By Farshad Adel
China should be considered a new actor in the West Asia region. The emergence of this new player is the logical and natural outcome of China’s rise as an international power and the expansion of its global influence.
In recent decades, China has sought to increase its influence worldwide by emphasizing key concepts such as “shared development, multilateralism, and win-win benefits.” Among these efforts, relations with Arab countries in West Asia hold significant importance for China, as extensively outlined in the China-Arab Policy Paper adopted in 2016.
This document describes the historical breadth of China-Arab relations, reflecting an effort to outline a vision encompassing various areas, including political cooperation, trade and investment, social collaboration in health, technology, and agriculture, as well as people-to-people exchanges. The paper also highlights high-level financial exchanges, cooperation in nuclear energy and other technologies, infrastructure development, and mutual support in international affairs.
China has pursued this vision for relations with the Arab world with determination. For instance, its trade with the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members grew from $10 billion in 2000 to over $230 billion in 2021. By the end of 2022, these six GCC countries, with a trade volume exceeding $315 billion, were among China’s largest trading partners.
Additionally, the value of Arab investments and assets in China surpassed $5 billion by the end of 2023, primarily in energy and petrochemical sectors.
China’s cooperation with Israel has also expanded across various fields, including infrastructure, agriculture, and education. Bilateral trade between China and Israel reached a record $21 billion in 2022. Over the past decade, Chinese companies have signed around 500 investment contracts in the occupied territories, mainly in technology sectors such as telecommunications and artificial intelligence.
China’s growing cooperation with West Asia is reshaping the region, and its investments are naturally amplifying its role. However, China does not currently appear interested in enhancing its involvement in West Asia’s security dimensions.
This claim is reinforced by China’s stance on the Gaza conflict, where, despite condemning civilian casualties and refraining from endorsing claims that Hamas’ October 7 attack was terrorism, it has maintained a cautious distance, emphasizing diplomatic solutions like the two-state formula.
Similarly, China’s position on Syria remains consistent. While it has vetoed ten UN Security Council resolutions critical of the Assad regime and invested over $3 billion in Syria’s oil and gas sector, it has cautiously avoided direct involvement in Assad’s potential downfall, advocating instead for a political solution to ensure stability. China will likely seek influence in Syria’s future through close ties with Arab states, with instability in Syria and its spillover effects posing the greatest risk to Chinese interests.
This cautious approach was also evident during the Iran-Israel conflict. Despite politically condemning U.S. and Israeli actions, China has not engaged in substantive military cooperation with Iran. Although the 25-year Iran-China cooperation agreement includes clauses on “enhancing law enforcement and security cooperation, including counterterrorism” and “expanding military collaboration to strengthen defense and strategic capabilities,” these have not translated into tangible outcomes.
China’s Vision for West Asian Security
China views the security of all West Asian countries as interconnected, believing instability in any one nation could affect others—including regions like Xinjiang. Thus, lasting security in West Asia can only be achieved through win-win cooperation, development corridors, integration into global value chains, and economic interdependence. China, emphasizing multilateralism and respect for sovereignty, positions itself as a reliable partner, facilitating mutually beneficial development for both itself and West Asia.
China’s Security Strategy in West Asia
China aims to avoid direct entanglement in West Asia’s security crises while refraining from threatening U.S. security interests in the region, keeping its strategic competition with the U.S. focused on the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.
China’s approach to security engagement in West Asia is not direct intervention but “development for stability”—a strategy previously tested in Xinjiang, which faced separatist and extremist challenges.
Despite prioritizing economic influence through trade, bilateral investments, infrastructure projects, and tech cooperation, China has also fostered growing security ties with several West Asian states. Examples include joint drone production with the UAE’s Golden Group, ballistic missile cooperation with Saudi Arabia, joint military exercises with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, and the establishment of its first overseas military logistics base in Djibouti. These steps could reshape China’s security role in West Asia in the coming decades, though an abrupt shift in its current cautious security policy appears unlikely.
Obstacles to Iran-China Security Cooperation
As an emerging power in West Asia, China prioritizes trade-centric relations with regional states while recognizing U.S. influence and avoiding direct challenges to Washington. Notably, China’s closest military collaborations in the region are with countries that also maintain strong ties with the U.S.
Despite its global rise, China avoids presenting itself as a superpower, instead identifying as a developing nation committed to win-win cooperation and advocating for equitable economic opportunities for developing countries. This is formalized in its 2023 initiatives: Global Development, Global Security, and Global Civilization, which emphasize multilateralism, mutual benefits, and the interdependence of nations’ security.
While China criticizes U.S. policies, it stresses adherence to international order—a point repeatedly communicated to Iran. From China’s perspective, Iran’s image as a revisionist, anti-Western regional power—coupled with its unresolved tensions with the U.S. and extensive sanctions—poses the biggest obstacle to strategic ties.
As a UN Security Council permanent member, China is reluctant to damage its global brand by aligning with a state perceived as anti-system. Moreover, Iran’s sanctions-limited role in global value chains diminishes its appeal as an economic partner for China’s initiatives.
Given China’s focus on economic rather than security-political engagement in the Middle East, Iran is excluded from its list of preferred strategic partners, explaining the lack of progress in implementing the 25-year cooperation agreement.
China’s cautious stance toward Iran will likely persist even under a Trump administration, as Beijing prioritizes managing U.S.-China relations to sustain trade and economic ties.
Notably, while China supplied military aid to Russia despite U.S. opposition, this was likely a strategy to exhaust Moscow and remove it from the U.S.-China-Russia strategic triangle.
The Path Forward for Iran-China Relations
For Iran to enhance military-security cooperation with China, it must recalibrate its macro-policies in line with regional and global realities. Key steps include:
– Emphasizing international responsibility,
– Formulating strategies complementary to China’s economic initiatives and regional partnerships,
– Lifting international sanctions and reintegrating into global value chains.
Economic integration between Iran and its neighbors, under a well-defined “Look East” and neighborhood policy, could attract Chinese investment in high-tech industries. Given China’s ambition to lead in advanced technologies by 2049, Iran’s human capital, industries, and energy resources hold unique appeal—but only if Iran normalizes its standing in the eyes of global powers.
Under such conditions, the groundwork for expanded Iran-China military-security cooperation would be laid, potentially enabling Iran to access sensitive defense technologies, including fighter jets, network-centric warfare systems, AWACS aircraft, radar, and air defense systems.
Author: Farshad Adel – Secretary-General of The Iran-China Think Tank For Strategic Studies, Teheran, Iran.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy or views of World Geostrategic Insights).