World Geostrategic Insights interview with Ioannis P. Sotiropoulos on the shifts in Germany’s policy toward Ankara and situation in the Aegean, and about Turkey’s registration of the “TurkAegean” trademark, and why Greece has been silent on demands made by Turkey to allow Finland and Sweden to join NATO.
Ioannis P. Sotiropoulos, Ph.D., is a Senior Analyst in International Affairs, and Director of the Sector of Geopolitics of the Cold War, Laboratory for Geopolitical Analysis, Department of Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies, NKUA
Q1 – Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock met in Istanbul on July 29, 2022. The meeting had points of contrast. Baerbock rejected Turkish claims to some Greek islands in the Aegean and pointed the finger at the militarization of the surrounding areas. “The Greek islands of Lesvos, Chios, Rhodes and many others are Greek territories and no one has the right to question that,” the German minister said, “we cannot solve the problems in the Eastern Mediterranean by increasing tensions.” While Cavusoglu explicitly expressed regret for the “more balanced positions” of the previous German government. But at the same time we can note that Berlin seems to confirm the joint venture with Ankara for the production of a new generation submarine, which could change the balance of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean in favor of Turkey. So, what is your opinion about the current policy pursued by Germany with regard to Ankara and the situation in the Aegean in general?
A1 – Regarding the shift of the German policy, this started slowly from last year and it is continuing steadily. Two are the main factors that triggered and influenced the phenomenon. First factor is the Russo-Ukrainian war, and second is the radical upgrade of Greece’s military-defense capacity.
Prior to the commencement of the war, Germany had a cheap energy mixture to supply its energy intensive industries, with the big markets of Russia and China widely open to its export and minimal capital spending for defense purposes and military equipment. None of these still stand, while no one is in a position to know the future of the German enterprises in Russia and the billions of German investments in the country. The result was Berlin to gobanging with the American eurasian policy and NATO’s strategy, leaving as the only option for differentiation the matter of energy in the near future, most likely in 2023, a fact which was assisted by the newly elected german government which does not hide its pro-western preferences and orientation. Yet it is a fact that since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022, Berlin adopted a “safe” stance on the Greek-Turkish matters, including difficulties of the southeast Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.
This stance coincides with the political stance and the standing positions of the European Union, which considers the Turkish expansive neo-Ottoman, neo-imperial proposal of the “Mavi Vatan” as completely anachronistic and unfounded, as a source of international problems that will bring the EU to a desperate state and eventually harm it. For this reason, the EU and Berlin fully adopt as their political position for the region the option of international legitimacy that emerges by the international law which defines absolute Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands, except for what is expressly defined by the relevant treaties. In addition, it seems that the terrifying socio-political impact that was created and is ongoing fast in Europe, due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, does not leave any room for further experimentation in the wider area of European interests.
Also, the fact that Turkey deviates from NATO and the EU policy weights catalytically, being the only member state of the Western Alliance that did not apply any economic sanctions against Moscow, and maintains intact, if not deepen, its political-diplomatic and economic relations with Russia, which, inter allia (see S-400 [C- 400 Триумф] missile system issue), directly questions Ankara’s loyalty to the Western Alliance and the Western Community. Towards Western Alliance, Germany is strategically turning to again, at least until it implements its new €100m defense budget for next year, which looks set to reach around €800m by the end of the decade.
Regarding the case of the German submarines U-214, Berlin has no reason to abort the already slow process of a profitable trade agreement that has a long standing history. Nonetheless, even the purchase and integration into the Turkish navy of the latest generation of U-214 submarines, the situation in the eastern Mediterranean will not change much, due to the fact that Greece has already been operating in the waters of the Aegean and the southeast Mediterranean for over 15 years, 4 of these submarines, while Athens is very close to adding to her capacity an additional stock of new 533mm torpedoes, (DM2A4 Seehecht/ SeaHake mod 4) for those from Germany.
In any case, Germany’s stance on the southeast Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea is a clear political shift towards the support of international legitimacy and international law. In addition to the aforementioned reasons, Berlin is beginning to take into consideration much more serious the peripheral balance in relation to the defense sector. Historically, during the 20th century, Greece has always had a clear military advantage, since it made sure that it was superior in terms of aeronautical forces, both in terms of their weaponry quality and operationally, over revisionist Turkey. With the advent of the ten-year economic crisis 2010-2020, the performance gap between Greece and Turkey narrowed so that for some analysts they are considered equivalent in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. For this reason, Greece, in order to ensure its territorial sovereignty and its sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, carried out an active policy both in the military and in the political field. In the military field, the spearhead is the purchase of a new squadron (24) of 4,5th generation aircrafts, Rafale F3R air superiority from the French Dassault, and 3+1 Belhara frigates, FDI Class from the French shipyards of the Naval Group of Lorean, while at the same time, Athens and Paris signed a very important defense agreement of mutual military assistance.
It also signed for the upgrade of 86 4th generation F-16s to the 4+++ generation F-16 Viber, the best version of these aircrafts. In addition, it has sent a letter of request for 1+1 squadron of F-35s (5th generation) from the US, which views the case extremely positively, especially after the establishment of its new military base in Alexandropole in northern Greece near the exit of the Dardanelles Straits. In conclusion, we can say that Greece is at least one step ahead of Turkey in the aeronautical sector, with a dynamic tendency to move even further.
In the political field, Greece and Cyprus were quick to take advantage of the rift in the relations between Turkey and Israel in 2010. This was favorably received by Jerusalem who was in search of a strategic partner to cover the gap left by Ankara. An indication of this newfound cooperation was the historic first conventions of the Supreme Council of Ministers for Cooperation between the Governments of Greece and Israel on 8 and 9 October 2013, where several legal agreements between the two countries were signed for cooperation in various sectors (e.g. security, tourism, cultural, energy etc.).
The convention was followed by the Greek Israeli Business Forum for the cooperation of business circles from both countries. In the same vein, Major General Giora Eiland, former head of the National Security Council of Israel, stated on 30 November, 2014 in relation to the deepening of the Greek-Israeli relations on the defense level:. “We decided to have a military attaché in Athens, something that only happens in 15 cities worldwide. This shows the depth of cooperation that exists now. We conduct common aviation and naval exercises in Greece, the Israeli defense industry supplies the Greek armed forces, the cooperation in the field of security and exchange of information is deepening, for the common fight against terrorism. Relationships that are based on mutual economic benefits, as well as energy, have their own dynamics. Of course, if the Turkish-Israeli relations continue to deteriorate, there is another reason for closer cooperation between Greece and Israel.”.
At the same time, Athens promoted the military-energy-political close collaboration with Cairo. On 8 November 2014, Greece, Egypt and Cyprus signed an agreement being “… cognizant of the immense challenges to the stability, security and prosperity of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the need for a concerted and collective response …” They even issued a joint communique on the respect of sovereignty of states’ rights: “…Turkey to cease all seismic survey operations underway within the maritime zones of Cyprus and refrain from similar activity in the future. … we emphasize the universal character of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and decide to proceed expeditiously with our negotiations on the delimitation of our maritime zones, where it is not yet done.”. This Tripartite agreement solidified the historic commitment of the three states for the future developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: “We commit to mobilize all our capabilities in order to effectively promote our common interests and values. In this framework, we have established the tripartite consultation mechanism, which met today at the highest political level with a view to working towards unleashing the full potential of our region to the benefit of the peoples of our three countries and of the whole region”. Not long after the Declaration signing, on 25 November 2014, Major General Mahmoud Ibrahim Mahmoud Hegazy, the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian National Defense signed a Memorandum of Military Cooperation with his Greek Counterpart, General Michael Kostarakos, during his visit in Athens. Strongly promoting the joint EEZs delimitation with Cyprus and Greece, Egypt has committed, as a result of this Agreement, to provide military support if need arises in order to defend the Cypriot neo-reserves.
The statement of the Egyptian Ambassadress in Nicosia, Dr. Heba Salah Eldin El Marassi, on 18 August 2015 in Cyprus News Agency (CNA) is indicative of Cairo’s intentions: “All three countries Greece, Cyprus and Egypt took a significant step to deepen their cooperation, which provides protection to their sea area from any violations … There are areas of cooperation for addressing mutual threats and challenges which affect us together.”. It is notable that within the context of the existing military cooperation dozens of joint aeronautical exercises are conducted, with the epicenter located south of Crete at the boundaries of the two adjacent EEZs. Over the years, the two tripartites have been strengthened significantly, constituting the only security and stability formula for the South-East Mediterranean region, while the realization of the East-Med Pipeline in such a difficult geostrategic competition of the Western Community with Russia, seems closer since then.
It therefore becomes clear that Ankara’s revisionist policy in the geographical region that concerns Greece, Cyprus, Near East and part of the Classical Middle East, has bogged down due to the military and political vigilance of Athens, Nicosia, Jerusalem and Cairo, which constitute the stable political pillar of politico-military alliances with the aim of a safe south-eastern Mediterranean and the progress and well-being of its peoples. This has been noticed and is gradually being assimilated by the governments of the EU countries, and consequently Berlin, which now draw up policies and take diplomatic positions taking into account all of the above.
Q2 – The Aegean has always been primarily associated with Greece rather than Turkey, both in tourism and on the cultural-historical side. However, Ankara has obtained at the European Intellectual Property Office the registration of the “TurkAegean” brand, which Turkey is using to promote tourism in the coasts bordering the Aegean Sea. Given the sharp Greek-Turkish confrontation in the Aegean, in your opinion, why was this registration granted without considering the possible implications? What has been the reaction of Greece?
A2 – The TurkAegean case is a case of political propaganda to avoid. One can easily see that the Turkish leaders “shot themselves in the foot” with TurkAegean. The Turkish “own goal”, starting from the Greek word Aegean, is evident from the posting of the advertising/propaganda map that accompanies the whole project. The potential tourist and/or commercial representative will be invited to look at the geographical map of the Aegean Sea, which highlights only the coasts of Asia Minor, as the tourist and commercial destination of TurkAegaen (sovereignty 7.5%), while at the same time advertising Greece as the country to which almost the entire rest of the Aegean Sea belongs (sovereignty 45.5%), since the remaining 47% is international waters, but with continuous geographical development (holes on the map) with the parts of Greek sovereignty of the Aegean Sea!
Regarding the developments, the trademark was accepted by only one Spanish office and not all of the EU offices. Nevertheless, Greece is resorting to a legal appeal within the EU, with the aim of abolishing it. Nevertheless, Greece is resorting to a legal appeal within the EU, with the aim of abolishing it. The whole episode confirms that “the Aegean Sea has always been primarily associated with Greece”, as you very correctly mention in your question.
Q3 – At the last NATO summit in Madrid, Erdogan, for his consent to the accession of Sweden and Finland, has obtained the lifting of the arms embargo on Turkey and the end of the traditional Scandinavian protection of human rights in favor of the Turkish and Kurdish opposition. Greece during the summit seems to have been silent and acquiescent to the demands made by Turkey. Why?
A3 – The issue of Turkey’s refusal to sign the accession of Sweden and Finland to the NATO alliance, immediately evolved from an internal issue of the alliance to a matter of tripartite negotiations between the 3 countries. This is the reason why Greece did not intervene diplomatically. Otherwise, the situation would be further complicated, risking becoming part of the problem itself. On the contrary, the “Eastern bazaar” was unfolded to its full extent by Turkey, reminding of its socio-political culture and the priorities it has in its foreign policy, even though it is a member of NATO alliance with fixed ideological principles and political positions, which it systematically defies.
Ioannis P. Sotiropoulos, Ph.D., Director of the Sector of Geopolitics of the Cold War, Laboratory for Geopolitical Analysis, Department of Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies, NKUA