By Nikola Mikovic
Leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, Lugansk People’s Republic, as well as Russia-occupied southern Ukrainian regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, hope to join the Russian Federation in the coming days. Kyiv and the West will never recognize Russian annexation of those territories, which means that the Ukraine war will go on, and will likely enter a new, potentially very dangerous phase.
After the four regions hold referendums, the Kremlin will likely formally recognize the results of the plebiscite, and pave the way for their incorporation into the Russian Federation. But Moscow could also use the referenda as a method of pressure on Ukraine, as well as a source of leverage with Western powers. In that case, the Kremlin will not hurry with the annexation of southeastern Ukraine, although such a move will create an additional mistrust of the local population in the Russian authorities.
Pro-Russian population living in the Donbass and southern Ukraine knows quite well how Moscow, following its debacle in the Kharkiv region, openly betrayed those people on the ground who agreed to collaborate with the Russian forces. Prior to the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Russian officials traveled to the region, telling the locals that “Russia will stay there forever”. Many of those who naively believed the Kremlin’s empty promises tried to escape to Russia, since staying in Ukraine meant a severe punishment for collaboration with the occupiers.
Thus, if the Kremlin does not immediately recognize the results of the plebiscite, and incorporate the four regions into the Russian Federation, the locals could interpret such a hesitation as a sign that Russia will not stay there forever. Kyiv, for its part, will see such a move as a clear signal that Moscow is willing to continue making deals with the Ukrainian political leadership. Recent release of the Azov Regiment fighters perfectly illustrated Russia’s readiness to “do business” with the Eastern European country and its Western partners.
Despite war, Moscow continues exporting natural gas to the West through Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin is also interested in selling ammonia to Western countries, but on September 16 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed that he would allow Russia to use Ukrainian territory for such a business only in exchange for Ukrainian war prisoners. Following Zelensky’s demand, on September 21 Russia released 215 Ukrainian POWs, including the commanders of the Azov Regiment.
Therefore, it is entirely possible that the Kremlin will use the referenda as a bargaining chip with Ukraine. And it would certainly not be the first time for Moscow to implement such a strategy. In May 2014, the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic held referendums on secession from Ukraine. It took eight years for Moscow to recognize the Donbass republics.
If, however, Moscow decides to act promptly, recognize the referendum results and annex southeastern Ukraine, nothing will change for the Donbass, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, since Ukrainian Armed Forces will undoubtedly continue attempting to restore Kyiv’s sovereignty over the regions. In other words, for the local population, artillery shelling and partisan warfare will remain a norm for the foreseeable future. What might change, though, is the Russian perspective of the conflict.
After the annexation, Russia will fight the war “on its own soil”. That could be one of the reasons why Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilization. Russia likely aims to preserve control over the Donbass and southeastern Ukraine. But given that the Ukrainian military will continue receiving all kinds of weapons from the West, Moscow will have a hard time achieving such a goal, even with additional 300.000 mobilized soldiers. Moreover, a significant number of new forces will have to stay in Western Russia in order to prevent Ukraine from potential attempts to seize parts of Belgorod, Bryansk, or Kursk regions.
In order to achieve the initial goals of the so-called special military operation – although it is rather questionable if the Kremlin still has such plans – Moscow will have to completely change its military and political strategy. In other words, besides mobilization of troops, Russia will have to mobilize its military-industrial complex, and various other sectors of the country’s economy. Easier said than done, given that many sectors of the Russian economy are dominated by oligarchs who will unlikely be willing to give up their profits for the sake of the Ukraine war. In addition, Russia’s military-industrial complex is heavily dependent on the import of various components, which means that Moscow, in the long-term, may start facing weapons shortages.
More importantly, if Russia does not manage to at least preserve the status quo in Ukraine, and find a way to force the Eastern European country to sign a lasting peace deal, the Kremlin risks more humiliating defeats. As a result, in order to save face and pressure Kyiv to agree on Russian conditions regarding a ceasefire or a peace agreement, Moscow might eventually use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Such a move will almost certainly lead to a serious escalation and, as the United States President Joe Biden said, “change the face of war unlike anything since World War II.”
At this point, however, Russia is more likely to continue using the existing conventional weapons, and to deploy more forces to Ukraine in order to preserve control over the Donbass, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. But in the long-term, if things go wrong for the Kremlin, a nuclear escalation should not be ruled out.
Author: Nikola Mikovic (Journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia. He covers mostly the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine)
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).
Image Credit: AP