World Geostrategic Insights interview with Adam D.M. Svendsen on the concept of Intelligence Engineering and how it is transforming traditional intelligence methods, improving international cooperation and trust in information sharing between different agencies.
Adam D.M. Svendsen, PhD, is an Associate Professor at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC/FHS) and an international intelligence and defence strategist, educator, researcher, analyst, adviser and consultant. He is a multidisciplinary expert in Global Security and Intelligence, who divides his time between the UK and Scandinavia, advising European projects, lecturing internationally, and contributing to defense research, while authoring peer-reviewed works and engaging with major international organizations.
Q1 – Your work introduces the notion of “Intelligence Engineering.” Could you explain this concept and how it fundamentally shifts the perspective from traditional intelligence gathering and analysis?
A1 – This is a good question and place to begin. At its most basic, ‘Intelligence Engineering’ (IE) is defined in my textbook, ‘Intelligence Engineering: Operating beyond the Conventional‘ (Bloomsbury, 2017), as: ‘the use of scientific and technical knowledge to artfully create, operate, maintain, and dismantle complex devices, machines, structures, systems, and processes that support and/or disrupt human endeavour occurring in the intelligence context…’ . We can readily add that from that extensive basis, ‘Spanning both human and technical intelligence realms, IE includes the collection and analysis of information that is of military and/or political value, and that relates to international relations, defence, and national security.’ Also extending the range of work covered by IE, ‘Strategic Futures [foresight], risk management across resilience concerns are similarly engaged.’
While extents may vary, intelligence is traditionally recognised as considerably ‘an art’ and ‘a science’ in how it is done and in how intelligence practitioners go about their business. In its main and adopting a ‘critical constructivist’ perspective, we can argue that contemporary intelligence is today moving beyond merely its roots in the general disciplines of the ‘arts’ and the ‘sciences’, and is further extending into more specific and (pro)active ‘engineering’ realms. Amongst other transformations, that work includes the discernible and increased uptake of ‘System-of-Systems’ and ‘Team-of-Teams’-based architectural design and shaping processes.
What we can term the ‘intelligence-engineering nexus’, and indeed the more coherent actions of the ‘Intelligence Engineering’ phenomenon itself (e.g. as defined above), becomes much clearer than previously. Many changes are undergone, especially as we move beyond merely more ‘breaking down’ activities and simultaneously extend into more explicit ‘synthesis’ tasks.
Another way of explaining where we are today, whereas so-called ‘traditional intelligence’ might have been more concerned about the ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ dimensions of its work, as well as providing more of a ‘supporting function’ as part of its overall balance; today we are also more concerned about ‘influence’ and ‘directing’ dimensions, and intelligence is performing more of a leading role along those lines on and from increasingly widespread bases.
Q2 – You’ve applied Intelligence Engineering methods to cyber scenarios. What are the unique challenges in generating reliable cyber intelligence (CYBINT) scenarios, and how do these methods address uncertainty?
A2 – This is another great question that again is very expansive. There are several challenges in generating reliable CYBINT scenarios. Most importantly here, we can highlight their ‘operational parameters’ (such as asking fundamental interrogative questions, such as: ‘what is involved or going on here? How? Why?, and so forth) require being clearly drawn, including answers to those earlier questions being robustly underpinned by properly verified intelligence input.
That last work is accomplished in terms of clearly delineating the key intelligence-related ‘factors’ and ‘indicators’ involved (e.g., figuring as ‘variables’), as well as next carefully monitoring their changes, for example, over the course of time and/or space/place.
In my recent 2024 book, co-authored with Dr. Bruce Garvey, MBA, ‘Navigating Uncertainty using Foresight Intelligence‘ (Springer, 2024), we developed the concept of constructing a ‘problem space’. This was done in order to better scope the full-spectrum range of issues, problems, risks, hazards up and across to threats all being confronted in, for example, cyber contexts, as well as being encountered and experienced more generally.
Through our multi-stepped process – which is described in more detail throughout the book – we then transform the ‘problem space’ into a ‘solution space’. We are able to ascertain and then assign different close-to-far ‘distances’ between ‘solutions’ in terms of (as well as the extent of) their similarities and differences when compared alongside each other.
Called ‘Strategic Options Analysis’ (SOA), that work, in turn, ultimately enables the ability to offer decision-maker end-users a series of ‘strategic options’, which are in effect the differently configured scenarios presented in their variously packaged forms.
By then interrogating the different range of ‘strategic options’ or ‘scenarios’ displayed to them, decision-maker end-users can better explore the different configurations that overall provide varying answers to the main question asked in any foresight enterprise of ‘what if?’ Improved assistance in better navigating situations and conditions of uncertainty is thereby offered through the greater provision of this Foresight Intelligence. Where to start on journeys to most desired destinations, as well as at least having a sense of which pitfalls to avoid, is made clearer.
Q3 – In your book “Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror”, you examine Anglo-American security relations after 9/11. To what extent did this cooperation serve as a model for wider international intelligence liaison, and where did it fall short?
A3 – When taken most generally over the long course of history and with any more specific points of ‘imperfection’ aside, UK–US intelligence relations are widely recognised as collectively being one of the ‘best’ examples of international intelligence cooperation.
In their ‘specialness’, while they might be thought of as being ‘sui generis’ (without parallel and/or being beyond generalisation), we can argue that ultimately in-depth examination of UK–US intelligence relations and taking comprehensive account of all of their associated interactions can in fact effectively provide us with some considerable insights concerning wider international intelligence cooperation and how it works – often indeed referred to more technically, officially and formally as ‘liaison’.
The ‘uniqueness’ and ‘exceptional’ qualities boasted by the UK-US intelligence relationship arguably form even an ‘inspirational model’ which others seek to follow. Illustrating many of the ‘paradoxes’ of intelligence and the ‘double-edged sword’ nature of liaison work, the ‘strengths’ found in the relationship can equally indicate where its ‘weaknesses’ might exist, particularly when there are situations and conditions of ‘overreach’ and/or ‘under-reach’ discernible in the relationship in different places and at different points of time. There are many demonstrative case study examples of these ‘imbalances’, for instance as found described in my book chapter: ‘“Strained” relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo American intelligence and security co-operation’ that features in S. Marsh and A. Dobson (eds), Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (Routledge, 2012).
I have also developed many different ‘levels’ of analysis and subsequent engineering in my work over the years, such as showcased in more depth in my 2012 book, ‘Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence’ (Palgrave/Macmillan), to effectively illustrate where and how we can do our more sophisticated ‘benchmarking’ in such circumstances.
Q4 – You discuss the “professionalization” of intelligence cooperation. What key standards or best practices are essential for building trust and ensuring effective information sharing among diverse international agencies?
A4 – I do see ‘key standards’ and ‘best practices’, including at the international level, as being important for the ‘professionalisation’ of Intelligence co-operation. Those efforts even involve the more explicit process of ‘international standardisation’, as well as highlighting the consistent upholding and constant maintenance of those types of standards over time.
In my ‘professionalization’ book, the ‘key standards’ and ‘best practices’ that I particularly emphasise, at least in a beginning manner, are largely drawn from previous research undertaken by other scholars studying the ‘professionalization’ process(es) of similar and comparable ‘functional agents’, such as the police.
Indeed, here, we can appropriately quote Professor Allyson MacVean, who has found from her research on the theme of the professionalisation of policing that: ‘It is widely accepted that a profession can be defined as occupations that embrace six particular features: autonomy, commitment, collegiality, extensive education, service orientation and specialised skills and knowledge.’
Q5 – After more than 20 years since 9/11, how has the phenomenon of “intelligence liaison” evolved, particularly in addressing non-state actors like the Islamic State?
A5 – Overall, intelligence liaison continues to be very mixed and uneven today, including when addressing most recent threats – as my 2016 article: ‘Developing international intelligence liaison against Islamic State: Approaching “one for all and all for one”, published in the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, demonstrates.
Here, we have an overall trend which sustains much continuity with what we have seen previously in the past. We can add that while, both centrally and more peripherally, highly secretive intelligence liaison has become better understood through its much more thorough analysis in recent years, discernible limits simultaneously emerge and persist boasting many continuing defence and security implications. As intelligence liaison continues on its incremental evolutionary trajectory overall, we can argue that it still very much remains generally a ‘work-in-progress’ in terms of its wider development.
Q6 – As an intelligence strategist focused on “Strategic Futures,” how do you differentiate between “early warning,” “anticipation,” and “foresight” in a practical security context?
A6 – Revisiting the core definitions of any concept is always most helpful for working out where differentiation may occur, together with how that phenomenon might be further developed. This is where thinking and working much more in ‘pluralistic’ terms and in terms of adopting different foci, approaches and methods, as well as harnessing their diverse overlaps and combinations, come in most helpfully. In our work we can also go beyond just the scoping of concepts with the employment of more of a practical eye towards their greater implementation.
For me, drawing on the different concepts listed above, ultimately and albeit to different extents, they all have to meet the fundamental intelligence end-user criteria of being ‘STARC’. Namely, that is meeting: Specific, Timely, Accurate, Relevant and Clear needs, in order to successfully fulfil any requirements encountered in a practical security context. That most matters whatever label or concept might be precisely applied.
Q7 – How is your current research with the Norwegian Armed Forces leveraging intelligence engineering to address future security challenges and multi-domain strategy?
A7 – All my work is entirely research-based and evidence-informed, so perhaps some of the clearest insights in answer to this question can be found as detailed via my 2021 article: Addressing ‘Multiplexity’: Navigating ‘multi-everything!’ via Intelligence Engineering.
Here, harnessed via ‘Intelligence Engineering’, both ‘System-of Systems’ and ‘Team-of-Teams’ concepts are combined in, firstly, ‘context appreciation’, and then, secondly, ‘solution-fashioning’ roles. This work is done in order to better negotiate situations and conditions of ‘multiplexity’, where ‘multiple complexities’ are involved in and across the multi-domains, which span from the more physical sea, land, air, space domains to the more virtual domains of cyber and information. That work: (i) builds on ‘hindsight’, identifying and learning lessons from the past (history); to (ii) helps develop current ‘insight’, relating to ‘what is happening now?’; extending to (iii) helping inform ‘foresight’, considering questions, such as ‘what might happen next?’
Adam D.M. Svendsen, PhD – Associate Professor at the Norwegian Defence University College.
Image Source: U.S. Air Force