By Chester Cabalza

    There’s a belief that Russia’s war on Ukraine will make Poland a future target especially if the conflict in Kyiv concludes. Its strategic vulnerability in the eastern flank would divert Moscow’s capable launching of conventional attack in the East Shield, a fortified direct land link with Belarus and Kaliningrad through Suwalki Gap connecting Poland to the Baltic States. 

    Chester B. Cabalza

    While there is no sign of immediate invasion, Russia is still committed to Ukraine’s destruction; however, multiple forecasts point to a serious security risk within 3-5 years especially if Kyiv falls or a geopolitical reset occurs between Kremlin and the White House.

    On the other hand, China’s intensified gray-zone strategy in the South China Sea and interference with Philippine supply missions, boarding boats, water cannons, and strategic control in the Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal are calculated approaches if Beijing forcibly invades Taipei, then Manila becomes geopolitically critical particularly in the Bashi Channel and Luzon Strait which are key maritime gateways between Taiwan and the Pacific. The Philippines’ geography situated it within the first island chain, making it more tactically compelling in any Taiwan conflict over access or blockade control. 

    Given the clear strategic foresight, Poland is building one of the strongest armies in Europe since Moscow’s full-scale military adventurism around Ukraine since February 2022. Warsaw, with over 4% of its gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defense in 2024, managed to reach a 4.7% increase in 2025. The ex-communist Central European nation and now a European Union member disbursed USD 35 B defense bill last year and would even round off a national defense budget of USD 48.7 B this year. 

    The Philippines’ military expenditure expanded by almost a fifth to USD 6.12 B in 2024 from USD 5.14 B in 2023 and increased its defense budget by 12.3% in 2025. However, Manila spends more percentage of GDP compared to Indonesia and Thailand, but both ASEAN neighbors posted higher nominal values in defense spending. The modest increase attributed to the external security threat of Manila from Beijing after its revitalized military modernization program. 

    While Warsaw is responding to heightened tensions in Eastern Europe, particularly Russia’s activities near Belarus and Kaliningrad, its defense programs cover advanced systems like Patriot air defense, Abrams tanks, and domestic munitions production. In contrast, Manila is pivoting toward territorial defense in the West Philippine Sea countering gray-zone threats and countering internal security roles. Major procurements include FA-50 fighter jets, Super Tucano aircraft, armored vehicles, corvettes, helicopters, and cyber defense systems. 

    Poland and the Philippines are geographically distant but both devout Catholic nations share common characteristics as emerging middle powers in Europe and Asia. Both countries face increasingly complex regional security environments and cooperation between them on the defense economy that ranges from arms production, procurement partnerships, and technology exchange are importantly strategic; thus, making it more substantial in a multipolar world. 

    Through a middle power coalition, Warsaw and Manila could be effective on multilateralism and defense partnerships which other European powers co-opted with the Philippines including France, Germany, and Lithuania. Although, Poland heavily relies on alliance with NATO and the Philippines with the US through the 74-year-old Mutual Defense Treaty. But the two emergent middle powers are pursuing constant military modernization in response to perceived threats to achieve strategic autonomy without being overly dependent on any single major power. Thus, cooperation enhances their collective leverage and bargaining power with larger defense exporters. 

    As frontlines of great power competition, the Central European and Southeast Asian middle powers could exchange experiences on counter-hybrid warfare, civil-military defense integration, early warning systems, drone warfare, and cyber defense. More so, since the Philippines recently revitalized the self-reliant defense posture, Poland can support its fellow Christian state in developing its own arms industry or enter joint ventures together. They can forge military cooperation on affordable land systems in artillery and armored vehicles; small arms and ammunition manufacturing; maintenance, repair, and overhaul hubs in Central Europe and Southeast Asia; and increase training in defense coordination, procurement, and NATO-ASEAN interoperability standards. 

    Poland and the Philippines may differ in their strategic interests and grand narratives, however, both transformative countries can punch above their weight in defending international norms on sovereignty-centered policy, maritime law, and human rights. As catalysts of change, both mid-sized armies can forge regional security frameworks in NATO and ASEAN, contribute to the UN peace operations and humanitarian causes, and promote peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution both internally and within the international community. 

    As dynamic middle powers, Warsaw and Manila can open the gates for a joint SRDP programs since defense industries are crucial components of national security—it provides vintage and modern military equipment, technology and services necessary for any sovereign state to defend itself against foreign aggression, essentially acting as a vital pillar to a nation’s defense posture. Thus, there is a need for defense industries to spearhead sophisticated shared research and development (R&D) in cutting-edge technologies amid the pivotal geopolitical turpitudes and game-changing grand strategies. 

    For instance, as a frontline NATO state, Poland is one of the most active members on the eastern flank, providing deterrence against Russian aggression. Warsaw can host forward-deployed NATO forces, including US troops, missile defense systems, and multinational battlegroups. Poland has the highest share in NATO by helping relieve burden-sharing concerns to stabilize Europe. It is one of the first responders to Russia’s assault on Ukraine since Crimea’s loss that provided critical military aid, humanitarian relief, and refugee support sheltering over three million Ukrainians. Poland has served as a logistical and training hub for Western equipment and personally aiding Kyiv during the war. Most importantly, Warsaw is a vocal advocate of deterrence posture toward authoritarian powers, supporter of energy security and democratic solidarity across borders. 

    The Philippines, often hailed as a maritime rule of law advocate and at the forefront of defending the UNCLOS in the South China Sea. It has won the 2016 arbitration ruling against Beijing’s expansive claims and the landmark judicial decision reinforces international maritime law. The Philippines regularly conducts freedom of navigation patrols, often with allied support, to uphold maritime order. As a promoter of rules-based order and conflict prevention mechanisms with ASEAN, Manila has participated in multilateral naval exercises to strengthen cooperative security. 

    To further enhance defense diplomacy and strategic dialogue between Poland and the Philippines, they need to establish a bilateral defense consultative forum, annually or semi-annually, focused on strategic assessments on Russia and China and their hybrid threats. There should be a military doctrine exchange and forge memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation covering joint training, industrial cooperation to boost defense economy, and humanitarian response coordination. 

    Poland has a fast-developing defense industry and pursues joint ventures with the US, South Korea, and European partners, of which it overlaps with Philippine suppliers. More so, Manila needs to boost its self-reliant defense posture while Warsaw needs new markets and partners for scaling production. Both democratic countries can open opportunities for transfer of affordable land systems for howitzers, armored cars, and small arms. Or pursue joint maintenance facilities in the Philippines for Polish or NATO-standard equipment, collaborate in ammunition manufacturing, and increase exchange on cybersecurity and drone technologies. 

    Author: Dr. Chester Cabalza is the Founding President of the Manila-based think tank International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC).

    (The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the  views of World Geostrategic Insights). 

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