World Geostrategic Insights interview with Randa Kassis on the current situation in Syria and future prospects, the position of European chancelleries and institutions towards the jihadist-led government, and her vision and commitment to a secular and pluralistic Syria.
Randa Kassis is a Syrian politician, writer, and a secular figure in the Syrian opposition. She founded the Movement for a Pluralistic Society and the Astana Platform, and previously served on the Syrian National Council. She has participated in key peace efforts such as the Geneva Talks. Kassis is also the author of the Crypt of the God, Le Chaos Syrien, and others.
Q1 – Several months after the fall of Assad’s regime, Syria still seems to be grappling with lawlessness, fragmentation, worsening sectarian divisions, widespread insecurity, violence against religious minorities such as Alawites and Druze,and economic paralysis. How do you assess the current situation in Syria?
A1 – Several months after the fall of Assad’s regime, Syria continues to face severe instability. For the first time, we are witnessing a jihadist at the head of a state, openly welcomed by a European leader such as President Macron. This alarming legitimisation ignores the fact that, in 2015, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—leader of al-Nusra—praised the Paris attacks as a successful operation against the kuffar, regretting only that his group had not been behind them.
Even more disturbing is that Jolani’s organisation, HTS, has been linked to the terrorist who beheaded Samuel Paty. Yet this very group is now being recast as a political partner. Meanwhile, massacres against Alawites and Druze have increased, creating an atmosphere of terror and persecution for these communities.
Security remains elusive. The rule of law has disintegrated in many areas, replaced by militias, criminal gangs, and jihadist factions operating with impunity. Human rights abuses are rampant, and civilians are left defenceless in the face of this unchecked violence.
The economic situation is equally dire. Most public employees have not received their salaries for months, and a large number of Alawites have been dismissed from their posts, fuelling resentment and further polarisation. Electricity remains a major crisis throughout the country, despite earlier promises from Qatar to offer support—promises that have amounted to little in practice.
In a striking echo of Assad’s tactics, Jolani now presents himself as the only bulwark against “worse jihadists”, recycling the old narrative of “me or chaos”. This dangerous rhetoric risks replacing one form of tyranny with another, while the Syrian people continue to suffer under new masks of oppression.
Q2 – More specifically, how would you explain the current tensions between the Syrian government and the Druze communities, which are negotiating their integration into the Syrian state while seeking a degree of autonomy?
A1 – None of Syria’s communities can trust a jihadist-led government—especially while we continue to witness the ongoing killing and humiliation of minorities by Syrian and foreign fighters linked to Jolani’s security forces. These are not isolated acts of violence. Even if Jolani tries to deny responsibility, as the head of a de facto state, he is ultimately accountable for the actions of his intemilitias, whether Syrian or foreign.
Just two days ago, he appointed Abu Hatem Shaqra, a former Daesh member, as commander of the 86th Division—the same man responsible for the murder of politician Hevrin Khalaf and others. This decision clearly shows that extremist ideology remains at the core of this so-called government.
And most importantly, we have all seen what happened to the Alawite community after they surrendered their weapons: they were killed, massacred, and marginalised. That memory serves as a stark warning to all other communities. No one can trust, cooperate with, or disarm under such a regime built on intimidation, sectarianism, and impunity.
The only viable path forward is the establishment of a federal state—one that guarantees local autonomy while fostering economic links between regions. Only shared interests and our common history can bring Syrians together under the banner of federalism, not fear
Q3 – Abu Muhammad Al-Jolani, leader of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, a jihadist group that played an important role in Assad’s overthrow, is head of the Syrian transitional government. Al-Jolani, who has also been involved with al-Qaeda in the past, is now using his civilian name Ahmed Al-Sharaa in an attempt to reshape his international image as a respectable politician. What is your opinion on a hardened jihadist becoming president of Syria?
A3 – The idea of a hardened jihadist like Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—now calling himself Ahmed al-Sharaa—becoming the self-proclaimed president of Syria is both alarming and unacceptable. Jolani, with a long history of involvement with al-Qaeda and now head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, cannot simply reinvent himself by adopting a civilian name and expect the world to forget his past.
Wearing a tie does not make him a moderate, let alone a centrist politician. Let’s be clear: he is not a politician. He is a jihadist who seized power through a military coup, and he remains the same man. Nothing fundamental about him has changed—least of all his mindset—because the environment around him has not changed. He is still surrounded by the worst of jihadists and terrorists, and it is within that same ecosystem that he continues to operate.
This superficial transformation is a deliberate attempt to deceive international actors and gain legitimacy. But no amount of rebranding can erase the fact that Jolani represents the continuation of extremist rule under a new name.
Q4 – Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has established a transitional government composed of 23 ministers from different backgrounds, partly in response to international pressure for greater representation in the government of Syria’s various ethnic and religious communities, women, and civil society. What is your opinion on the effectiveness and composition of the current Syrian government? Does it truly promote inclusivity?
A4 – Jolani has retained control over the key regalian ministries—defence, interior, justice, and foreign affairs—ensuring that real power remains tightly concentrated in his hands and among loyalists. The so-called inclusivity of his transitional government is nothing more than a performance for international observers.
He appointed one Christian woman—the only woman in the entire cabinet—as Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, a portfolio with limited influence. She has no real power, no capacity to effect meaningful change. He also named one Alawite, one Druze, and one Kurd, yet this token representation is deeply misleading. The second most powerful figure in the government is Jolani’s own brother, while the foreign minister, Shibani, is a known loyalist. Many other posts are filled by HTS members, confirming that the structure is designed to preserve internal control, not foster inclusion.
Nomination of a single woman and three members of minority communities does not make this government inclusive. It’s a superficial gesture, not a shift in governance. In fact, Jolani appears to be copying Bashar al-Assad in both style and substance—centralising power, relying on security networks, and using the illusion of diversity to mask authoritarian continuity.
This is not a transition. It is a rebranding of tyranny.
Q5 – What is your opinion on the position of European chancelleries and institutions that seem to have legitimized the new Syrian government? Should Joulani’s past be ignored for the sake of supposed stability in Syria and a change in its relations with Iran and Russia?
A5 – The position of certain European chancelleries and institutions in extending implicit or explicit legitimacy to the so-called transitional government led by Jolani is not only short-sighted—it is morally and politically bankrupt. By engaging with a man who built his power through jihadist violence, led an al-Qaeda affiliate, and whose forces continue to perpetrate human rights violations, Europe is abandoning its own values under the pretext of “stability”.
Furthermore, let us not be deceived by the name change. Al-Jolani, now presenting himself as Ahmed al-Sharaa, will revert to being al-Jolani the moment he tightens his grip on Syria. The threat he poses is not confined to Syria alone—he represents a broader danger to the entire region and to Europe itself. We need only recall how the Taliban treated women in Afghanistan, despite all their empty promises to the international community. The same pattern of deception is unfolding here.
It is also naïve to believe that Jolani will act as a counterweight to Russia. He lacks both the will and the capacity to challenge Russia’s presence in Syria—he will not demand the withdrawal of Russian troops, nor will he dismantle their military bases. As for blocking Iranian influence, that too is an illusion. Jolani is not a strategic alternative; he is a future liability.
Q6 – You are in contact with President Trump. What do you expect from the current US Presidency with regard to Syria?
A6 – At this moment, President Trump is primarily focused on other crises, particularly Ukraine, and Syria is not a top priority. However, one thing is certain: the current US administration is not sympathetic to jihadist figures. There is no appetite to legitimize a man like Jolani.
No serious high-ranking American officer is going to advocate lifting sanctions while armed groups continue to kill anyone who doesn’t align with their ideological agenda. The ongoing Islamisation of Syria and the continued presence of foreign jihadists in key military positions under Jolani’s command only confirm the true nature of his regime.
Yes, we may well see someone like Macron welcome him—another example of Western blindness disguised as pragmatism. But diplomatic smiles and carefully staged meetings won’t erase Jolani’s past or his present. Only a fool could believe this man represents peace, stability, or legitimate leadership for Syria. Even if some Western countries engage with Jolani through mediation by certain Gulf states, it will not result in any meaningful progress towards lifting sanctions or advancing reconstruction. We have already seen how Arab states, some European governments, and even members of parliament attempted to reintegrate Assad—without any success.
Q7 – How do you see the future of Syria? Is it justified the concern about a possible Islamization of the country? A return to military dictatorship?
A7 – This is no longer a concern about the Islamisation of Syria—it is the Islamisation of Syria. At the centre of it stands Jolani, a jihadist rebranding himself as a statesman while entrenching a regime rooted in ideological extremism. He is not a transitional figure—he is Syria’s next dictator, and worse, a jihadist one.
Jolani is dismantling what remains of Syria’s coexistence and diversity. His rule will not unite the country; it will fracture it further. Every day he stays in power is a step deeper into sectarianism, repression, and irreversible division.
This isn’t a transition—it’s a dangerous transformation. If the world stays silent, Syria’s identity will be lost for good. And no constitution, no summit, no foreign aid will be able to restore it.
Q8 – What is your vision for a secular and pluralistic Syria? How could this be achieved?
A8 – My vision for a secular and pluralistic Syria is built on the foundation of a federal state—or, at the very least, a deeply decentralised system similar to the Spanish model. Syria’s rich religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity cannot survive under renewed centralised rule—especially after decades of authoritarianism and the rise of jihadist control. Federalism or deep decentralisation offers a path to preserve this diversity, rebuild trust, and ensure that all communities have a genuine stake in the country’s future.
This model is not about fragmentation, but about coexistence through autonomy. Each region must be allowed to manage its own cultural, social, and economic affairs, while contributing to a unified national framework—establishing shared economic interests among the regions. All regions must be represented in Damascus, which should remain the capital of all Syrians, not the centre of domination. Real stability will come when governance reflects Syria’s complex realities on the ground—when people feel represented, protected, and free from both ideological domination and centralised repression.
This vision can only be achieved through a gradual, strategic process. It begins by building alliances between regions such as the coast, Suwaida, and Hauran to secure their right to auto-administration. That is precisely what I—and many others—am actively working to achieve. Once this model is successfully implemented in these areas, we will expand step by step, region by region. I am not claiming that we can establish a federal system across the entire Syrian territory overnight. It will take years, careful coordination, and the political will of those committed to a truly inclusive and stable Syria.
Randa Kassis – Syrian politician and writer.
Image Credit: Omar Haj Koudor/AFP