By Fawad Khan Afridi

    The latest crisis between India and Pakistan has confirmed a new normal in South Asia’s strategic landscape, which includes faster military action, more serious nuclear threats, and disregard for efforts to reduce mistrust.

    As a response to the killing of  26 tourists in Pahalgam, India launched Operation Sindoor, with missile and air strikes against alleged terrorist bases along the line of control with Pakistan.

    Narendra Modi said that during Operation Sindoor, Pakistan begged for a ceasefire, indicating that there is no end to the ongoing fight against terrorist activities. In addition, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh emphasized the Indian Navy’s growing involvement in stopping any Pakistani aggression.

    As part of Operation Sindoor, India demonstrated its naval reach by deploying aircraft carriers and submarines beyond the Himalayas, a shift in its defense doctrine. This means that India’s ability to deter Pakistan has expanded to include threats to Pakistani sea lanes, thus extending potential combat areas beyond Kashmir.

    All these moves go hand in hand with a rethinking of India’s nuclear strategy. Although India formally declares that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, its official statements now seem less clear on its nuclear doctrine. The decision to suspend the Indus Water Treaty and the Shimla Agreement in Sindoor underscores how India has renounced traditional agreements that helped maintain stability between the two countries. 

    Former senior advisor to the Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant General (retired) Vinod Khandare, believes that India is becoming more assertive in defense matters thanks to the strengthening of its air defense and naval capabilities.  This is his blunt comment – “There is no point in going to the UN; a good terrorist is a dead terrorist” – which made it clear that Delhi is targeting terrorists in practice rather than relying on negotiations abroad.

    India’s Directorate General of Military Operations (DGMO) said that Sindoor’s objectives had been achieved without causing significant civilian casualties, while Pakistan disagreed and responded accordingly. In fact, the Pakistani army denied that India had targeted only terrorists, claiming that the attacks killed 31 civilians and destroyed local mosques and schools. Photos released by the  Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the wing of the Pakistani armed forces responsible for media and public relations, were used to support such claims, as part of a broader information war. 

    The Pakistani army stated that any misstep by India in the future would lead to a “total response by the Pakistani armed forces with the support of a determined nation,” claiming that India’s actions were carried out solely to divert public attention from their power struggles.

    On May 10, in response, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyan al-Marsus to strike what it claimed were 26 military targets in India, including air bases and sites where BrahMos missiles were stored. Drones used by Pakistani forces for reconnaissance reportedly invaded Indian airspace as far as New Delhi. Reports of the destruction of the Sirsa and Suratgarh bases were disputed by India, which released images showing only minor damage. Two Pakistani drones were intercepted by India near Udhampur and Amritsar, a clear sign of improved defenses. 

    The constant pattern of attacks, counterattacks, and information warfare is the explicit representation of the new normal. Neither side has renounced the idea of using nuclear weapons, but Prime Minister Modi’s assertion that “it’s not over” suggests that India may be willing to use them differently in a crisis. Many Indian think tanks now favor “countermeasure” options: carrying out air strikes on Pakistani nuclear bases to prevent them from launching nuclear weapons. Even if India maintains its NFU policy, the use of troops and the defense minister’s focus on the navy suggest that it could resort to a combination of traditional and nuclear strategies.

    Current nuclear deterrence programs are expanding. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif promoted Army Chief Asim Munir to field marshal for the success of Operation Bunyan al-Marsus. Pakistani officials say their weapons and drone program is helping to rebalance power with India, which is getting stronger in conventional defense.

    ISPR  has declared that appropriate responses will be given to India’s future “adventures,” suggesting that Pakistan is willing to accept risky options in order  keep India on tenterhooks.

    The impact of this new stance on regional peace is very significant. The possibility of an unintended escalation is higher, as the parties see small air strikes or naval maneuvers as signals of larger attacks. Due to the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty and the Shimla Agreement, there are now fewer guardrails to control tensions. Furthermore, the combination of traditional and nuclear capabilities seen in both the new Indian Navy and Pakistani policies confuses the established rules of deterrence.

    Civil society and small neighboring states are experiencing leaks, monetary uncertainty, and other effects. The narrative of surgical strikes has won over most Indians and helped fuel nationalism. In Pakistan, stories of Bunyan al-Marsus are being used to help shape a narrative of resistance to oppression. Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh are caught in the middle, concerned that a conflict could destabilize the region and trade routes.

    Global reactions have been slow. The US government has urged caution and called for a de-escalation of tensions, but has not been directly involved in mediation efforts. Beijing supports Pakistan’s “legitimate defense,” calling on India to avoid measures that could destabilize the region. Russia has sought to act as a mediator by proposing talks, while remaining largely outside the conflict.

    Even as countries strengthen their defenses, there are still opportunities for diplomatic overtures. The use of messages through secret channels and back-channel discussions could help countries defuse potential conflicts. However, real progress requires recognizing that the ongoing risks are not worth the damage they cause. Reaffirming the commitments of the National Front for Unity or clarifying who is the party leader could encourage renewed trust. Restoring agreements on the Indus River and starting SAARC trade talks would be important signals of an easing of tensions.

    It is not possible for South Asia, with such a large population, to face endless economic crises. As India’s conventional forces and naval actions strengthen its position and help prevent militancy, without focusing on dialogue, tensions could continue without finding a solution. Pakistan is urged to realize that relying heavily on unconventional warfare and nuclear threats will only exacerbate its problems.

    More dialogue, greater trust, and clearly defined military policies are needed to overcome the new normal. At this point, India and Pakistan can only build a more lasting peace by giving greater weight to diplomacy. For now, maintaining the new normal is a delicate balancing act: a mix of talks, drones, and nuclear preparations could plunge the region into a conflict from which it would be very difficult to escape.

    Author: Fawad Khan Afridi– MPhil student at the National Defense University, Islamabad, Pakistan. 

    (The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).

     

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