World Geostrategic Interview with Dr. Hriday Ch. Sarma on the growing presence of Asian countries in the South Caucasus, India-Azerbaijan relations, including in relation to the implementation of the multi-modal transport corridor INSTC, and the military dimension in Armenia-India relations.
Dr. Hriday Ch. Sarma is an independent researcher. He is also a co-founder of Caucasus-Asia Center, a non-partisan organization that works towards connecting businesses in the Greater Caucasus and countries in EuroAsia.
Q.1 – Asian powers are increasingly interested in the South Caucasus. Not only China, Pakistan and India are also trying to strengthen their presence in the region. Pakistan mainly through the consolidation of its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan, India by developing its relations with Armenia. What are the factors that have contributed to the entry of the Asian players into the South Caucasus? What are their main geopolitical interests there?
A.1 – Up until a few years back, roughly around the end of 2016, there was limited (economic) presence of the Asian countries in this strategic region. That was also the time when the three newly independent countries- Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia- were dedicatedly attempting to foster stronger ties with the EU and the US. So, none of them cared to look ‘East’; however, things started to change when the Aliyev regime gave up its plans of gaining any further membership to the EU institutions and instead focused on strengthening its ties with its Muslim neighbours, both far and near.
In January 2017, Azerbaijan began releasing tourist visas online. This allowed Pakistani nationals, especially the businessmen, to easily come into the country who in the past were securitized even if they came as tourists. That was, in fact, a turning point for the growing Asian (strategic-level) imprint in the region which we see today. The people-to-people engagements between Azerbaijan and Pakistan further consolidated the bilateral defence and economic ties. Around about the same time, China also started giving an impetus to its BRI projects in the region in its attempt to build a modern supply and transportation network connecting with Europe. All the three South Caucasus countries attempted to gain a piece of the Chinese investment that was coming in. China reciprocated as it understands the geostrategic importance of the region, lying at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. India is a late (strategic-level) entrant in the region. The Indian government is only now siding with Armenia, which it did not do even during the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020. Regardless of India’s strong cultural ties with Armenia, the former has throughout stayed away from openly siding with the latter on sensitive political matters. India’s recent change in stance has come about as a result of Pakistan’s strengthening “strategic partnership” with Azerbaijan.-
Q.2 – There is a growing diplomatic rift between India and Azerbaijan, mainly due to affinities in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Kashmir conflicts. Especially the 44-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 has led to crystallization of informal alliances between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan on the one hand, and India and Armenia on the other. However, India seems to be investing in cooperation with Azerbaijan despite the geopolitical differences. In the first six months of 2022, India became Azerbaijan’s fourth largest export partner. Compared to the same period in the previous year, Azerbaijan’s exports to India increased by 107 percent to US$896 million. Most importantly, both India and Azerbaijan are interested in the full implementation of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). How do you think relations between these two countries will develop?
A.2 – For I have both researched and practically worked in certain capacities on the INSTC project, I may say that this project is currently in a dormant stage. I am not saying that all construction activities and policy deliberations (both bilateral or multilateral between the participating countries) have come to a standstill, but the changed global political scenario has put a brake on the prospects of realization of this project. Unless the US and EU relaxes its sanctions against Iran, no major international company (or even any Indian company) is willing to take the risk of going alone.
As for India-Azerbaijan trade, you are correct that the trade between the two countries is witnessing an upswing in recent times. Here a few factors are coming into play:
i) Strong Indian diaspora in the country: There is a sizable Indian community residing in Azerbaijan, many of whom are pursuing businesses and have been staying there for many years now. Some of these businessmen have married Azerbaijani ladies and are raising their families there. Moreover, the Indian Association in Azerbaijan (a non-profit body) has been at the forefront of organizing various cultural and business-related events, connecting Indians in Azerbaijan, Indians in India and the people of Azerbaijan.
ii) The bigger territorial size and economy of Azerbaijan vis-à-vis Armenia: Azerbaijan is approximately 86,600 sq km, while Armenia is approximately 29,743 sq km, that makes Azerbaijan 191% larger than Armenia. Azerbaijan’s GDP totalled $54.62 billion in 2021, while Armenia’s GDP stood at 13.86 USD Billion. The numbers speak volumes about the state of prevailing scenarios in both countries. However, a fact can not be disregarded that Armenia has an advantage on technology matters as compared to its counterpart, which is where India and Armenia are starting to collaborate.
iii) Pro-active role played by Embassies of both countries: Here the role of the Embassies have been instrumental in shaping the economics (‘economic diplomacy’) between the three discussed countries. It must be said that the Azerbaijan Embassy in New Delhi, especially under previous Ambassador Ibrahim Hajiyev (who acted in this capacity for quite a few years), very actively worked to promote trade ties between the two countries. Moreover, the official visit of India’s ex-foreign minister Sushma Swaraj in 2018 (at the side-line of the Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement) cemented the ties between the two countries in different sectors, including in energy, transportation and capacity building.
Q.3 – In June 2022, when rumors emerged of possible Azerbaijani military operations near the border with Armenia, an Armenian defense delegation visited India to negotiate with New Delhi on the purchase of weapons, including drones. In late September, Indian newspapers reported that India will export missiles, rockets and ammunition, including the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher system (MBRL), to Armenia through a government-to-government contract. How important is the military dimension in Armenia-India relations? Can it cause changes in the overall geostrategic framework of the South Caucasus?
A.3 – Frankly, I am not too sure about the effectiveness of the Pinaka multiple rocket launcher system that claims to fire a salvo of 12 rockets over a period of 44 seconds (the upgraded version that can fire 72 rockets in 44 seconds is not up for sale).
Back in 2014, there were reports that this Indian developed rocket system failed to meet mission parameters during a trial test from Chandipur base in the state of Odisha, which then put the reliability of the weaponry system at a stake. Subsequently some improvements were made to this system, but no major changes!
The particular version of this weapon system that India is negotiating to sell can engage area targets up to 38km at mean sea level and at higher altitudes the range increases by a few more kilo-meters, which still remains a very modest target range. Even if Armenia acquires this rocket-system, it will not be able to cause any major damage deep inside Azerbaijani territories, except in the settlements near the borders. It needs to be noted that Baku lies around 290 kms (180 miles) and Ganja around 100 km (62 miles) from the frontlines of Nagorno-Karabakh. Essentially, the Pinaka weapons system cannot be compared with the Iskander surface-to-surface missiles that Russia supplied Armenia in 2016 which has a range of 300 kilometres.
I see, India-Armenia military cooperation will increase in the coming time with likely deliveries of anti-tank missiles and other ammunition happening soon. However, this would cause Pakistan to sell even greater indigenously built and Chinese imported/ designed ammunition to Azerbaijan.
To my understanding, India at the moment is unwilling (rather incapable) of causing any markable change to the overall geostrategic landscape in the South Caucasus, which if it attempts will cause kickbacks in unexpected ways.
Dr. Hriday Ch. Sarma – Independent researcher, co-founder of Caucasus-Asia Center, a non-partisan organization that works towards connecting businesses in the Greater Caucasus and countries in EuroAsia.