maintain their equidistance in the Russia-Ukraine war, despite the predictable increasing Western pressure.
Dr. Paradorn Rangsimaporn is a Thai diplomat and independent researcher. His book “Central Asia and Southeast Asia: Exploring the Dynamics of Greater Engagement” was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2022. He holds a DPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford. This interview reflects his personal views.
Q1 – Central Asia is becoming a competition ground for regional and extra-regional powers. China is seeking to replace Russia as the leading power in the region, and the United States, the European Union, Turkey, and other regional players are also eager to acquire a greater presence in Central Asia, also taking advantage of Russia’s difficulty in maintaining its dominance in the region due to the war in Ukraine. In your book “Central Asia and Southeast Asia: Exploring the dynamics of greater engagement,” published in August 2022, you delve into Central Asia’s relationship with Southeast Asia and ASEAN. What are the key dynamics and shared geopolitical interests currently driving relations between the Central and Southeast Asian countries?
The Central Asian states, like those in Southeast Asia, are faced with similar geopolitical tensions and great-power rivalry that require similar responses. I argue that this response is the pursuance of a hedging strategy – neither balancing nor bandwagoning – to avoid taking explicit sides in order to maintain their strategic autonomy and flexibility. Part of this strategy is the diversification of their foreign relations in order to avoid overdependence on a particular great power, be they Russia or China in Central Asia, and the US or China in Southeast Asia. By diversifying their relations with other powers, which are mostly middle powers like the EU, Turkey, Japan and South Korea, Central Asian states are enhancing their strategic space and room for manoeuvre, to avoid being entrapped in great-power conflicts. This is reflected in their multi-vector foreign policies that they attempt to pursue to varying degrees. Southeast Asian states are seen as one alternative vector, amongst others, for the Central Asian states to establish stronger relations with, particularly in the economic sphere, to help diversify their foreign economic relations and to avoid being overly dependent on a particular power.
I argue in my book that there have been 3 key drivers of greater engagement between the two regions. Firstly, is the growing interest of ASEAN and some ASEAN member states to conclude a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), in which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members, while Uzbekistan is an observer. ASEAN is a vast market of more than 650 million people, while the EAEU market is more than 180 million. Therefore, an FTA between the two would provide access to vast and untapped markets for each other. To date, Vietnam and Singapore have already concluded an FTA with the EAEU, while other ASEAN countries like Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand are eager to do so as well. Secondly, are the connectivity opportunities presented by China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which would enable greater trade and economic engagement between the two regions through better transport and logistics infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s central and pivotal role in the BRI has increased its attractiveness for ASEAN countries who are interested in exploring a faster route to transport goods to Europe as well as in accessing the Central Asian market of about 75 million people. Thirdly, Central Asian states are wary, if not fearful, of growing Chinese influence. There have been Central Asian concerns ranging from fears of an influx of Chinese migrants that would take away local jobs, land and women, Chinese rhetoric on readjustments to existing borders, perceived lack of transparency and alleged corruption in Chinese business dealings and investments, and China’s mass repression of its Muslim minorities, not only Uighurs but also Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. Such concerns have prompted Central Asian states to search for alternative economic partners, including in Southeast Asia, that can provide some economic counterweight to China.
Q2 – Central Asia is suffering economic consequences from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions from the West, and Russia’s response to those sanctions, have had a heavy negative impact on the economy. Central Asian countries also have fears that Russia may not fully respect their sovereignty and that no one will provide sufficient assistance if they become a target of Russian aggression. Central Asian countries therefore have good reasons now to push hard for greater regional integration, and to attempt to resolve their regional disputes without the involvement of outside powers. What is your opinion? How can ASEAN be a model of integration for Central Asia?
Like Southeast Asian states, external threats and common interests have prompted Central Asian states to enhance their regional cooperation, if not yet integration, particularly amidst today’s rising geopolitical challenges. The Central Asian states have tried this in the past but were unsuccessful as their attempts were often thwarted by Russia or derailed by mutual suspicion and rivalry, particularly between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two regional powers. This changed with Uzbekistan’s new President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who opened up the country and improved relations with its neighbours. Recognizing the need for greater regional cooperation, the Central Asian states are cooperating with each other more and there is discernible momentum towards an exclusive Central Asian regionalism, without the involvement of external powers. Four “consultative” summits have been held in Kazakhstan (2018), Uzbekistan (2019), Turkmenistan (2021) and Kyrgyzstan (2022), which seems set to be a regular dialogue forum. They also have so-called C5+1 dialogues, in which the five Central Asian states engage with individual external powers like Japan, South Korea, the EU, India, the US and recently Russia and China.
Central Asian states recognize the need for such a dialogue platform in order to strengthen their bargaining position in managing relations with external powers. This is similar to the use of ASEAN as a hedging platform to manage relations with the great powers, through ASEAN-led fora such as the ARF, ASEAN+3, and East Asia Summit. The aim is to ensure that no individual power dominates, enmeshing them in a network of diplomatic and economic relations in which ASEAN can assert influence. I call this “hedging regionalism” in my book, namely the use of regional cooperation platforms, such as ASEAN, as a hedging mechanism. This is one of the attractions of the ASEAN model for Central Asian states. Another is normative convergence where the “ASEAN way” of respect for sovereignty, non-interference, consensus, flexibility and informality, with focus on regime security, economic development and stability over democracy promotion converge well with the norms, principles, and priorities held by Central Asian leaders. Another attraction is ASEAN’s “soft regionalism” approach, focusing on consensus, consultations, flexibility and weak institutions that do not override national sovereignty, unlike the “hard regionalism” of the EU with its formal integration and institutionalisation. The ASEAN model is thus one of the main examples of successful regionalism that Central Asian states often look to emulate.
Q3 – Central Asia is also becoming a ground of rivalry between Iran on the one hand and the United States, the EU and Turkey on the other. Following the disruption of international trade and transport routes caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war and Western sanctions against Russia, Iran has seen a sudden increase in its importance as a transit and transport hub connecting China and Central Asia to Europe, and even Russia to India, along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). What are your views on Iran’s connectivity initiatives in Central Asia? How might they affect Southeast Asian countries?
Even before the war, Iran’s role as one key link in the connectivity chain to access the Central Asian market was well recognized by some Southeast Asian countries. Indonesia, for instance, has already been using Iran’s Chabahar and Bandar Abbas ports to transport goods into Central Asia. Concerns regarding excessive Chinese restrictions on Southeast Asian goods transported through China’s Lianyungang port onwards to the Khorgos dry port on the border with Kazakhstan, particularly during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, also prompted Southeast Asian exporters to look for alternative routes to China’s BRI such as via India’s International North-South Transport Corridor, in which Iran plays a key role. Being doubly landlocked, Uzbekistan well recognizes the need for alternative routes to the sea and has been a strong champion of Central Asia-South Asia connectivity in order to access the markets of Southeast Asia, amongst others, and vice versa. However, continued US sanctions on Iran and worsening instability in Afghanistan adversely affect the willingness of Southeast Asian countries to use this Central Asia-South Asia route, despite being the shorter route to Central Asia than via China.
Q4 – Southeast Asian countries are known for their policies of balancing between the great powers. Regarding the current conflict in Ukraine, first, at the multilateral level, Southeast Asian countries initially joined the West in condemning Russia, but then gradually softened their stance toward Moscow. At the bilateral level, Southeast Asian countries maintained close diplomatic and economic ties with Russia, and several Southeast Asian countries also tried to mediate between Ukraine/West and Russia. Thus, basically, Southeast Asia is not taking sides in the Russia-Ukraine war. However, the conflict is unlikely to end in the near future. What is your opinion? Will Southeast Asia be able to maintain its equidistance in the Russia-Ukraine war, despite the predictable increasing Western pressure?
In the post-Cold War period, Southeast Asian states have traditionally been loathed to choose sides in a great-power conflict. They prefer to try to pursue a hedging policy of maintaining good relations with all sides in order to preserve their strategic autonomy, enhance their strategic space and maintain their strategic flexibility. They have also used ASEAN as a hedging platform to manage relations with external powers to ensure that no individual power dominates in their region. But ASEAN centrality and unity have been increasingly under strain due to pressure arising from the Myanmar military coup and the country’s worsening security situation, intensifying US-China rivalry, and the Russia-Ukraine war.
ASEAN has been divided in its position and approach to these situations, and ASEAN statements have often reflected the lowest-common denominator position on these issues. Hedging has become a luxury that ASEAN states cannot afford for long. In response to the Russia-Ukraine war, we have already seen a spectrum of positions amongst ASEAN states. Singapore is closely aligned with the Western response, having joined sanctions against Russia. Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos have maintained their historical closeness with Russia, although Myanmar’s voting in the UN does not reflect this as the Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN remains the one appointed by the pre-coup government. Other ASEAN countries lie in between. Cambodia interestingly takes a more critical stance towards Russia, while Thailand tries to maintain its impartiality, but this is somewhat called into question by its erratic voting behaviour in the UN. I believe that most Southeast Asian states will try to maintain their impartiality and to not choose sides as best they can. But to what extent they are successful remains to be seen and is dependent on the internal and external factors of each individual state.
Paradorn Rangsimaporn – Thai diplomat and independent researcher. Author of the book “Central Asia and Southeast Asia: Exploring the Dynamics of Greater Engagement”, published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2022.