China’s recent escalation against Japan following Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on November 7 reveals less about Tokyo’s intentions than about Beijing’s strategic anxieties in a shifting international order.
During deliberations in a House committee, Takaichi responded to persistent questioning by an opposition lawmaker regarding hypothetical contingencies involving Taiwan. Her answer did not constitute a diplomatic statement aimed at strategic signaling. Nevertheless, Beijing abruptly intensified diplomatic, economic, and military pressure, demanding that she retract her remarks. This unexpected overreaction rapidly triggered a bilateral diplomatic crisis and injected acute turbulence into Japan–China relations.
Takaichi refused to cancel her statement. Instead, on November 25, her cabinet issued an official written response to a formal parliamentary inquiry. In it, the cabinet reaffirmed Japan’s long-standing legal position: the limited scope of collective self-defense and the strict conditions governing the application of the concept of a “Survival-Threatening Situation” remain unchanged. Beijing, however, appears to have misinterpreted her remarks as implying that Japan would apply this legal concept in the event of a Chinese armed attack on Taiwan. That interpretation is unfounded.
In hindsight, Takaichi would have been wiser to preserve strategic ambiguity and avoid engaging hypothetical scenarios. Japan is neither legally nor politically positioned to undertake armed intervention in Taiwan. Under the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952, Japan renounced sovereignty over Taiwan without assigning it to any successor state. Tokyo has long derecognized the Republic of China on Taiwan. Moreover, the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Japan’s Constitution, and subsequent national security legislation strictly limit the use of force to cases directly tied to Japan’s own survival—primarily the defense of U.S. forces operating in the region when Japan’s security is at stake. Beijing is well aware of these constraints, rendering its alarm largely unwarranted.
That said, Takaichi’s remarks do complicate Beijing’s public opinion warfare against Taiwan, which aims to cultivate a sense of siege among the Taiwanese public in order to achieve unification without fighting. Ironically, the more Beijing publicly pressures Takaichi to retract her words, the more Taipei is encouraged—often through misunderstanding—much as Chinese public sentiment is shaped by the Communist Party’s own propaganda. At the same time, Beijing’s coercive behavior has bolstered Takaichi’s domestic standing, as many Japanese perceive China’s actions as baseless imputation and political intimidation.
Rather than de-escalating, Beijing has intensified its confrontational posture through travel restrictions, trade controls, threatening military exercises, and diplomatic offensives invoking the U.N. Charter’s ex–enemy clause. Yet these measures have proven largely ineffective. Japan has diversified its economic ties, coordinated diplomatically and militarily with the United States and key allies, and absorbed reputational attacks that have gained little traction internationally. In several cases, Beijing’s actions have backfired, inflicting greater harm on China’s own domestic interests than on Japan.
Given that Chinese leaders can anticipate these limits and reversals, the intent behind Beijing’s strategy becomes clearer. China appears to seek a controlled deterioration of relations with Japan—particularly in economic and social exchanges—while preserving overall interdependence. Beijing is grappling with the destabilizing effects of a massive economic bubble burst, compounded by U.S. tariffs and high-tech competition. Under these conditions, curbing capital flight—especially the emigration of affluent Chinese to Japan accompanied by large-scale asset transfers—has become an urgent priority.
On the Japanese side, Prime Minister Takaichi and a weakened Liberal Democratic Party face their own domestic imperatives. To sustain approval ratings, they must satisfy core conservative supporters increasingly alarmed by the rapid influx of Chinese immigrants and tourists, soaring real estate prices in major cities, and overtourism that many feel is eroding Japan’s social order and way of life.
Paradoxically, then, strained Japan–China relations currently serve the interests of both Takaichi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Their approaches are not cooperative, but they are congruent. Beneath the surface of confrontation lies a tacit alignment of domestic political incentives. This dynamic unfolds alongside enduring strategic competition between Japan and China and against the backdrop of intensified U.S.–China rivalry.
Crucially, this impasse should be understood within the broader transition from waning U.S. global hegemony to an emerging multipolar balance-of-power system—one in which the United States remains the foremost among several regionally dominant powers. From the perspective of the U.S.-led liberal international order, a Japan–China crisis is often framed as a potential trigger for major war, even a U.S.–China hegemonic conflict, necessitating reinforced deterrence or renewed containment. Yet under multipolarity, the same phenomenon can be interpreted as part of an evolving check-and-balance mechanism among the United States, China, and Russia.
At the core of today’s global politics lies a struggle between globalist and anti-globalist forces. This contest has reshaped American domestic politics and produced far-reaching international consequences, particularly under the Trump administration. While globalist influence within the United States has receded, its major bastions remain in the North- Atlantic—most notably the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Canada.
The most recent U.S. National Security Strategy document reflects an assumption of multipolarity, prioritizing American predominance in the Western Hemisphere, followed by economic competition, and the avoidance of military confrontation in Asia. Washington now seeks coexistence with China while pursuing grand bargains after stalled tariff-centric trade negotiations exposed U.S. vulnerabilities, including dependence on Chinese supply chains and Beijing’s advances in artificial intelligence. Simultaneously, President Trump has aligned with Russia’s anti-globalist leadership and sought a Ukraine settlement favorable to Moscow—moves fiercely resisted by remaining North-Atlantic globalists. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Takaichi’s warm embrace of Trump’s anti-globalist posture, though lacking a fully articulated grand strategy, situates her closer to this emerging axis. In this sense, Trump, Xi, Putin, and Takaichi find themselves on the same side against North-Atlantic globalists, despite profound differences among them.
Seen in this light, the current Japan–China impasse is less dangerous than it appears—provided that strategic communication is restored. To prevent miscalculation, Prime Minister Takaichi should consider dispatching the new Director of the National Security Secretariat as a special envoy to President Xi with a confidential message. Such a démarche should clarify the legal and political meaning of her statement and acknowledge the coincidental convergence of interests between Tokyo and Beijing, even amid persistent historical grievances and geopolitical rivalry.
In an era of emerging multipolarity, managing confrontation—not eliminating it—has become the true test of statesmanship.
Author: Masahiro Matsumura – Professor of International Politics and National Security at St. Andrew’s University in Osaka (Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku), Japan.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).