By Anton Evstratov
Situation of crisis in the world puts the countries of Central Asia at risk of losing some of their political and economic sovereignty.
The coronavirus pandemic, the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, and the consequences of changing political and military realities in the South Caucasus are determining the development of the current and short-term situation in Central Asia.
The biggest irritant of the military-political situation in the region, according to most of the expert community, is Afghanistan, from where, conforming to the agreement reached, American troops will soon be withdrawn. This especially concerns Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and the latter has already been promised CSTO military support in case of complications on the Afghan border. Tashkent, for its part, as well as Ashkhabad, not being a member of the CSTO, rely on Russian assistance in the bilateral format of interaction. In this sense, Uzbekistan has a much deeper level of cooperation with Moscow; a new program for Russian-Uzbek strategic cooperation has already been signed. Uzbekistan is also benefiting from some American assistance – in particular, having received from the United States some weapons of its previously reduced Afghan contingent.
The Strategic Military Partnership Program for 2021-2025 was signed on April 28, during a visit to Tashkent by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. The document provides for a joint fight against terrorism, as well as improvement of defense capabilities of the Uzbek Armed Forces and training of Uzbek officers in Russian military universities. The decision to create a joint air defense system with Tajikistan was signed during the same tour of Shoygu, already in Dushanbe.
The Russian side is the main moderator of regional security and actively interferes in military and political processes of its states. On the territory of Tajikistan, in particular, there is a Russian 201st military base, and other countries take part in military and military-police exercises initiated by Russia, among which for 2021 alone are “Interaction-2021” and “Cobalt-2021. Tajikistan is also implementing a program to create a common air defense system with Russia, which, however, is not relevant for countering the Taliban and is rather aimed at the future (as a deterrent against the United States and indirectly – China).
Tajikistan’s recent border conflict with Kyrgyzstan, exacerbated by the fact that both countries are members of the CSTO, increases the degree of Tajikistan’s “problems. Despite the temporary freezing of the border incident, both military and civilian lives have been lost on both sides, and the territorial problem has not been finally resolved. The demarcation between its two allies will be the most important task of the near future for Russia and the CSTO bloc as a whole. In this context, the mentioned agreement on the creation of joint air defense forces of Russia and Tajikistan is extremely important, which demonstrates Moscow’s sympathy in this conflict. Considering that Dushanbe does not have any combat aviation (not counting helicopters), the supply of Russian S-300 air defense systems to the republic would be a major factor in its hypothetical confrontation with Bishkek, which has combat aircrafts, even though they are outdated Soviet ones.
At the same time, all the states in the region, except Turkmenistan, are part of the common air defense system of the CIS countries, which on the one hand is undoubtedly a positive factor of common security, but on the other hand, given the contradictions of some countries (especially Kyrgyz-Tajik), cannot but raise questions for the future.
Another line of interaction to achieve regional security is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes all Central Asian countries, and Afghanistan is involved as an observer. However, this organization, which does not have its own military contingents and is under the prevailing influence of China, is considered as a security structure only secondarily – in the wake of its economic advantages.
When it comes to the military-political situation in the region, in addition to the negative factors of the Afghan threat and the Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict, there are positive ones – in particular, a decrease in the degree of tension between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the use of cross-border water resources. Previously, in light of the construction of the Rogun dam in Dushanbe and some other facilities and the lack of water in the Uzbek territories, the parties were repeatedly on the verge of war, but with the coming to power in Uzbekistan of President Mirziyoyev, the risk of violent resolution of controversy has significantly decreased. Currently, the two sides are working to reach a procedure for using the rivers that satisfies each state.
In general, however, water resources in Central Asia are extremely limited, and are a constant factor of tension in almost every country. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, located in the upper reaches of rivers (Naryn, Syr Darya, Amu Darya), facing environmental problems (in particular, droughts), are trying to preserve fresh drinking water by building dams, reservoirs and other irrigation facilities. However, Uzbekistan, which is located in the lower reaches of local rivers, is extremely uninterested in this.
This year was also marked by drought, which affected Kyrgyzstan to a greater extent, where the water level in the largest Toktogul Reservoir dropped almost threefold. To restore the water level at least to the minimum level, Bishkek was ready to close the locks, however, experiencing pressure from Uzbekistan and indirectly from Kazakhstan. Since the issue of water resources is linked to the issue of energy supply, these countries have agreed to supply Kyrgyzstan with electricity in exchange for maintaining a comfortable regime of the mentioned reservoir, which feeds strategically important for the country hydroelectric power plant.
Thus, the resource crisis is also projected onto the economy, which also leaves much to be desired in the region. First of all, the economic problems of the Central Asian countries are related to the coronavirus pandemic, which has largely stopped or slowed down regional and global economic ties. As a result, the countries of the region experienced a slowdown in economic growth that will continue, and only at the end of the year may there be some stabilization with the prospect of a gradual increase in production volumes. The pandemic crisis has hit both industry, affecting relatively developed Kazakhstan, and agriculture, creating a critical situation for Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The latter, in addition, are experiencing serious socio-economic problems related to the curtailment of labor exports to Russia, which cannot be employed in the home country. Moreover, legislative norms introduced by the Russian Federation have raised the question of the return of tens of thousands of migrant workers already working on its territory, who also cannot be accumulated in their places of birth and residence.
As a result, there is a growth of protest potential of the population, which can be extremely critical for such a weak regime as the Kyrgyz one. At the same time, the Merziev regime in Uzbekistan, which is carrying out, or at least declaring, sociopolitical and economic reforms, has sufficient credibility and, consequently, a margin of safety. Moreover, the Uzbek authorities still have a powerful repressive apparatus capable of suppressing popular unrest and demonstrations, just as they did under the previous leader Karimov.
The Rahmon regime in Tajikistan is just as strong, despite social problems and economic stagnation. Additional strength comes from the support of Russia and the CSTO and, in a sense, from the Afghan threat, which requires national unity and gives the authorities a free hand for repressive measures.
A special case is Turkmenistan, which did not recognize the presence of the coronavirus on its territory, but was forced to impose restrictions virtually identical to those of the other states. Turkmenistan has also encountered problems with the return of migrant workers – only not from Russia, but from Turkey and Cyprus, and just like its neighbors, it is unable to accumulate them, and the impoverishment of the population on its territory is frightening. At the same time, Berdymukhamedov’s regime looks quite strong due to the suppression of any opposition and repression on the one hand, and the low level of socio-political development of the population on the other.
The most multifaceted and complicated situation in the region is in Kazakhstan, its richest and most economically developed country. On the one hand, there is no question of the return of tens of thousands of migrant workers in Kazakhstan. On the other hand, the standard of living of its population has also declined significantly. According to a number of surveys, we are talking about a 20-30% drop in the income of the average citizen. As a consequence, discontent with the authorities and the protest potential of the population is growing. The situation is aggravated by some sobering of the population from the “transit of power” from Nazarbayev to Tokayev, who in fact retained all the key powers of the former leader. It is noteworthy that the protest activity in Kazakhstan, previously concentrated solely in large industrial cities, is now affecting the economically depressed villages as well. At the same time, Kazakhstan still has oil revenues that can be used to calm people’s discontent, and the credibility of the new president has not been completely exhausted. At the same time, the authority of Nursultan Nazarbayev remains on the one hand and his control over law enforcement agencies, allowing him to avoid a critical situation, on the other.
Interstate conflicts, the threat of invasion from Afghanistan and the growth of the population’s protest potential dictate the need for Central Asian countries to maintain an acceptable level of military effectiveness. However, the situation here is far from ideal. In fact, only the regional leaders, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have truly combat-ready armed forces. Tajikistan, as mentioned above, has no combat aviation, and its tank and artillery fleet is based on obsolete Soviet models. The situation in Kyrgyzstan is slightly better – it has several dozen Soviet MIG-21s and aircraft of other designs, and its tank and artillery fleet is numerically higher than that of the Tajiks, but in both countries the equipment is obsolete morally and in extremely poor operational condition. For example, these countries possess T-55 tanks, D-1 howitzers and other equipment that became a rarity in the second half of the 20th century.
Turkmenistan has a larger military force and a decent military budget, which at some stages was even larger than Kazakhstan’s, but the structure, training and command of its Armed Forces are extremely low. This was demonstrated, in particular, by the truly disastrous results of the Turkmen military’s border clashes with Afghan gangs a few years ago.
As for the armies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the latter ranked higher in all recent ratings. However, this state of affairs occurred because Tashkent has a much larger reserve, Nur-Sultan. It also has a tangible superiority in the number of tanks and artillery. However, Kazakhstan has several times the military budget of Uzbekistan, and its army is equipped with much more advanced weapons. This applies both to tanks T-90 and planes that were supplied through cooperation within the CSTO, and air defense systems (Kazakhstan has the Russian S-300, while Uzbekistan can match them only with the old Soviet S-200) and drones (Uzbekistan has no drones at all), which have demonstrated their effectiveness, for example, in Karabakh.
However, full-scale hostilities between regional leaders are practically excluded, and conflicts between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan seem to be preventable by Russia and the CSTO.
Speaking of the Afghan threat, contrary to the opinion of the aforementioned many experts, we are inclined to state an exaggeration of its danger for Central Asia. The Taliban movement is extremely combat-ready and effective, primarily through its guerrilla actions. However, the latter can only be successful in the ethnic territory of the movement’s supporters. Outside Afghanistan and, with some reservations, the adjoining areas of Pakistan, the Taliban have never demonstrated, and do not seek to demonstrate, any success. Moreover, the movement has never announced an invasion of neighboring Central Asian countries, speaking only of cooperation and dialogue with them. Should hostilities break out, the Taliban would have to wage an ordinary war, far from being a guerrilla war, from which any Central Asian army, even the weakest, equipped with the heavy equipment, aircraft, helicopters, and artillery absent from the Taliban would easily emerge victorious.
In many respects, the “Afghan card” in Central Asia is played by the world powers that aspire to dominate the region – Russia, China and the United States. Moreover, for Moscow the danger of the Taliban leaving Afghan territory – real or imaginary – is extremely advantageous in terms of building up its presence in Central Asia – not only militarily but also politically and, if necessary, economically. This state of affairs may, in a sense, correct the negative dynamics of Russia’s loss of influence in the region in favor of China. At the same time, domestic and general cultural Sinophobia in the societies of Central Asian states is hardly capable of putting a definitive end to Russophilia and Russian influence in these states.
In somewhat more promising position in terms of regional influence is another player – Turkey, which since the early 1990s has been actively promoting its culture in the region, educating its Turkic identity through public organizations, network of Turkish lyceums and other infrastructure. Ankara has been particularly successful in this regard in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. The latter is tied to Tajikistan not only culturally but also economically, since many Turkmen labor migrants work in Turkey. Kyrgyzstan, as a member of CSTO and a formal ally of Armenia, in recent days stressed its pro-Turkish stance by opening an exhibition devoted to the war in Karabakh, reflecting the position of Turkey and Azerbaijan in this conflict. At the same time, Turkey has problems with spreading influence even in these countries – Turkmen workers simply can no longer stay in Turkish and Northern Cyprus enterprises and farms because of the coronavirus, and Bishkek has refused to transfer the Turkish high schools controlled by President Erdoğan’s opponent Fethullah Gülen to the Turkish government. However, Turkey is unable to support its cultural influence in the region either economically or militarily – its trade turnover with Central Asian countries is many times less than even Russia’s, let alone China’s, and it cannot physically contribute in any way to regional security.
Thus, the Central Asian states currently face a number of complex problems. Some of them have arisen spontaneously and recently (coronavirus), some have worsened in recent years. In the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, these are border tensions and water and energy problems; in the case of Uzbekistan, demographics and the collapse of labor migration. Turkmenistan, along with the traditional socio-economic challenges, has fewer and fewer intellectual resources to develop its gas fields, and may cede control over them to the Chinese. Kazakhstan, for its part, has faced growing protest potential and a loss of confidence in the government.
At the same time, the region is an area of struggle between the world (Russia, China, the United States) and regional (Turkey) powers. At present, only Russia and China are able to provide effective assistance to the countries of Central Asia in maintaining stability and order – the former with political and military leverage (including through the CSTO), the latter with economic leverage. All this will be done at the cost of the sovereignty of the regional countries, and this scenario is unlikely to be avoided in a period of crisis.
Author: Anton Evstratov (Russian historian, publicist and journalist living in Armenia, lecturer at the Department of World History and Foreign Regional Studies at the Russian-Armenian University in Yerevan).
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).