By Anton Evstratov
Despite the expectations of anti-Iranian forces around the world related to the mass protests of late 2022, and the economic, political and social problems in Iran, we cannot talk about “revolution” or “collapse” of the current political regime in Iran.
There is no doubt that the Islamic Republic currently faces a number of challenges. First of all, it is the general lack of change, the conservative situation in all spheres – in general, not the most favorable one. Both the reformists and the conservatives who won the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections recognize this reality. Meanwhile, it was the latter that blamed all the troubles on the reformist government of former President Hassan Rouhani, and at the moment they do not demonstrate any adequate mechanisms for solving the problems.
The most troubling area for modern Iran is the economy. It has been hit hard by economic sanctions, greatly intensified after the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. Attempts to curb their effect by forcing cooperation with other countries have had either a partial (as in the case of Russia) or almost no effect (with China and Turkey). Over the last year, the GDP growth rate of the IRI has declined by almost 7%, unemployment is around 12-15%, and the national debt is about 50% of the country’s GDP.
In the first months of 2023 alone, the Iranian national currency depreciated by 50%. Prior to that, during the protests, there was a decrease of 20%.
As a result, according to various estimates, about 60% of the population of the Islamic Republic currently live below the poverty line and 18.4% are in absolute poverty.
All these disappointing indicators take place against the background of huge Iranian hydrocarbon reserves, the export of which, however, is extremely difficult due to the aforementioned sanctions. It is noteworthy that Tehran’s economic problems have also been indirectly affected by Tehran’s rapprochement with Moscow, because now Russia is forced to sell its oil and gas at preferential prices to Turkey and China, thus reducing the market for Iran. The latter is looking for a compromise with such an important strategic partner, which inevitably leads to concessions and additional problems in the economy.
In addition, the IRI’s loyal position towards Russia and its special operation in Ukraine puts into question the negotiation process on the Iranian nuclear program and the prospects of a new “nuclear deal. This means that a solution to the external causes of Tehran’s economic problems is not expected in the near future. However, the political elite of the Islamic Republic seems to be ready for this kind of reality, being focused on the Eurasian vector of foreign policy and the development of relations with neighboring states, as well as Russia and China. The conservatives dominating the Iranian political horizon are particularly inclined to this vector.
All of these foreign policy factors are reflected in the domestic situation in Iran. In Iran, at least 60% of those employed work in the informal sector, and social inequality has been growing steadily. In Iran, the minimum wage (which is about $560) has not increased for several years, while prices, including those for basic necessities, have risen steadily and rapidly. Wage arrears are not uncommon in both the private and public sectors.
All of this is aggravated by corruption, which has both subjective and objective causes, in particular, the control of senior officers of the IRGC and the corps as a whole, at times, over large (and crucial) sectors of the Iranian economy.
Social and economic reasons were at the heart of the mass protests of 2017 and 2019, and even the protests of late 2022, which were motivated by the tragic death of student Mahsa Amini, were motivated by the same problems. In this case, the political rallies turned into a social protest – at least in the country’s regions – producing a rather remarkable mix, relatively new to Iranian political realities (previously, the opposite was true – social protests could gradually descend into political demands and slogans).
Since the most basic, underlying problems have not been solved, the government’s loyalist measures to the population (in particular, more than 84,000 detained protesters were pardoned in two stages) do not save the situation as a whole. The protests are periodically resumed, which, in turn, further lowers the rating of the current government and its head, conservative Ebrahim Raisi, who has chosen a policy of publicly ignoring what is happening and acting only by the repressive apparatus. If his predecessor Hassan Rouhani tried to respond to the protests, made concessions and accepted at least some of the demands of the discontented, Reisi and the conservatives simply closed the issue – including by refusing to discuss it in the Mejlis.
The population is no less irritated by the closed nature of the ruling regime. For example, there are practically no new people in the Raisi government. Instead, there are politicians who previously held high positions under past presidents from the conservative camp. Many of these figures are participants in high-profile corruption scandals, in particular the speaker of the Majlis Galibaf. The head of the Islamic Republic’s judiciary, Mohsen Ejei, has a reputation in the West as “executioner number one,” and he only confirmed this reputation during the crackdown on protests.
At the same time, at this point there is no point in seriously talking about a change of power – the 2023 protests, despite their media replication inside and outside Iran, are inferior in scale to the 2009 and 2019 rallies, and the government retains the levers to regulate the situation – both repressive and socio-economic (along with amnesties, these include subsidizing the prices of a number of basic goods and services, directive job creation at the expense of the public sector or enterprises controlled by the IRGC, finding new sources of finance at the expense of the needs of Russian special operations in Ukraine, etc.).
Moreover, it is obvious that the Iranian political regime has generally recovered from the consequences of the protests and is actively engaged in foreign policy. However, the leadership of the Islamic Republic is not succeeding in everything – this also applies to agreements with external players (in particular, the lack of real benefits from the signed agreement on partnership with China until 2040 looks particularly critical) and reforms inside the country. Problems of this kind tend to accumulate, and the IRI will have to solve them. Although no revolutionary change of power is to be expected, the absence of an adequate solution to social and economic problems will make it very difficult for the conservatives to retain power in the next elections, while traditionally in Iran, the president holds office for at least two consecutive terms.
Separately, we should consider the possibility of the hypothetical death of the 83-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which should bring to power new forces from within the ruling regime. The military-political elite, represented by high-ranking officers of the IRGC, has proved to be particularly good among them and has an opportunity to get more involved in running the country after the death of the Supreme Leader and the departure from the leading positions of the clergy, most of whom are already at a very advanced age. This kind of scenario is possible and may even increase the stability of the Islamic regime, but should be considered at least in the medium term.
Author: Anton Evstratov (Russian historian, journalist and journalist living in Armenia, lecturer at the Department of General History and Foreign Regional Studies at the Russian-Armenian University in Yerevan).
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)