By Ida Sargsyan and Anton Evstratov
On November 15, the Armenian National Assembly held a budget debate for 2024, during which the country’s military budget for next year was presented separately.
According to the submitted bill, in 2024, compared to 2018, the defense budget will more than double: expenditures through the Ministry of Defense will amount to 555 billion dram ($1.4 billion) or 37.7 billion dram more than the indicator for 2023 (of 7.3%), which in turn will amount to 5.3% of GDP.
One of the key points of the discussions was the statement by Andranik Kocharyan, chairman of the NA Standing Committee on Defense and Security, that the armaments that Armenia intends to purchase from now on, in addition to defense equipment, must be new.
Armenia’s military budget for the coming year is of particular interest against the backdrop of political statements and events occurring in Armenia. As is well known, Russia has traditionally been the main supplier of arms to Armenia. However, in recent years, particularly after the 2020 war, and the subsequent ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, relations between the two allies have deteriorated sharply.
Yerevan has accused Russia of failing to deliver $1.5 billion worth of weapons and refusing to return funds already transferred. The Russian side, in turn, claims that the weapons are ready for Armenia, but the Armenian side does not take them, despite the fact that the Russian side is contractually obligated to deliver them. According to unofficial information, this is a contract between the RA Defense Ministry and Russia’s NPO Splav JSC, which produces Smerch MLRS missiles, which was supposed to produce missiles for Armenia. Obviously, Russia’s decision not to supply weapons is political in nature and forces Yerevan to look for new, more reliable supply markets that do not have such close ties and obligations with Azerbaijan.
Until now such suppliers have been India and France. After the 44-day war, information appeared online about the import of certain types of weapons from Iran to Armenia, but their origin was initially unknown. It was speculated that the weapons were Iranian. In 2022, Indian media began publishing information that Armenia and India had concluded contracts for the supply of various types of weapons worth nearly $244 million. These were Pinaka multiple rocket launchers (MLRS), which, according to Indian sources, are a local analogue of U.S.-made Himars systems.
In 2020, India also provided Yerevan with four Swathi anti-battery radars worth $40 million. At the DEFEXPO 2022 arms fair in India, representatives of the two countries also discussed the possibility of India supplying kamikaze drones and SAM Akash, as well as other ammunition. But there is no concrete data on the agreements reached. Another type of weapon purchased by India are ATAGS howitzers. These guns are designed for combat operations in mountainous terrain and meet Armenia’s requirements.
Already in the fall of this year it was reported that Armenia will purchase a UAV countermeasures system from Zen Technologies from India for $41.5 million. The contract also includes training for military personnel. In the summer of this year, Indian company MIL delivered 5 million rounds of 7.62 mm caliber ammunition to Armenia. India also plans to supply Armenia with 150,000 rounds of 30- and 40-mm ammunition.
It should be noted that Yerevan does not publicize its military cooperation with India. One of the reasons is the fear of creating obstacles from the Russian Federation. Gayane Abrahamyan, former parliamentarian and director of the educational center “In the Name of Equality,” has already reported on such obstacles.
Another “wrongdoer” is, of course, Azerbaijan. The country’s presidential aide, Hikmet Hajiyev, even met with the Indian ambassador, urging him not to arm Armenia for fear of escalation. Azerbaijan learned that weapons were coming to Armenia from India from Iran through the occupied high ground in Armenia’s Syunik province after the May and November 2021 aggressions. These positions allow full control of the transit route connecting Iran and Armenia.
France has also pledged to support the RA armed forces. Negotiations for the supply of French arms to Armenia began after the 2020 war, and on October 23, 2023, Yerevan and Paris signed a military cooperation agreement. According to the contract, France will provide Yerevan with three medium-range three-dimensional radars with AFAR Ground Master 200 (GM 200) and portable SAMs designed to defeat helicopters and Mistral aircraft at low altitude.
The cause of a diplomatic scandal between Baku and Tbilisi was the delivery to Armenia, via Georgia, of a batch of French “Bastion” multipurpose armored vehicles produced by the Acmat company. Azerbaijan did not hesitate to complain vigorously to the neighboring state, but Georgia made it clear that Baku should not dictate its terms. Although Georgia remains neutral in the conflict between neighboring countries, it is clear that its path of integration with the European Union brings Georgia closer to Armenia than to the dictatorship in Baku, as Europe supports Yerevan in its aspirations to free itself from Russia’s dominant influence.
It should be noted that soon after the delivery of the French armored vehicles, Georgian Defense Ministry chief Juansher Burchuladze arrived in Armenia on an official visit that ended with the signing of a defense cooperation plan between the two countries for the coming year. Thus, Georgian mediation is likely to continue in the supply of arms to Armenia.
Taking into account the trends in European policy toward Armenia, it is to be expected that in addition to France, other EU countries will also show interest in the Armenian market, previously not considered due to Russian influence. In particular, Sweden has made a proposal to join Paris in providing military assistance to Yerevan, albeit symbolic, but aimed at signifying European support.
European support for the Armenian Armed Forces also manifests itself in the form of training of military personnel. Within the framework of the strategic dialogue document signed between the RA and Britain, an agreement was reached that London will provide assistance in managing the RA’s borders to solve security problems. In addition, the British side will provide assistance in teaching the English language to the military, employees of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Regarding the structure of the Armed Forces, the policy to increase the number of contract soldiers by making the service more attractive continues. Enlisted soldiers are given the opportunity to continue contract service after 6 months of mandatory service for a period of 5 years. Changes to the law provide for high payments in case of health problems, for service at posts and other social benefits. There is also an opportunity to improve qualifications for career advancement.
Another innovation of the government is the introduction of military service for women on a voluntary basis. “Compulsory military service on a voluntary basis” means that such service is voluntary until conscription, then service for 6 months becomes mandatory.
In addition to internal systemic reforms, the Armenian armed forces will change in appearance. This year the Ministry of Defense held a competition for new uniforms. The new designs have not yet been selected for all units, so the competition is still open.
Conclusions: Despite the relatively wide range of acquired weapons, their technical characteristics are mostly inferior or not superior to their Russian counterparts, even from the Soviet era. For example, the air defense systems acquired by India are nothing more than an export version of Soviet models from the 1960s-1970s. As for the prices of armaments, it is likely that Yerevan will have to buy all these products not at domestic prices, as in the case of Russian armaments, but at world market prices, which is very sensitive given Armenia’s limited financial resources.
Armenia can try to compensate for this with its own production. In particular, the country has already started the production of UAVs, but it is not serious to talk about a real replacement with its own products-the quantity and quality of available devices do not give this opportunity. In addition, at the moment Armenia does not even have production of individual components to repair existing equipment, which places the country in a direct and virtually hopeless dependence on suppliers.
Armenian-Iranian military cooperation also cannot be considered satisfactory, as Armenia practically does not purchase Iranian weapons. This is partly due to Tehran’s desire to have an equidistant position in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, as well as the reluctance of the Iranian side to compete with the increasingly neighboring Russia in the Armenian arms market. In addition, Iran’s ability to supply weapons to Armenia is limited: while Iranian UAVs and missiles have proven their effectiveness in some recent military clashes, the Islamic Republic is forced to purchase essential weapons such as tanks, aircraft, UAS, etc. on its own or to produce similar ones of objectively low quality and obsolete design.
Despite its obvious desire to diversify its arms suppliers away from cooperation with Moscow and gradually reorient itself toward the West, the Armenian leadership cannot completely do without Russian arms purchases. A total rejection of military cooperation with Russia will not only stop the influx of new Russian weapons at preferential prices, but will also cripple the work of existing ones, as it will be extremely difficult to supply them with repair components. At the same time, Russian authorities are trying to sabotage deliveries to Armenia-even under already signed contracts-to pressure the Pashinyan government and try to obstruct its path to the West. This, however, is itself a vicious cycle, causing irritation in Yerevan and incentivizing the RA leadership to further diversify its weaponry.
However, Armenia is playing an extremely dangerous game, in the event of failure of which it could be left unarmed in the face of super-militarized Azerbaijan and NATO country Turkey, which remain Armenia’s main and, in fact, only adversaries on the hypothetical and real battlefield. Moreover, Moscow still has more direct levers of pressure on Yerevan, which it can use if necessary.
The Armenian leadership must engage in a subtle political and diplomatic game to be able, in the near future, to relatively gently remove the country from the sub-military-political influence of the Russian Federation. Also important in this context is the position of Western countries – the United States and the European Union – interested in Russia’s geopolitical weakening and removal from regions of traditional influence. With Russian troops engaged in Ukraine and Moscow’s focus on Azerbaijan, which is more valuable to Russia economically, Armenia becomes an obvious field where Russian influence can be undermined. The West has every opportunity to do so, but will political will be sufficient?
Author: Ida Sargsyan, Anton Evstratov
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)