By Chester Cabalza, Ralph Romulus Frondoza, and Chelsea Nicole Pineda
Tokyo is ramping up its security cordon in Southeast Asia while Manila continuously expands its diplomatic clout as amalgamated responses to common security threats amid Beijing’s bolder approach in achieving its geopolitical ambitions in the tense South China Sea.
Last December 18, 2023 marks the most pivotal development of Philippines-Japan security ties since the two Asian states fought against each other during the Second World War. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida agreed to speed up the negotiations to finalize the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) during the sidelines of the 50th Commemorative Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Japan Friendship and Cooperation in Tokyo.
None other than Marcos Jr. stated how ‘extremely significant’ RAA is in elevating Manila’s capability in maintaining peace and order in the contested South China Sea. The range of possibilities that the RAA offers primarily utilizes deterrence as a cornerstone in preventing full-blown regional conflict along their respective maritime borders. Although the exact contents of the agreement are still unclear, it is expected to bolster wider security cooperation between the two archipelagic nations through joint military exercises, defense training, and disaster preparedness, among others. In short, it would allow the deployment of armed forces on each other’s territories once the groundbreaking military pact is formally signed.
Albeit, the distinct aspects of the proposal that when realized to its fullest extent, certainly will revolutionize the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) sector of the Philippines which potentially serve as a lynchpin in countervailing the balance of power against a common regional adversary. This realization can bolster Japan’s transfer of state-of-the-art coastal radar systems by Mitsubishi Electric Company to the Philippines’ much-needed boost on military modernization and coastal defense.
In fact, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation delivered to the Philippines’ Department of National Defense on December 3, 2023 the military hardware fostering the bilateral security exchange that included air reconnaissance training for the Air Force personnel. Exchanges of defense equipment upgrade, both physical and human assets, not only eases adaptation of force interoperability, but also opens avenues of joint research and development between the bilateral partners. These are significant aspects which will future proof critical defense infrastructures for both the Indo-Pacific partners especially in an era of multi-domain conflict that unravels globally.
The RAA between Japan and the Philippines is a first of its kind in Southeast Asia, following Tokyo’s concluded agreement with Canberra and London in 2022. Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the Northeast Asian maritime nation from reactivating its armed forces and engaging in offensive military campaigns thus constraining the movements of the Japanese Self Defence Forces to self-preservation purposes. But the Japanese government has ventured out on policy options to expand its military ties within the US sphere of influence from joining the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ initiative to establishing new security cooperation frameworks to traditional non-traditional allies while working around its constitutional constraints.
Public perception towards the revision of Article Nine is slowly changing due to China’s territorial claim in the East China Sea, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and nuclear missile tests of North Korea, among others. Yet, until the Japanese public is fully swayed into a national referendum on the 1947 Constitution, the Japanese government will continue to work around the constitutional constraints further limiting defense policy initiatives and continuing reliance on external allies for national security, therefore impeding Japan’s aspirations for regional leadership, and addressing serious security challenges to its sovereignty.
As Manila’s increasing geopolitical importance becomes apparent, the Southeast Asian nation will serve as the real testing waters for the RAA with Japan before other non-Western countries shall follow suit. Before this happens, Tokyo must work around to fulfill its commitment to Manila as the first recipient of the Official Security Assistance (OSA). The OSA framework is an outcome of the 2022 National Security Strategy which separates the traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) focused on social and economic development.
However, the timely establishment of the OSA framework, a nexus of development and security, recalibrates the golden opportunity for Japan’s renaissance as a regional leader that provides non-Western allies and economically inclined countries to China a foreign policy option to develop maritime capabilities without sacrificing economic ties with Beijing. Hence, developing Southeast Asian countries would find the OSA a great addition to aid packages offered by the Japanese government because this would allow them to pursue socioeconomic recovery through ODAs and address defense exigencies simultaneously.
Tectonic shifts in the Asian security landscape further solidified Japan’s role as a key player in the regional security complex, expanding its robust military cooperation in East Asia while sharing its defense expertise and world war experience with the Philippines. Thus, the adoption of Manila’s compellence strategy presents a promising alternative mechanism aside from the collective deterrence it gets from Tokyo that seeks to shape an adversary’s conduct of convincing Beijing from the drawbacks of gray zone tactics of military laser grade and water cannon attacks. China’s dangerous maneuvers likened to a ‘horse with blinders’ signify a narrow tactical victory in a short-term period placing terror and violence above fairness, justice, and rules-based international norms. With the formative strategic deterrence with Japan through the innovative RAA, it further opens a novel parameter for sophisticated compelled strategy which certainly can help enhance diplomatic networks of Manila due to its potential vastness for military interoperability across the region.
Dr. Chester Cabalza is the Founding President of the Manila-based think-tank, International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC). Ralph Romulus Frondoza and Chelsea Nicole Pineda are Resident Fellows of IDSC.